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14/04/2007 | Second Quarter Forecast 2007: The Maneuvering Before the Storm - Part II

Stratfor Staff

East Asia: Continuing to Look Inward

 

Stratfor's annual forecast noted that 2007 would be a year for East Asia to look inward, focusing on domestic and regional issues -- with the regional rivalry between China and Japan growing prominent as the year played out. In the first quarter, this trend manifested itself in several ways.

The region's central governments continued to grow more powerful, especially in China, where Beijing tightened control over regional and local governments. The latest Communist Party secretary appointments undoubtedly strengthened Chinese President Hu Jintao's hold over the provincial and city leadership while consolidating Beijing's economic rule. Thailand's military regime also started planning to permanently reinsert itself into the country's political landscape. Regional geopolitical insecurity drove Beijing to undertake its January anti-satellite missile test, which was intended to warn the United States that although China said it would not "undertake military adventures in 2007," it also would not sit idly by should Taiwan attempt to push for formal independence on the eve of the 2008 Olympics.

Mirroring China, Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian continued to push for independence in an effort to prevent Taiwan from becoming irrelevant within the region. Unexpected financial turbulence shook global markets when the Shanghai stock market dipped in March, sending ripples around the world. Fundamentals changed little afterward, however, as the ripples did not stem from any real change in China's economic structure; psychologically, though, China's capacity for global financial effects is in a new spotlight.

Domestic political consolidation and constitutional change are still the key domestic policy drivers in Japan and South Korea. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is continuing to push for change for Japan's Constitution and defense structure, such as elevating the Defense Agency to a ministry and expanding defense cooperation with Australia. South Korea's ruling minority Uri Party split from President Roh Moo Hyun to clean house and select its presidential candidate, freeing up Roh to push through changes to the country's fundamentally diseased constitutional structure.

As we head into the second quarter, two dominant themes will drive events in East Asia: countries' introspection as they are consumed by internal elections and politicking, and intraregional nuclear discussions and economic interactions. Other possible factors are the emergence of a new trilateral Japanese-Australian-U.S. security arrangement and success for Taiwan's Chen in his efforts to provoke China. Probabilities for the former are nearly certain, and those for the latter are unknown.

Thailand is due for a new draft constitution April 19, which likely will enshrine the military's role in government, though not by including a clause for an "unelected prime minister" as previously suggested by the military chief. This will more likely happen via more subtle clauses designed to insert military representation throughout the central and provincial government departments. If the opposition uses this draft to generate a massive groundswell of anti-military sentiment, the regime's ability to retain control with minimal violence will be tested. The regime will continue to enhance its skills in balancing the country's different factions. The usual cycle of violence in the south will continue.

This quarter will see more Chinese political reshuffling to smooth the path for the country's fifth generation of leaders -- a process to be completed by 2012. Hu will move more of his chosen successors into place for final training before promotion to the Politburo, which likely will occur at the Party Congress this fall. Shanghai will be used as a new training ground for Hu protege Xi Jinping -- who recently was promoted to become the city's party secretary -- and also as a regional showcase of what local governments must do to avoid a crackdown. More responsibility for economic reforms will be shifted to private and foreign investors, with industries previously considered "too strategic" (such as oil and health care) being released from the state's iron grip. The new foreign exchange investment company could be established this quarter in order to kickstart an outward flow of renminbi-denominated investment funds. China needs to continue pushing investors to send their appreciating local currencies overseas in order to rein in an excess supply of money inside the country -- a root cause of the economy's imbalanced growth.

The first stage of the six-party nuclear deal is set for completion April 14, when North Korea closes its Yongbyon reactor. Each party will use minor reasons to delay progress in order to pursue its own agenda, but progress should still continue, with or without directly addressing North Korea's existing nuclear weapons.

