When the Group of Eight summit took place in Northern Ireland last month, Russian President Vladimir Putin, according to the diplomatic grapevine, wanted to use the gym at the Enniskillen resort, but his American counterpart Barack Obama had already booked it.
Neither would want to share the facility and Putin
settled for a swim in the frigid Lough Erne, which was beyond Obama's physical
stamina. All this might be idle gossip, but it helps capture the awkward nature
of the current Russian-American relationship at present.
If anybody had thought that the aloof body language at
the meeting at Enniskillen revealed that the US-Russian ties havetouched their
lowest point in very many years, the case of the ex-Central Intelligence Agency
whistleblower Edward Snowden tells us that they must deteriorate further before
getting any better.
In Northern Ireland, Putin and Obama shared a resort
town. From the latest indications, Obama, peeved over the Kremlin's decision to
give shelter to Snowden, may call off his proposed bilateral visit to Moscow in
September prior to the Group of 20 summit at St Petersburg.
Why do things have to come to this pass? Partly at least,
it is Beijing's creation, unwittingly or otherwise, by hustling Snowden into an
Aeroflot flight to Moscow knowing privately that Washington had revoked his
passport and that by the time he landed at Sheremetyevo airport he would be
without valid travel documents.
As Fyodor Lukyanov, a top establishment figure in the
Russian strategic community, noted wryly in an article in the government daily
Rossiyskaya Gazeta on Tuesday,
The PRC intelligence services, which put the American on
a plane for Moscow and told him that it was better there, deserved their
leadership's praise since they spared Beijing a sizable headache. The rest were
less fortunate.
Most certainly, Beijing acted out of pure unalloyed
motives to sequester China's nascent NTR - New Type of Relationship - with the
Barack Obama administration from being hijacked by Snowden.
In the event, China has made great propaganda out of the
Snowden case, but is is now liberated from having to make difficult decisions
regarding Snowden's ultimate fate. It is pillorying Washington on the one hand
for its "hypocrisy" in indulging in such massive scale of
cyber-espionage against sovereign countries, while at the same time raising
higher the bar of human rights standards for Moscow to live up to.
Unnecessary and misleading
However, the fault ultimately lies with Moscow, since it
failed to exercise the option of deporting Snowden back to Hong Kong when it
transpired that the alien in transit didn't have valid travel documents, which
is a usual practice. On the contrary, Moscow chose to take a legalistic line
that Snowden was not on Russian territory and to cap it, it enveloped him in a
blanket security cover that was unnecessary and misleading.
Again, unlike the complete vow of silence in Beijing, all
sorts of running commentaries began appearing on Snowden's invisible presence
in Moscow, with sources ranging from Russian government officials to pundits to
senior politicians, which only ultimately conveyed the impression that Moscow
was indulging in foreplay with Washington while pinning hopes on striking a
deal eventually with the US.
Suffice to say, Moscow cannot at this stage indulge in
lamentation that Snowden has become its unwanted baby.
Washington, on the other hand, has held on to a single
line consistently, from President Barack Obama down - namely, there shall be no
"wheeling and dealing" with Moscow over Snowden; and that Russia
should expel Snowden who has committed felony under American laws and should
stand trial in the US courts.
The US has also let it be known that any perceived lack
of cooperation from Moscow could have negative fallout for bilateral ties.
The fact that a high-level under deputy secretary of
state William Burns, an old Moscow hand, was deputed to handle the Snowden case
underscored the Obama administration's seriousness in trying to convince the
Russians that the Kremlin had sufficient legal and practical reasons to expel
the fugitive without travel document to the US - in short, that it would be a
political call.
But Moscow has taken an absolutely correct legal stance,
which is in additional a highly principled one, namely, that a truly great
power cannot overlook "humanitarian considerations".
No more wheeling and dealing
However, Russia also expects that the Russian-American
relationship will move on as if nothing has happened, so that once media
attention ceases, as happened so often in the Cold War relationship, a deal can
be worked out between the two governments. This is how Lukyanov concluded:
Edward Snowden will most likely shortly obtain Russian
asylum, temporary, as he says, but he could linger in Russia a long time. For
the circumstances preventing his return home or relocating to Latin America will
not disappear in the foreseeable future. Moscow and Washington have an interest
in this business being forgotten as quickly as possible, in it exiting the news
field. It would then be possible to discuss without undue publicity what is to
be done to extract this thorn in the side of relations.
Lukyanov recalled that an "elegant solution"
was worked out through a Russia-US deal in 2010 when Kyrgyz president Kurmanbek
Bakiyev was overthrown and it turned out to be in the mutual interests of
Moscow and Washington to mothball the deposed Central Asian head of state.
Bakiyev was, in the event, despatched to Minsk.
Would the Obama administration agree to a Minsk formula
in the Snowden case? This is the big question - and it seems unlikely, because
it essentially means that Washington should do precisely what Obama said he
wouldn't do - namely, "wheeling and dealing" with Beijing or Moscow
over Snowden's fate.
