Road connectivity was finally restored on June 27 by Commandos from the Special Operations Group (SOG) of the Orissa Police and the para-military Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), which moved with mechanical tree-cutting equipment and heavy earth movers to clear the road. During the operation, more than 170 trees were removed from the road and two large trenches were filled along the 22 kilometer road.

Narayanpatna was only the most recent of a continuous succession of Maoist-related incidents in Orissa’s severely affected southern border areas – the Koraput, Malkangiri, Rayagada, Gajapati and Kandhamal Districts – where there are unmistakable signs of a Maoist consolidation and of their attempts to transform the region into a ‘guerrilla zone’.

In the Narayanpatna Block, the Maoist-backed CMAS, functioning under the leadership of Nachika Linga, has primarily been agitating to forcibly take over agricultural land from non-tribals, as it believes that non-tribals have occupied such lands from tribals by deceit. The roots of CMAS can be traced to the Ryot Kuli Sangham located in Parvatipuram in the Vizianagaram District of Andhra Pradesh, when it functioned as one of its units under the name Chasi Mulia Sangham. In 2006, after Orissa banned the organistion, the group re-emerged as the Chasi Mulia Adivasi Sangha. The CMAS came into prominence in 2006, when it captured some 50 acres of non-tribal land in the Podapadar Gram Panchayat (village local self-government unit) in Koraput. So far, CMAS is reported to have forcibly taken over some 2,000 acres of land from non-tribals in areas around Narayanpatna. CMAS supporters plant red flags around agricultural plots and simply proclaim these as theirs. Though Nachika Linga claims that CMAS is linked to the Gananath Patra faction of the Communist Party of India-Marxist-Leninist (CPI-ML), the involvement of Maoists is evident, not only from the landmine attack, but also a declaration of support from the Maoists. Over the past six months, CMAS supporters have been involved in several violent incidents, including murder and arson, leading to an exodus of non-tribals (one report mentioned more than 210 families) from the area, with some of them now lodged in relief camps set up by the State Government at Radhakrishna College and Tehsil Office in Narayanpatna, and outside the District Collectorate in Koraput Town. In May 2009, CMAS activists killed a 40-year-old man, Nitya Melka, at Gotiguda village in Narayanpatna block. In the neighbouring Bandhugaon block, CMAS activists, under the leadership of Kondagiri Paidama, have occupied about 250 acres of non-tribal land with the ‘consent’ of land holders. CMAS activists also destroyed two nurseries at Musulimunda and Ambaguda in June 2009, alleging that the horticultural work encroached on tribal farmlands.

The occupied lands, according to Nachika Linga, have been distributed among the tribals village-wise. Responding to the Maoist-backed intervention in the revenue and agriculture systems, several Revenue Inspectors (RI), under the direction of Satyabrata Sahu, the Revenue Divisional Commissioner (South), were pressed into service to settle land disputes. However, the RIs withdrew, after serving for a week, fearing a CMAS backlash. Further, a dialogue between the Koraput District Collector, Gadadhar Parida, and Nachika Linga, the CMAS leader, to settle the issues, has failed. In addition, the directive of the Revenue Divisional Commissioner (RDC-Southern Division), to depute a Joint Commissioner, who was to camp in Narayanpatna for seven days every month to take up land disputes related to the alleged take over of tribal land by non-tribals suo motu for settlement, has also not met with much success.

As in Narayanpatna, the broad strategy of the Maoists is to arouse and mobilise people around a range of local ‘partial struggles’, making backward rural areas their main centers of action, building up the people’s army and people’s militia, establishing dependable strong and self-sufficient ‘base areas’ in the remote countryside and later gradually expanding to the ‘advanced areas’ to eventually encircle the urban centers. The establishment of ‘base areas’, where the State presence is completely destroyed and where the rule of the ‘revolutionary people’s government’ is established, is of crucial importance as the Maoists "rely on these strategic bases to fulfill their strategic tasks." The base areas constitute the rear of the guerrilla armies, and in their absence, it would be impossible to advance the objectives of the protracted ‘people’s war’. Till such base areas are established, however, the objective is to turn isolated, impoverished or otherwise troubled regions into ‘red resistance zones’, particularly where sufficient economic resources and a substantial population combine with difficult terrain, where the state’s presence is weak. In these ‘red resistance zones’ the Maoists take up local issues, ‘partial struggles’, to organize the masses, initially, for militant political activity, but eventually, for guerilla warfare and the protracted people’s war.

It is significant, in this context that the ‘strategic areas’ identified by the CPI-Maoist in their Strategy and Tactics of the Indian Revolution document of September 21, 2004, include the extensive area of Dandakaranya, Jharkhand, Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, the Andhra-Orissa Border, and the North Telangana and Koel-Kaimur areas. The Maoists believe they will be able to build these areas into a contiguous area of armed struggle, with each area influencing the other. As these areas get consolidated, the Maoists are expected to utilize their impact on the surrounding areas and develop them into guerilla zones, expanding the area of armed struggle.