This quarter kicked off with a successful conclusion to the South Korean-U.S. free trade agreement (FTA) talks. A flurry of intraregional interactions now will descend upon East Asia, with South Korea likely to speed up efforts to make similar agreements with the European Union, Gulf Cooperation Council states and China. Another deal worth watching is the Australian-Japanese FTA talks starting April 23, which could shed more light on the new regional trilateral security arrangement. For the rest of East Asia, FTAs and economics will be the main channel through which bargaining chips are dealt and exchanged in return for progression on other economic and political issues. Talk of a regional FTA might even resurface.

The structure of East Asia's new trilateral security arrangement will emerge, as the lines of military cooperation and interdependencies between Japan, Australia and the United States gradually take shape. China and Japan will continue a flow of positive diplomatic rhetoric and superficial actions, but remain fundamentally distrustful of each other. China will try to use its economic leverage with Australia to influence or gain additional insights into the new arrangement being established in its backyard. While still preoccupied in the Middle East, the United States will not explicitly target China, but the new security arrangement is intended to indicate where Washington's attention will next settle.

Taiwan's Chen already has swapped out his country's representative to the United States and convinced the Democratic Progressive Party to propose the formal abandonment of the "Five Nos" policy. Although he is constrained in his push for constitutional change, Chen's ultimate goal is to reshape both the domestic and international perceptions of Taiwan. With Beijing preparing to host the 2008 Olympics, Chen sees this as his opportunity to rile China with his "provocative" comments and acts. Either he will prod China into lashing out -- thus proving his point that China is the real threat to regional security -- or China will simply ignore Chen's actions, giving him proof for the Taiwanese people that Beijing's threats are hollow and that Taiwan should formally pursue its own national identity and independence. Either way, Taiwan will become a key driver of regional security attention and arrangements.

Sub-Saharan Africa: Power Transfers and Ongoing Violence

Stratfor's 2007 annual forecast for sub-Saharan Africa is on track thus far. Outside powers, led by Russia and China, have sought deals for Africa's resources, including oil, natural gas and mineral concessions. The United States remains engaged with Africa largely in terms of terrorism and security issues, particularly in the Horn of Africa. U.S. concerns contributed to the move to create an Africa Command, a theater military command that will unite U.S. Defense Department responsibilities in Africa. Powers within Africa continued defending their core interests, despite international attention aimed at settling conflicts -- another call we correctly made. The conflict in Sudan's Darfur region remains unresolved, and the Sudanese government remains steadfast in its opposition to U.N. peacekeeping force intervention. Ethiopia continues its intervention to defeat militant Islamist holdouts in Somalia, where conflict rages among the Ethiopians, Islamists and warlords.

Violence in Nigeria's Niger Delta region intensified during the first quarter -- which we had forecast -- as militant groups, their political patrons and government forces maneuvered ahead of upcoming national elections. January and February were the most violent months in terms of numbers of kidnappings of expatriate oil workers since the militant group Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) launched its campaign in December 2005.

Competing factions within South Africa's ruling African National Congress (ANC) party ramped up their struggle over the party's -- and by extension, the country's -- future. President Thabo Mbeki sought to strengthen his alliances with ANC party structures, while rival and former Deputy President Jacob Zuma began garnering political support among the country's trade unions, the Communist Party and the impoverished majority. The first quarter saw the South African government expropriate its first privately owned farm -- the kind of populist move Mbeki must employ more in order to defeat Zuma in the ANC primary in December.

As forecast, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) President Joseph Kabila devoted scant attention to the simmering conflict in the country's east, focusing instead on containing the threat posed in Kinshasa by leading political opposition figure Jean-Pierre Bemba. Kabila disarmed Bemba's private militia and effectively exiled the former warlord, removing the last impediment to his consolidation of control over DRC politics and ability to sell mining concessions.

Similarly, Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe faced down intense pressure from his own citizens and from within his ruling party; while Zimbabwe's political opposition and civil society demanded a change in government, the graver threat to Mugabe's grip on power came from competing factions of the ruling party that challenged Mugabe's authority. In Cote d'Ivoire, President Laurent Gbagbo moved a new prime minister into office as a part of a peace deal signed with the rebel group New Forces -- a deal that effectively split his political opposition while removing the militant threat to his unpopular and exclusionary rule.

