The future of this Arab nation, the current victim of western 'intervention', is now as uncertain as that of Iraq.
Shortly before committing suicide in 1961, the American
author Ernest Hemingway wrote about his electroshock therapy. "Well, what
is the sense of ruining my head and erasing my memory, which is my capital, and
putting me out of business? It was a brilliant cure but we lost the
patient."
This line was quoted by Naomi Klein in The Shock
Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism. Klein's book was a major
contribution to our understanding of how western countries, led by the US,
facilitated or took advantage of major disasters to attain domination over
vulnerable and politically disjointed countries around the world. In the chapter
entitled, "Erasing Iraq: In Search for a ‘Model' for the Middle
East," Klein describes the attempt at destroying and then resurrecting the
country to fit the mould sought by those who administered its fall. She
concluded Part 6 with the following statement: "So in the end, the war in
Iraq did create a model economy…it was a model for privatised war and
reconstruction — a model that quickly became export ready."
The US had commenced its war on Iraq in 2003, with the
‘Shock and Awe' bombing campaign. The aim was to disorient not only Saddam
Hussain, but Iraqi society as a whole. It was assumed that in the face of such
firepower, no Iraqi group would dare challenge their new rulers. We all know
now how wrong they were. The fact that the shock therapists are currently
negotiating the terms of their withdrawal only confirms that the shock doctrine
will eventually fail. Instead of ‘curing the patient' — as if this was ever its
true intention — it reverberates into series of crises that extend beyond the
boundaries of the operation.
Yet, somehow the Iraq ‘model' is still being exported,
and the current victim in this dismal saga is Libya.
What began in Libya as peaceful protests on February 15
soon descended into civil war between warring parties, each posturing as the
true saviour of the Libyan people. A National Transitional Council (NTC),
mostly made of defectors from Gaddafi's regime, claimed to represent all
Libyans. Of course they possessed no such mandate, except for the quick
validation bestowed upon them by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Nato).
The Libyan army was perhaps confident that their superior firepower and Muammar
Gaddafi's connections with the Nato members that supported the NTC would
guarantee the outcome of the battle in its favour.
But Nato had different calculations. First, the so-called
Arab Spring has changed the enduring paradigm in the Middle East, where major
geopolitical shifts are often determined by external factors. This gives the US
and its allies room to initiate policies, as opposed to responding to crises.
Second, as explained by Klein, crises can quickly become opportunities for
‘humanitarian' interventions, allowing western powers to construct post-crisis
scenarios to suit their interests. In Iraq, no-fly zones over northern and
southern Iraq were declared by the US, Britain and France after the 1991 war.
They were based on a questionable interpretation of UN Security Council
resolution 668. The parameters of the no-fly zones mission eventually extended
to mean all-out war in 2003. Also, the reasoning behind that intervention
changed accordingly.
In Libya, the scenario was similar, but time was of the
essence. The near-bankrupt Nato countries that had initiated the war against a
former ally understood that the public mood in their countries would not
support a costly and prolonged military intervention. Thus, unlike Iraq, it
took Nato a matter of days to interpret UNSC resolution 1973 — authorising ‘All
necessary measures' to protect civilians — to mean regime change in Libya.
From Nato's standpoint, overt and covert operations would
produce faster and more satisfying results in Libya than years of sanctions,
air strikes, debates about UN resolutions and eventually a full-scale invasion.
Nato's behaviour in Libya seemed to be controlled by a greater sense of urgency
than had been the case with Iraq. And still, there were glaring commonalities.
Libya was Iraq, shocked and awed repeatedly, Sirte was Fallujah and Saddam
hanging from a rope was a bloodied and dying Gaddafi in the back of a truck.
In her visit to the ‘soil of free Libya' on October 18,
US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton hoped that Gaddafi would soon be captured
or killed. The anticipation was reiterated by British and French officials, all
seemingly eager to transition from an era of dictatorship to one of democracy.
But security chaos, which has already taken hold in Tripoli, seems the most
likely fate awaiting the ‘new Libya'. Libya's interim leader has put forward
the option of incorporating Libya's fighters into the army or private security
contractors. As for rebuilding, this will also follow Iraq's example. The
mission will be entrusted to those Nato members credited with ‘liberating'
Libyans.
Rightwing US Senators including John McCain wrote this on
Libya in the Wall Street Journal: "What remains is an enormous opportunity
for the US to build a partnership with a democratic and pro-American Libya that
contributes to the expansion of security, prosperity and freedom across a
pivotal region at a time of revolutionary change."
The shock therapists are still applying their horrifying
treatment to another victim. The future of Libya is now as uncertain as that of
Iraq. And still, as with Iraq, this does not mean the treatment will succeed.
As Ernest Hemingway once wrote, "A man can be destroyed but not
defeated."
**Ramzy Baroud is the editor of PalestineChronicle.com.
He taught Mass Communication at Australia's Curtin University of Technology.
His latest book is My Father Was a Freedom Fighter: Gaza's Untold Story.