The world is likely to remain vulnerable to terror attacks, given emboldened state sponsors like Iran, fragile states like Afghanistan and opportune targets around elections in Europe and Asia. Weak national governments and porous borders allow terror groups to find safe places to plan, operate and move easily between countries.2023 was an especially deadly year for terror attacks. ISIS has evolved into a network of capable regional affiliates. Iran will likely continue to support terror proxies, despite the risks.
International
terrorism, perpetrated by the likes of al-Qaeda and Islamic State, kept the
world living on a knife’s edge for nearly two decades following the 9/11
attacks. Until recently, public concern about terrorist threats seemed to have
receded. After the defeat of Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) five years
ago, terrorism understandably faded in the minds of many (though not all)
politicians, policymakers and the public.
Hamas’s
devastating assault on Israel in October 2023 and ISIS’s brutal attack on
Moscow in late March 2024 should serve to jolt the international policy
community out of its complacency on the threat of terrorism. It is now clear
that a reevaluation of the risks posed by international terrorism and its
potential impact on global stability is necessary, as violent extremism will
persist and possibly increase.
Hamas’s
wake-up call
Hamas’s
attack on Israel last fall was unexpected even by Israel, a state with one of
the most highly capable intelligence services in the world. The assault also
served as a perfect example of a low-probability, high-consequence terrorist
event, replete with wide-ranging political, economic and security consequences.
Today,
going on six months of war between Israel and Hamas, the Middle East and its
periphery are deeply unsettled. There are serious concerns about a broader
regional conflagration that could involve the United States, Israel, Arab
states, Lebanese Hezbollah, Syria and Iran, further undermining global
stability, which is already challenged by the two-plus-year-old Russo-Ukrainian
war.
For
example, in opposition to Israel’s offensive in Gaza, Yemeni Houthi rebels have
attacked international shipping targets in the Red Sea with Iran-supplied
weapons, drawing American and British military retaliation. As a result,
maritime shipping and insurance rates have skyrocketed and sea-borne supply
chains have been interrupted. Much of the Red Sea’s maritime traffic is now
diverting around Africa’s Cape of Good Hope for safety, vastly increasing
shipping times and cost.
The Gaza
war has also short-circuited the promising diplomatic engagement between Israel
and Saudi Arabia and has chilled the rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and
Iran. International and internal political and social tensions over the
conflict have also risen in many countries outside the Middle East, including
in the United States and Europe.
The
larger point is that a terrorist event – even if localized – can have outsized
political, economic and security repercussions. With this in mind, let us take
a brief tour through the major terror actors that have the capacity to
undermine stability and prosperity – locally, regionally and globally.
Iran as
a state sponsor
Support
from a nation-state is often critical to non-state actors such as terror groups
and insurgent movements. State governments are generally those with the
resources – including funding, weaponry, training and even intelligence – that
can make smaller allies and proxies more effective in advancing their causes
and mutual interests.
Washington
has long considered Iran the foremost state sponsor of terrorism. Through its
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), Tehran trains, equips and advises
several Middle Eastern terrorist and militant organizations, including Hamas
and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (in Gaza and the West Bank), Hezbollah (Lebanon
and Syria), Kata’ib Hezbollah (Iraq) and the Houthis (Yemen). These groups
loosely form Iran’s infamous “axis of resistance.”
Tehran
has worked with the Taliban in Afghanistan to advance its anti-Western agenda,
and its relationship with al-Qaeda has long been murky and troubling. While
sectarianism is an important dynamic in Middle Eastern politics, the Iranian
Shia regime has no problem aligning itself with like-minded Sunni groups that
support its ambitions, such as the Taliban and Hamas.
Due to
its perceived success in using proxy militant groups since 1979, Tehran is
likely to continue supporting terror groups and surrogates that amplify Iran’s
ability to advance and protect its interests and provoke and punish its
enemies.
Islamic
State seeks another caliphate
ISIS
lost all of its territory in Iraq and Syria by spring of 2019, and has lost
four senior leaders since then to counterterror operations. Yet while Islamic
State is bloodied, it is not necessarily bowed. The allure of an “idyllic”
Islamic caliphate – which it fundamentally achieved for a three-year period –
still motivates supporters.