One country that completed its internal consolidation of geopolitical control is Angola, the wild card in our 2007 forecast. Luanda has become more aggressive internationally and is beginning to drive increasingly hard bargains for its oil and minerals concessions, as forecast. Angola has used access to Chinese loans -- used to rebuild war-shattered infrastructure and exploit onshore and offshore oil fields -- to offset Western and multilateral institutional financing in order to avoid the strings attached to monies from such groups. No longer facing internal threats to its control, Luanda has become more interested in asserting itself in central Africa and challenging South Africa's historic hegemony in the southern African region.

The second quarter of 2007 will see complicated power transfers begin in several prominent African countries. Nigeria's national elections will dominate the early part of the second quarter. The country's presidential election is slated for April 21, and will be Nigeria's first transition from one civilian leader to another. Violence and disruptions of political events will become more extreme and more frequent as the ruling party and the opposition groups try to stifle the competition. Vice President Atiku Abubakar will continue, though unsuccessfully, to fight his disqualification to run in the election. Opposition parties will fail to unite in order to unseat the ruling People's Democratic Party (PDP), as the parties' presidential candidates will be unwilling to concede to one another. President Olusegun Obasanjo turned down the legal chance to stay in power longer after Alliance for Democracy presidential candidate Adebayo Adefarati died March 29. Thus, Obasanjo will broker no further efforts to challenge Umaru Yaradua and Goodluck Jonathan, the respective presidential and vice presidential candidates of the PDP, in the April elections. Yaradua is the favorite to win.

Violence in the country's Niger Delta region will increase as elections draw closer. Competing political parties and competing factions within those parties will help militants to either disrupt opposition support or push the Delta toward further chaos in order to paint the ruling PDP party and officials as weak on security. The government, which has recently launched crackdowns in the Delta, will continue increasing security operations there, leading to more skirmishes and more deaths. The ideologically motivated MEND's activities will take a backseat to other groups' politically motivated violence as the elections draw closer; but whatever the motivation, attacks and kidnapping operations against foreigners and oil infrastructure will continue unabated.

In South Africa, presidential successor infighting will dominate the ruling ANC party's activities. The ANC will hold its National General Council in June, at which it will heatedly discuss organizational and political issues facing the party as it struggles to determine who will succeed Mbeki as party and state president. Mbeki will adopt more populist economic policies during the run-up to the party's December elections in order to deflect criticism from Zuma's supporters, who say the Mbeki government has not done enough for South Africa's impoverished majority. Meanwhile, other figures such as Finance Minister Trevor Manuel will seek to position themselves for the ANC leadership position as the Mbeki faction of the ANC seeks to sideline Zuma. Externally, South Africa will attempt to be more involved in mediating the deteriorating political and economic situation in Zimbabwe, though the Mbeki government will be hard-pressed to apply anything more than quiet diplomatic efforts to the Zimbabwe crisis.

Domestic and international pressure on the Mugabe government in Zimbabwe will continue to mount during the second quarter. Mugabe and the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) will become increasingly defiant and draconian in their methods to silence and marginalize the political and popular opposition. The ruling party will see serious internal fractures as presidential aspirants -- including former army commander Solomon Mujuru; his wife, Zimbabwean Second Vice President Joyce Mujuru; and Emmerson Mnangagwa, the former Central Intelligence Organization chief and rural housing minister -- maneuver to succeed Mugabe. Despite being 83 years old, Mugabe will announce his desire for another term in office. He will rely on presidential guard units and youth militia to enforce his hold on the opposition and handle threats from his increasingly daring rivals in the ZANU-PF. Mugabe is likely to grow more antagonistic toward foreign media and foreign diplomatic missions, which he sees as colonial influences intent on toppling his regime and reversing his liberation-struggle gains. Zimbabwe will reach out to other liberation-era states in Africa and peripheral powers such as China in an effort to avoid international isolation and mitigate international criticism.