Therefore, all things taken into account, a poignant
moment of truth is arriving for both Moscow and Washington in their post-Cold
War relationship. For Moscow, it is nothing less than a crisis of identity,
whereas for Washington what is needed is a session of cathartic therapy on the
couch that might help it understand itself better.
For Russia, the Snowden case demands that it reboots the
Kremlin's foreign policy doctrine. So far it has been a foreign policy riveted
on "national interests". Now, ideology is making a comeback. It may
not be Marxist ideology, but nonetheless a compelling humanistic ideology that
gives primacy to "humanitarian considerations" in foreign policy.
How far can Russia practice an ideology-laden foreign
policy in a world that is torn apart by inequities, violence and
authoritarianism? This is one thing.
The second question is whether the influential sections
of the Russian elites would really afford to accept a situation of being
socially ostracized by the West, whom they visualize as their natural partners
in the North?
The heart of the matter is that the trans-Atlantic
alliance pulls together, finally, despite an occasional hiccup or two, and on
an issue that hurts American pride and makes the US appear an impotent
superpower America's allies will not carry on business as usual with Russia.
On the other hand, given Russia's social formation in the
post-Soviet period, it is improbable that the bulk of Moscow's elites would
find Bolivia or the Ecuador to be agreeable destinations substituting for
London or Zurich.
This brings us to a third question, which concerns the
world order in which Russia needs to operate. Make no mistake that the US will
react positively to any decision involving "asylum" for Snowden -
temporary or otherwise. If so, what follows?
The entire trajectory of post-Soviet Russian-American
relationship has so far been non-confrontational. This can change. And it is a
reflection on the world order in which Russia needs to live that, after all,
three (or even four, including South Africa) out of Russia's BRICS partners
(Brazil, India and China being the others) would not even contemplate the
course of action that Moscow seems about to choose; namely, granting shelter to
an American fugitive from law out of "humanitarian considerations".
Rewriting Ol' Boris' history
In sum, the Snowden case demands that Russia make up its
mind what sort of relationship it seeks with the West. True, Russia is used to
a life under Western sanctions; but then, it was a difficult life not out of
choice but out of compulsion. There are inherent limitations to innovating
Russia's economy and globalizing it without Western technology and investments
- the "China option", Eurasian Union project, or World Trade
Organization membership notwithstanding.
Simply put, Washington would expect Russia to cooperate -
just as Spain, Italy, France and Portugal did by blocking Bolivian President
Evo Morales' passage when it suspected Snowden was aboard his plane - although
these countries too felt exasperated over the US' cyber-espionage. At the very
least, Washington would expect the same degree of "pragmatism" on
Russia's part which Beijing displayed in the Snowden case.
Conceivably, the trap that the Obama administration set
for Russia may be that the latter is called upon to make an existential choice
regarding its identity and role as a great power with global reach and
influence.
It is an unfair thing to do, because the US is only used
to making demands on its relationship with Russia and never granting the
latter's wishes. As Bill Clinton once told former deputy secretary of state
Strobe Talbott in an outburst of honesty when Clinton was president and Boris
Yeltsin was his counterpart in the Kremlin,
We [US] haven't played everything brilliantly with these
people [Russians]; we haven't figured out how to say yes to them in a way that
balances off how much and how often we want them to say yes to us. We keep
telling Ol' Boris, 'Okay, now here's what you've got to do next - here's some
more shit for your face.'
Today, the Obama administration needs to factor in that
Bill Clinton's Russia team still remains largely intact in the Washington
circuit even after Ol' Boris left the Kremlin 12 years and six months ago. Put
differently, Russia won't take "more shit" in its face anymore.
If the Obama administration is in any doubt, this week's
unprecedented military exercise by the Russian armed forces in the Far East
should help dispel that misconception.
Russia has no enemies in the Far East. Nor does Russia
have to prepare against the likelihood of a war with Japan, China or North
Korea. Nor are its famous strategic bombers Tu-95MS going to be called upon to
perform real time tasks.
The real message is that the military exercises ending on
Saturday, involving 160,000 servicemen, 5,000 tanks and combat armored vehicles,
160 warplanes and helicopters of long-range, military transport, fighter,
bombing and army aviation, as well as 70 warships and vessels, were ordered by
the Kremlin with a paltry 48 hours' notice and yet they took off and could take
place with such finesse.
President Vladimir Putin's presence at the 247th
multi-service firing range Tsugol in the Eastern Military District on Wednesday
underscores that Ol' Boris has become a part of history - and so indeed the US'
post-Soviet triumphalism.
In sum, the charade of the US-Russia "reset"
which Obama conjured up during his first term has outlived its utility.
Selective engagement of Russia will no longer do. Russia demands a
comprehensive, equal partnership based on mutual respect.
The Snowden case testifies to the urgency for Washington
to go back to the drawing board and work on a new blueprint of relations with
Russia - similar to the NTR China has been demanding.
**Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar served as a career diplomat
in the Indian Foreign Service for over 29 years, with postings including
India's ambassador to Uzbekistan (1995-1998) and to Turkey (1998-2001).