Central Asia is forging fresh alliances to navigate the nuanced relationship between regional giants Russia and China, opening new avenues for engagement with the EU and US. With their geopolitically significant positioning between Russia and China, the Central Asian Republics (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan) frequently tread a delicate balance. China seeks their natural resources, while Russia aims to uphold dominance within the post-Soviet economic, military, and diplomatic spheres.
The
historical tie to the Soviet Union naturally links the republics to Russia.
Many use the Cyrillic alphabet and have integrated Russian vocabulary into
their languages, facilitating wider integration with Russia. Moreover, their
technology, equipment, and military systems are predominantly Russian-based,
bolstering prospects for cooperation. Russian soft power surpasses that of
China or the United States in the region, notably as the favored destination
for study abroad or labor migration. For instance, in Kazakhstan, 78% of
Kazakhs studying abroad choose Russia.
Generally,
the republics harbor distrust towards China, wary of becoming subservient to
Beijing. Simultaneously, they fiercely value their independence and resist
returning to Russian influence. Economically, they lean towards China, while
preferring Russia for security cooperation. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan all participate in China’s Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI), and all except Turkmenistan are part of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO). Among them, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and
Tajikistan belong to the Collective Security Organization (CSO), comprising six
former Soviet states. In 2022, just before the Ukraine invasion, Kazakh
President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev sought military assistance from the CSTO to
quell unrest in Almaty and other cities.
Moscow’s
Long Shadow
The
Russian invasion of Ukraine revealed the republics’ limited trust in Russia, as
they hesitated to endorse the invasion officially. However, their reliance on
Russia restrained them from outright condemnation. Following Western sanctions
on Russia, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, both part of the Eurasian Economic Union
(EAEU), experienced disruptions in ruble payments from Russia for customs
duties. Eventually, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan affirmed Ukraine’s territorial
integrity and provided humanitarian aid to the conflict zone.
The
Central Asian Republics increasingly doubt Russia’s ability to fulfill their
security needs. Regardless of their stance on the Ukraine invasion, it
certainly did not escape their notice that Russia failed to achieve a swift
victory. Moreover, Russia played a negligible role in the 2022 border conflict
between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Additionally, Moscow couldn’t safeguard
Armenian Christians in Nagorno-Karabakh during their expulsion by the
Azerbaijani military in 2023. In response, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol
Pashinyan publicly questioned Russia’s capability to protect Armenian interests
and contemplated withdrawing Armenia from the CSTO. Consequently, Armenia has
been strengthening military ties with the United States.
The CSTO
faces another setback in its sustainability with Georgia, a predominantly
Christian nation, shifting toward Europe, NATO, and the EU. Despite being the
largest army among the republics, Uzbekistan never joined the CSTO. Initially,
Uzbekistan permitted the United States to establish an airbase on its
territory, but pressure from Russia and China led to the withdrawal of
permission. Despite the CSTO’s weakening and Russia’s declining military
influence, the Central Asian republics and other former Soviet states haven’t
sought military partnerships with China. This situation presents an opportunity
for the US to emerge as the security partner of the Central Asian republics,
given the perceived decline in Russian power to a level where Russian objections
could be disregarded.
China
and Other External Players
As
Russian influence declines, China intensifies its engagement with the
republics. Approximately a year after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Beijing
initiated the China-Central Asia Summit (C+C5) to draw Central Asia further
into its sphere. Historically, when both China and Russia were strong, they
preferred to maintain a buffer. However, with Russia’s current weaknesses – its
economy struggling and military resources stretched thin – China is seizing the
opportunity to court the republics. Nevertheless, Russia propagated anti-China
sentiments in the republics during the 1990s, leaving a lasting impact.
Moreover, China’s past efforts to limit the Central Asian Republics’ influence
on its Uyghur minority in Xinjiang linger in memory. Despite China’s recent
outreach efforts, the republics remain wary due to awareness of China’s
reeducation camps and repression of Muslims. Concerns over debt from the Belt
and Road Initiative, unfinished projects, unrealized GDP gains, and compromised
sovereignty regarding foreign policy and engagement with the West act as
significant barriers to closer ties with China.
Turkey
and Iran have historically wielded significant influence in the region. Turkey
tends to be more secular, whereas Iran supports various factions and militant
groups, including Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis, in countries like Syria,
Yemen, and Afghanistan. Although there was a resurgence of Islam and some
fundamentalism in the republics after the Soviet Union’s collapse, the majority
of the population in these nations rejects the presence of the Islamic State or
terrorism. They are determined not to become another Afghanistan.
Amid
concerns about the risks of excessive proximity or dependence on China or
Russia, the Central Asian Republics seek an alternative path. They are
exploring options beyond alignment with either nation. The Organization of
Turkic States, previously known as the Turkic Council or the Cooperation
Council of Turkic Speaking States, serves as an intergovernmental organization
encompassing all Central Asian Republics except one, offering a potential
avenue for collaboration.
The
republics are also turning their attention to the EU and the United States. In
November 2022, the EU inked a Memorandum of Strategic Partnership with
Kazakhstan. During President Trump’s tenure, Central Asia’s view of the United
States saw improvement. Thus, the outcome of the 2024 US elections could
influence future relations. Presently, the US ranks third, trailing behind
Russia and China in most soft power and economic engagement metrics with the
republics. However, both the U.S. and EU share an interest in rare earth
minerals and other resources, while the republics aim to diversify their
markets. Collaborating on rare earth contracts presents an opportunity for
closer cooperation between Western powers and the republics.
The
Organization of Turkic States (OTS) is gaining significance, aiming to enhance
cooperation among Turkic states, which share common historical, linguistic, and
cultural ties. This increased integration poses a challenge to the dominance of
China and Russia. Turkey, traditionally influential in the region, further
asserts its influence through leadership in the OTS. Through the High-Level
Strategic Cooperation Councils, these relationships are expanding across
various domains such as trade, transportation, communications, and development
aid. Additionally, as a NATO member, Turkey has the potential to bolster
relations between the Central Asian republics and the US and Europe. The
combined efforts of the United States and the EU could offer the Central Asian
Republics greater investment and trade opportunities compared to what China
provides, with more favorable terms, lower interest rates, and without
jeopardizing sovereignty or risking absorption into greater China or Russia.
Moreover, the United States can act as the security guarantor, a role the
republics would never entrust to China.