In Cote d'Ivoire, Gbagbo will do his best to thwart the most critical reforms promised in the recently signed peace agreement between the government and the rebel group New Forces. Though he appointed rebel commander Guillaume Soro as prime minister, Gbagbo will integrate the rebel fighters into the national army in order to disperse these former combatants and keep them from posing a consolidated security threat. The plan for issuing national identification cards to northern Ivorians and registering them will be delayed, for these two controversial issues would likely spell the end of Gbagbo's rule. Meanwhile, opposition figures, including former President Henri Konan Bedie and former Prime Minister Alassane Ouattara, will struggle to find places in the government -- especially Ouattara, who was ousted as the protector of northerners' interests when Soro was named prime minister. But Gbagbo will continue to sideline them.

Violence will intensify in Mogadishu as competing factions struggle to either enforce their control or eject their enemies. Under fire, Somalian President Abdullahi Yusuf's government will reiterate calls for greater security assistance from the African Union (AU) and the international community. The remnants of the Supreme Islamic Courts Council, reconfigured into the Popular Resistance Movement for the Land of the Two Migrations, will intently fight Yusuf's government. The Islamists will find natural allies among Somalia's leading Hawiye clan, whose members believe that Yusuf, a member of the rival Darood clan, is actively discriminating against them. The AU will struggle to obtain the funding and support it needs to keep any effective peace in Mogadishu in place and will suffer increasing casualties as its troops -- much like the Ethiopian troops in Somalia -- are seen as occupiers. A national reconciliation conference will begin in April, though Yusuf's demands that the conference include religious and clan leaders acting in individual capacities and exclude moderate Islamists will ensure that any successful reconciliation is a distant possibility at best. Yusuf will fail to impose a government in Somalia that transcends clan rivalries, and inter-clan violence and tensions will continue unabated. Ethiopia will be forced to continue its intervention in Somalia, despite its desire to reduce its footprint in the country, as no other security force -- including that of the AU -- will be capable of guaranteeing Yusuf's security.

The Sudanese government will continue to face international condemnation and pressure to resolve the ongoing conflict in its Darfur region. President Omar al Bashir remains steadfastly opposed to any U.N. peacekeeping force intervention, since such a force would curtail his government's ability to strike at the Darfur rebels intent on fighting for greater autonomy. The ruling regime will tolerate a hybrid peacekeeping force under the African Union's aegis, though such a hybrid force of 7,000 troops would be hard-pressed to improve security in the 200,000-square-mile area of Darfur.

South Asia: Domestic Issues, the Taliban and Musharraf's Struggle

The annual forecast for 2007 emphasized that Pakistani politics would be the most significant driver in South Asia, as Pakistani President Gen. Pervez Musharraf's political standing would carry implications for the U.S.-led campaign against al Qaeda and Taliban forces in the region. This issue will remain dominant in the region in the second quarter.

Musharraf has devised a complex strategy to ensure that he remains in power as president and military chief through the January 2008 general elections. But his election gambit took a turn for the worse in March when he acted on bad advice and gave the green light to sack the country's chief justice. Though Musharraf's intent was to clear a potential obstacle to his re-election bid, he sparked a nationwide outcry against the military-dominated regime that has forced him into a compromising situation that will end up forcing him to give up a certain degree of power.

Musharraf will be in damage-control mode during the second quarter, and could attempt to temporarily defuse the crisis by restoring the chief justice. Such an outcome, however, will only further erode Musharraf's ability to rule, and would create a crisis of governance.

Meanwhile, radical Islamist forces in the country will take advantage of the political fracas to increase suicide attacks and expand their efforts to "Talibanize" Pakistan beyond the Pashtun areas. Given Musharraf's weak political standing, the Pakistani government's cautious approach will not thwart the growing radical movement. To salvage his political position and help combat religious extremism in the country, Musharraf might have no choice but to encourage his allies in the ruling Pakistan Muslim League to consider working out a power-sharing agreement with secular parties in the opposition, namely the Pakistan People's Party-Parliamentarians.

