The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam launched an airstrike against the main Sri Lankan air force (SLAF) base, Katunayake, near the capital of Colombo, on March 26. The attack was more of a nuisance raid than a tactical strike. The airstrike's psychological repercussions and implications for the escalating conflict between the government and the Tigers will outweigh its military effects.

The Sri Lankan Defense Ministry said three bombs were dropped from the Tigers' aircraft just before 1 a.m. local time. The small bombs -- one of which failed to detonate -- landed near the SLAF Aeronautical Engineering Wing, killing three people and injuring 16. The raid's apparent target was the SLAF fleet of MiG-27 and Kfir fighter-bombers based at Katunayake. None of these aircraft were harmed, the ministry said, though other sources reported that two helicopters were damaged.

The Tigers have shown an active interest in air operations; they reportedly have maintained an airstrip near Kilinochchi, in Sri Lanka's Wanni district, and their air wing -- Vaanpuligal -- has been in development since the late 1990s. Aside from a reported attack against the government-held town of Jaffna in August 2006, the March 26 airstrike was the Tigers' first use of ground-attack aircraft. The Katunayake strike demonstrated that the Tigers can stage conventional air attacks, rather than just suicide air attacks as previously thought. The Tigers also demonstrated the ability to modify civilian aircraft for strikes and that they can navigate, bomb and return to base at night.

The number and types of aircraft the Tiger air wing operates is unknown, but it reportedly has at least one Czech-made Zlin Z-143 light plane, and possibly a Swiss-made trainer plane and a few helicopters. The Z-143 can take off and land in less than 1,000 feet, making operations from a crude jungle airstrip easy. It can carry more than 176 pounds in cargo, along with two pilots and two passengers; without the passengers, the plane's payload is more than 500 pounds.

Because Katunayake air base and Sri Lanka's Bandaranaike International Airport share a location, the airstrike has raised concerns about threats to the country's economy. The strike was directed specifically at the military side of Bandaranaike, as the Tigers wanted to destroy SLAF combat aircraft on the ground. Nevertheless, the airport was closed following the attack, with flights diverted to airports in India, but reopened a few hours later. After the attack, Hong Kong-based Cathay Pacific Airlines canceled its flights to Colombo International Airport, stranding more than 100 passengers in Sri Lanka. Also, the Australian Foreign Affairs Department issued a warning against traveling to Sri Lanka after the strike.

The Tigers said the airstrike was meant as retaliation for the wave of bombing raids the SLAF has conducted against targets in Tiger-held areas of the country. To this end, the strike was completely ineffective. SLAF operations were only slightly disrupted and resumed hours later in the Tiger-held northern part of the Wanni district, possibly targeting the Tigers' airstrip. Any SLAF strikes are likely to prompt the Tigers to retaliate with more airstrikes of their own, or suicide attacks against targets in Colombo.

Because it has been the most effective tool against them, the Tigers would love to counter the SLAF. Attempts to acquire more conventional means to do it, such as man-portable air defense systems from connections overseas, have not yet come to fruition. Though it would take many successful raids to mitigate the government air threat, the airstrike did give the Tigers a propaganda victory, and likely lifted their morale.

The Tigers promised more air attacks, but they could find it difficult to penetrate Sri Lankan air defenses a second time. In July 2001, three squads of Tiger suicide bombers attacked the airport, destroying or damaging dozens of military and commercial aircraft. Sri Lankan defenses shifted to account for that threat -- just as they are likely to do in order to adapt to this new threat. Within hours of the attack, the Sri Lankans launched an investigation to determine why their air defenses failed to respond to the hostile aircraft.

The bombing might not have been a big military success, but it will have wider repercussions on the war. For one thing, Colombo is likely to use the airstrike to strengthen its bid to acquire more capable weapons systems from abroad. Other governments' willingness to get drawn into the conflict by supplying arms to Sri Lanka remains to be seen.

Furthermore, with the Katunayake strike, the Tigers demonstrated they can inflict sensational, if not effective, blows against the government and cast doubt on the SLAF's ability to protect itself and Sri Lanka's main international airport.

The SLAF will have to respond to the ding to its image, and to the attack. As the SLAF tries to destroy the Tiger air wing, its airstrikes will bring about more retaliations from the Tigers.