Some
10,000 ISIS fighters and 50,000 associated others (including the family members
of fighters) are currently jailed or held in camps in Syria. Many of their
countries of origin refuse to repatriate them due to concerns that they include
ISIS sympathizers who will radicalize and recruit others to their cause,
bringing radicalism and violence back home.
A large
breakout from a prison or camp – something that has been tried before – could
catalyze a revitalization of what was once the world’s largest and richest
“terrorist army,” a force that took and held territory in two sovereign states
for a few years.
Even
now, ISIS is still operationally active, especially through its affiliates
beyond Iraq and Syria. ISIS has terror branches, networks and cells in
Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, the Philippines and Yemen, as well as in African
countries like Egypt, Libya, Nigeria, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of
Congo, Mali and Mozambique.
Until
lately, the success of ISIS’s African affiliates had led some to conclude that
the continent was the global epicenter of the Islamic jihadist movement.
Indeed, Africa’s Sahel region has been a particular hotspot, afflicted by the
presence of both ISIS and al-Qaeda elements.
But
recent high-profile international attacks by Afghanistan-based ISIS-Khorasan
(ISIS-K) have raised its visibility markedly. ISIS-K claimed responsibility for
the January bombings at a memorial for IRGC general Qassim Suleimani in Iran,
which killed nearly 100 people. It also perpetrated the recent deadly shooting
attacks in Moscow that killed over 130 people. And, in August 2021, ISIS-K
launched a dramatic attack on the Kabul airport during the U.S. withdrawal,
killing both civilians and American forces.
ISIS-K
operatives have also reportedly been involved in other unsuccessful terror
plots in Russia, Germany and Sweden; France and Italy have raised their
security levels. It is clear that this group has objectives – and reach –
beyond Afghanistan.
Will the
Taliban provide a safe haven?
With the
Taliban now the presiding government of Afghanistan, there is worry among
policymakers and observers that the South Asian country will once again become
a safe harbor for international jihadists, as it was before the 9/11 attacks.
The fact
that al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri was killed in Kabul in 2022 indicates
ongoing Taliban ties to the terror group. Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent
(AQIS) also operates out of Afghanistan to advance its agenda across South
Asia, including against Pakistan and India.
The
Taliban does not rule Afghanistan unopposed. ISIS-K is a major challenger for
power, and the Taliban does not have the ability or capacity to end the
insurgency. ISIS-K has undertaken several high-profile attacks inside
Afghanistan, undermining confidence in Taliban governance and the group’s
ability to provide safety and security.
Meanwhile,
Pakistan is one of the most terror-afflicted countries in the world, with
nearly 1,500 fatalities in 2023, and is home to at least 15 reported terrorist
groups. The most powerful among them is the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), an
ally of both the Afghan Taliban and al-Qaeda that seeks to overthrow the
(nuclear-armed) Pakistani government.
The
resilient al-Qaeda
Perhaps
the most infamous name in modern terrorism, al-Qaeda is now seemingly a shadow
of its 9/11 self. The death of its leader, Zawahiri, has left al-Qaeda Core,
the central part of the organization, without a high-profile helmsman to
recruit, radicalize or propagandize.
That
said, the group is resilient. There is little debate that it is still
interested in reinvigorating itself to advance its Islamist agenda and to
compete with Islamic State for funding, foot soldiers and fame. Although the
global threat posed by al-Qaeda is not what it was in the early days after
9/11, it still maintains significant affiliates around the world to advance its
Islamist, anti-Western goals and its dream of creating a caliphate.
Take
East Africa’s al-Shabaab, which the U.S. State Department calls “one of
al-Qaeda’s most dangerous affiliates,” responsible for killing “thousands of
people, including Americans, in Somalia and across East Africa.” Besides its
destabilizing of East Africa, U.S. policymakers are concerned about al-Shabaab
sponsoring terror attacks on American soil. Other al-Qaeda partners can be
found in the Middle East, South Asia, the Levant, the Maghreb, the Sahel and
the Arabian Peninsula.