The United States will watch these developments in Pakistan closely, and will give Musharraf some breathing room while he attempts to sort out problems at home. Washington has an interest in ensuring that Musharraf maintains a hold on power and that the military remains at the helm, even if concessions need to be made to the civilian opposition parties.

Taliban activity in Afghanistan will intensify this spring, with a heavy emphasis on suicide attacks against Afghan and NATO forces. A coordinated campaign by Taliban and al Qaeda militants also appears to be under way, in which motorcades carrying high-value military or intelligence officials are singled out. NATO and Afghan forces will mount a strong counteroffensive, making this quarter a particularly bloody one.

The Afghan government of President Hamid Karzai and its NATO allies will focus on their hunt for pragmatic Taliban in an effort to undercut the jihadist insurgency. This will involve negotiating via tribal elders across the Pashtun areas in southern and eastern Afghanistan, reaching out to Hizb-i-Islami chief Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and driving a wedge between Taliban commanders in Afghanistan and the Taliban elements allied to the Mullah Omar-based leadership, which has close links to al Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban.

In India, domestic political and social issues continue to absorb the government's attention. The ruling Congress party is struggling to maintain a populist attitude toward India's lower classes while appeasing Indian corporate interests. This balancing act has left both sides unsatisfied and has provided the main opposition Bharatiya Janata Party an opening to advance itself. Congress' hold on the central government will not be seriously threatened in the second quarter, but the party will have to rely heavily on populist measures to win back support.

A hot issue over the next few months will center on the creation of additional special economic zones (SEZs) throughout India. Impoverished farmers backed by vociferous leftist groups will intensify their resistance to the SEZs' creation. Maoist rebels, also known as Naxalites, will try to take advantage of the tensions stemming from the government's bid to acquire farmers' lands for the SEZs by intensifying their operations against security, political and economic targets in the states of Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Orissa.

India also will pay closer attention to its southern neighbor, where the Sri Lankan army is engaged in major tit-for-tat fighting against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. Colombo will lobby hard for increased military assistance and advanced radar equipment to combat the Tigers, but the Congress party will remain cautious about enhancing Sri Lanka's military capabilities for fear of alienating the Indian Tamil population and the party's Tamil political allies. The Tigers will attempt to resist Sri Lanka's aerial assaults in their eastern strongholds by turning to more spectacular attacks, including suicide bombings, and by demonstrating the expansion of their naval and air branches.

In Nepal, the interim government and Maoists will limp toward finalizing a peace deal that will allow the Maoists to formally enter the government and erode the royal family's political position. Though general elections are slated for mid-June, there is a strong possibility that they will not take place on time considering the deteriorating law and order situation in the southern plains of Terai, where Maoists and a group of plains people, known as Madhesis, are locked in turmoil.

Global Economy: Short-Term Shakiness, But No Recession

Stratfor expects that the irrationalities introduced by the past six years of rapid economic growth could trigger a shakedown in the U.S. economy that will stop shy of an actual recession. By the end of the second quarter, however, the United States will have dodged the bullet and should be surging ahead. The quarter could even end with the rest of the world wobbling as the United States climbs, but this too likely will pass.

Unfortunately for the rest of the world, the United States does not exist in isolation. From 1945 to 1985, very little of the U.S. economy was locked up in international trade, so when the United States suffered a recession, that recession's effect on the rest of the world was rather limited. As time rolled on, however -- and certainly by the late 1990s -- the United States became more involved, and now trade is just over 25 percent of the country's gross domestic product (GDP). In relative terms, that is still rather little (Germany's trade is more than 70 percent of its GDP), but in absolute terms it represents about $3 trillion annually.

In practical terms, the U.S. economy has become the global economy's market of first and last resort. Consequently, to paraphrase Wall Street investors, when the United States sneezes, the world catches a cold. Before the United States became so exposed, a U.S. recession meant money fled abroad. Now, however, since much of the rest of the world depends on U.S. markets, economic troubles in the United States directly translate into economic problems in the countries that like to sell to the United States.

So U.S. economic troubles still lead to capital flight, but now that flight is to the United States instead of from it. One result of this is that recessions are extremely short and mild in the United States. (Witness the brief, shallow recessions of 1990-1991 and 2001 -- the only recessions the United States has suffered in the past 25 years.) The one saving grace for the rest of the world -- and it is a huge one -- is that, compared to what it was in 1990, domestic consumption in the developing world (including China) and in Europe has expanded greatly.

While the United States certainly is the system's center, the rest of the system has sufficient bulk to self-ballast. So though a U.S. slowdown still causes more problems overseas than it does in the United States, it is hardly tantamount to an economic death sentence.

Overall, the economic volatility of the first quarter will intensify in the second, but by the time we reach the third, the United States will have pulled through. Once that happens, confidence should leak back into the rest of the global system and short-circuit a similar slowdown before it can do any serious damage.

However, there are two outliers to note.

First, U.S. economists are concerned about faltering subprime mortgage markets. To make an incredibly complex story simple, subprime mortgages are granted to people whose credit is not strong enough to qualify for a mortgage under normal circumstances. The specific part of the market that is suffering are those subprime lenders who have taken on variable-rate mortgages, which lock in an extraordinarily low rate -- allowing almost anyone to qualify because of the low payments that result -- but then force a later refinancing at normal rates, typically five years hence. These subprime variable-rate mortgages were first offered en masse five years ago. Now it is time to pay the piper, and many cannot. The good news is that of a total U.S. mortgage market of $10 trillion, the entire subprime market -- and many of these will not go bad -- is "only" worth about $650 billion. The bad news is that this sort of irresponsible mortgage has been given out for five years now, which means more mortgages are guaranteed to go bad. The impact is small, but the tailwind is now locked into the system for the next five years.

Second, there are two states where additional economic problems could crop up in the second quarter. The first, Japan, is the only country where domestic demand continues to underperform, making it perennially vulnerable to international economic downdrafts. Fresh statistics also indicate that deflation -- once thought defeated -- has returned. The second state, Germany, is struggling to slough off a decade of subpar growth. To balance its budget, Germany raised its consumption tax by 3 percent in the first quarter -- a step that, while fiscally sound, risks the recent progress Germany has made resuscitating its economy.

Of the two, we are more hopeful for Germany, where growth -- and confidence -- is better entrenched.

Stratfor (Estados Unidos)

 