Scenarios
Less
likely: The threat of terrorism decreases
It is
conceivable that the grievances that terrorists say drive their hostility could
be addressed at several levels, and that the use of terrorism as a tool to
coerce government policies through violence against innocents will diminish.
Peace,
based on political agreements between warring parties, could take hold in
regions afflicted by terrorism and insurgencies, reducing the perceived need
for the use of force against the government and the populace. A decreased
appetite for the brutality of terrorism among the public in afflicted areas
could also help starve terror groups of the supporters, soldiers, money and
freedom needed to operate.
Persistent
pressure from counterterror operations involving international cooperation, law
enforcement, intelligence, military, financial and informational means would
limit the opportunities for terror groups to survive and thrive.
However,
these means of reducing the threat of international terrorism are unlikely to
succeed – owing to current conflicts, ongoing political differences, the
effectiveness of terrorism in highlighting causes and inflicting fear, and
governmental capacity being overstretched by conflicts and great power
competition.
More
likely: The threat of terrorism increases
While
global terrorist threats overall have arguably diminished in the public mind in
recent years, terrorism is either aflame or smoldering in various parts of the
world. With political and sectarian tensions elevated, especially in the Middle
East, violent extremism could spread quickly, as evidenced by recent plots and
attacks.
Iran
will almost certainly continue to support its terrorist proxies to advance its
anti-American, anti-Israeli, anti-Western agenda. While Tehran tries to
maintain some degree of plausible deniability for its actions, its support of
terror proxies is a double-edged sword that could bring unintended
consequences. Some have called for direct Western attacks on Iran due to its
support of militant groups like Hamas, the Houthis and Kata’ib Hezbollah. Such
an approach could lead to a wider conflagration in the Middle East, with
broader consequences for global economic and political stability.
Weak
national governments and porous borders are also troubling, as they allow
terror groups to find safe places to plan, train, operate and move easily
between countries. As mentioned earlier, Afghanistan is an area of particular
concern in this respect, following the withdrawal of the Western coalition
forces that maintained pressure on terror groups, including those with
international ambitions and reach.
Technological
changes could also empower terror groups, especially in areas like drones.
Small, inexpensive, armed first-person-view drones are having significant
effects on the battlefield in Ukraine and beyond. Artificial intelligence,
including the use of deepfakes, may be used for nefarious purposes – serving
alongside social media as a force multiplier for extremists, for the purposes
of radicalization, recruitment and retention.
With a
large number of elections being held worldwide this year, including in the
United States, India, Indonesia and across Europe, the chances of related
terrorist violence are significant. More than 50 attacks took place during
Pakistan’s recent elections.
The
summer Olympics will also be staged in Paris this year and could provide an
opportunity for an attack at a crowded, high-visibility venue that would draw
worldwide attention. Mass casualty strikes at symbolic sites are attractive to
terror groups seeking global media attention to promote their extremist causes.
While
the specific threats have changed over the last five years since the fall of
ISIS’s caliphate, the menace of international terrorism will remain with us and
could worsen. Terrorist acts can be perpetrated with limited resources and
minimal costs and yet achieve significant results. Unfortunately, violent
extremists have recently demonstrated a continued desire and ability to project
power internationally.
The
success of recent attacks will only embolden and encourage terror groups. As
such, for the short term, terror groups will likely continue to use violence to
destabilize governments, interrupt peace efforts, highlight incendiary causes,
recruit soldiers and supporters and secure bases of operation.
https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/threat-global-terrorism/
***Dr.
Peter Brookes is a veteran national security policymaker and analyst. He has
served as a deputy assistant secretary of defense, Capitol Hill staffer, CIA
officer, State Department officer and naval officer. Dr. Brookes also served as
commissioner with the congressional United States-China Economic and Security
Review Commission and worked as a think tank analyst and foreign policy
columnist for the New York Post and Boston Herald. He is a graduate of the U.S.
Naval Academy (BS), Johns Hopkins (MA), Georgetown (Doctorate), Defense
Language Institute (Russian) and the Naval War College (Diploma).