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20/03/2007|
20/03/2007|
20/03/2007|
15/03/2007|
15/03/2007|
15/03/2007|
08/03/2007|
08/03/2007|
08/03/2007|
08/03/2007|
01/03/2007|
28/02/2007|
27/02/2007|
27/02/2007|
27/02/2007|
27/02/2007|
27/02/2007|
27/02/2007|
27/02/2007|
08/02/2007|
08/02/2007|
08/02/2007|
08/02/2007|
07/02/2007|
07/02/2007|
07/02/2007|
07/02/2007|
05/02/2007|
05/02/2007|
05/02/2007|
05/02/2007|
05/02/2007|
05/02/2007|
05/02/2007|
05/02/2007|
05/02/2007|
05/02/2007|
05/02/2007|
05/02/2007|
02/02/2007|
02/02/2007|
01/02/2007|
01/02/2007|
01/02/2007|
01/02/2007|
31/01/2007|
31/01/2007|
25/01/2007|
25/01/2007|
23/01/2007|
23/01/2007|
23/01/2007|
23/01/2007|
10/01/2007|
10/01/2007|
03/01/2007|
30/12/2006|
30/12/2006|
30/12/2006|
30/12/2006|
30/12/2006|
30/12/2006|
23/12/2006|
23/12/2006|
23/12/2006|
23/12/2006|
23/12/2006|
23/12/2006|
23/12/2006|
23/12/2006|
23/12/2006|
23/12/2006|
20/12/2006|
20/12/2006|
20/12/2006|
20/12/2006|
16/12/2006|
16/12/2006|
16/12/2006|
16/12/2006|
16/12/2006|
16/12/2006|
15/12/2006|
15/12/2006|
15/12/2006|
15/12/2006|
15/12/2006|
15/12/2006|
12/12/2006|
12/12/2006|
12/12/2006|
12/12/2006|
12/12/2006|
12/12/2006|
05/12/2006|
05/12/2006|
05/12/2006|
05/12/2006|
05/12/2006|
05/12/2006|
02/12/2006|
02/12/2006|
29/11/2006|
29/11/2006|
29/11/2006|
29/11/2006|
22/11/2006|
22/11/2006|
22/11/2006|
22/11/2006|
18/11/2006|
18/11/2006|
17/11/2006|
16/11/2006|
14/11/2006|
13/11/2006|
11/11/2006|
11/11/2006|
11/11/2006|
08/11/2006|
07/11/2006|
07/11/2006|
04/11/2006|
04/11/2006|
01/11/2006|
31/10/2006|
31/10/2006|
31/10/2006|
28/10/2006|
28/10/2006|
24/10/2006|
24/10/2006|
24/10/2006|
24/10/2006|
21/10/2006|
21/10/2006|
18/10/2006|
18/10/2006|
18/10/2006|
18/10/2006|
18/10/2006|
18/10/2006|
14/10/2006|
14/10/2006|
14/10/2006|
14/10/2006|
14/10/2006|
14/10/2006|
07/10/2006|
05/10/2006|
05/10/2006|
05/10/2006|
29/09/2006|
28/09/2006|
27/09/2006|
27/09/2006|
27/09/2006|
24/09/2006|
23/09/2006|
23/09/2006|
23/09/2006|
30/08/2006|
30/08/2006|
27/08/2006|
02/08/2006|
02/08/2006|
30/07/2006|
30/07/2006|
28/07/2006|
28/07/2006|
23/07/2006|
19/07/2006|
15/07/2006|
14/07/2006|
06/07/2006|
06/07/2006|
06/07/2006|
06/07/2006|
30/06/2006|
30/06/2006|
30/06/2006|
30/06/2006|
30/06/2006|
30/06/2006|
26/06/2006|
26/06/2006|
24/06/2006|
24/06/2006|
22/06/2006|
22/06/2006|
20/06/2006|
20/06/2006|
20/06/2006|
20/06/2006|
20/06/2006|
20/06/2006|
20/06/2006|
20/06/2006|
05/06/2006|
04/06/2006|
03/06/2006|
02/06/2006|
02/06/2006|
01/06/2006|
01/06/2006|
31/05/2006|
29/05/2006|
28/05/2006|
23/05/2006|
17/05/2006|
17/05/2006|
13/05/2006|
07/05/2006|
07/05/2006|
06/05/2006|
06/05/2006|
04/05/2006|
02/05/2006|
02/05/2006|
30/04/2006|
25/04/2006|
24/04/2006|
24/04/2006|
23/04/2006|
23/04/2006|
21/04/2006|
21/04/2006|
21/04/2006|
18/04/2006|
18/04/2006|
18/04/2006|
18/04/2006|
17/04/2006|
13/04/2006|
13/04/2006|
10/04/2006|
08/04/2006|
06/04/2006|
06/04/2006|
05/04/2006|
30/03/2006|
28/03/2006|
28/03/2006|
27/03/2006|
24/03/2006|
24/03/2006|
24/03/2006|
24/03/2006|
24/03/2006|
24/03/2006|
22/03/2006|
22/03/2006|
20/02/2006|
20/02/2006|
18/02/2006|
11/02/2006|
11/02/2006|
11/02/2006|
07/02/2006|
26/01/2006|
25/01/2006|
22/01/2006|
19/01/2006|
19/01/2006|
14/01/2006|
14/01/2006|
12/01/2006|
12/01/2006|
06/01/2006|
20/12/2005|
01/08/2005|
06/01/2005|

ver + notas
 
Center for the Study of the Presidency
Freedom House