It is in the context of efforts to develop the [Andhra-] Orissa Border into a ‘guerrilla zone’ that the incidents in Narayanpatna acquire importance. Narayanpatna is a key transit zone for the insurgents between the States of Orissa and Andhra Pradesh, bordering the extremist-affected Makau Police Station area in Andhra Pradesh. Maoists from Andhra Pradesh on their way to Orissa’ highly affected Malkangiri District usually cross over into Narayanpatna from Makau. They subsequently travel via Kutia, Pottangi and Padua in Koraput District to reach the rural areas of Visakhapatnam in Andhra Pradesh, which are linked to the remote areas of Malkangiri District. By strengthening their grasp over Narayanpatna, the Maoists will be able to ease communication between their strongholds in Andhra Pradesh and the Koraput and Malkangiri Districts in Orissa.

Evolving within this framework, CMAS has formed armed squads to protect tribals against apprehensions of attack by non-tribals. Boys and girls are being recruited into the armed outfit Ghenua Bahini Sangha (GBS, named after a local militant leader, Arjun Katreka alias Ghenua) and tasked with providing protection to tribals during rallies, meetings and land-occupation activities. Nachika Linga declares, "GBS has been formed in every tribal village. As many as 10 to 30 tribal youths from each village have been inducted. They are trained to use our traditional weapons. They maintain peace and harmony in their respective villages and also provide security to the CMAS members during major events."

Land taken over by the CMAS was redistributed among different villages and not among individual cultivators. This has provided an excellent opportunity to the Maoists to keep the flock together and consolidate their position among the locals. After taking possession of all the land around the villages, the tribals have reportedly been encouraged to engage in collective farming.

A senior Police official in Koraput told SAIR that, as the State has decided not to take Police action against CMAS and was trying to settle the land issue through investigation by the revenue department, it would take years to address the problem, providing fertile grounds to the Maoists to strengthen their base. A senior Police official in Rayagada, further, revealed to SAIR that the Maoists were rapidly moving towards putting in place full-fledged Area Committees in Orissa. Area Committees provide the crucial link in the party organization between the Division and State Committees above and Local Guerrilla Squads, Special Guerrilla Squads, Action Squads and village level Cells below. The Area Committee co-ordinates the action of front organsations and underground organizations, and also looks after the formation of militia in the area.

The attack on the public sector National Aluminum Company Limited (NALCO) mines at Panchpatmali near Damanjodi on April 12, 2009, and attacks on two Police Stations and a Police Outpost in Koraput District in the night of June 7 are indices of Maoist intent and strategy. There are, in addition, reports that around 200 locals were recruited by the CPI-Maoist to strengthen their newly formed Machkund Dalam (squad) under the Koraput-Malkangiri division.

While the Maoist move rapidly to advance their strategic and tactical objectives, the Orissa Government is still to find its feet. Sources in the Union Home Ministry disclosed that Orissa was among the few States that refuse to invest swiftly in Police capacity building. The State Government, on the other hand, is happy to blame the Centre for its inability to control the Maoist insurgency. Replying in the State Assembly to an adjournment motion on Maoist activities, the Orissa Chief Minister Naveen Patnaik, who won an unprecedented third tenure in June 2009, stated on July 21, 2009, "…. there is not enough central assistance to counter Naxalites in the state effectively. Among the various requests, which I have made to the Ministry of Home Affairs, I would like to mention our need for four battalions of central paramilitary forces on a long-term basis and three more for short-term engagement to control the menace. Our request for a dedicated helicopter also has not been acceded to…"

The White Paper issued by the Orissa Government on July 24, 2009, concedes that the Maoist insurgency is a major threat to the safety and security of the State. The White Paper reveals that 56 Maoist attacks claimed the lives of 74 SF personnel and 22 civilians in 2008, as against two SF personnel and 13 civilian fatalities in 2007. Almost half of the total Districts in the State – 14 out of 30 – are affected by Maoist insurgency. The Orissa Government, however, still insists that the State is "by and large peaceful." Open source reportage monitoring in the last three years by the South Asia Terrorism Portal, however,indicates that at least 22 Districts in the State are affected by the Maoist activities – a figure central intelligence sources concur with.

Maoist-related fatalities in Orissa, 2006-2009

On the State Government's action against Maoists, Chief Minister Patnaik disclosed that 59 CPI-Maoist cadres, including some top leaders, had been arrested and eight Maoists killed in different encounters during 2008. The Chief Minister also stated that some suggestions given by the Orissa Police Association to effectively combat the Maoists, such as fortification of Police Stations, provision of barracks and imparting suitable training to the Policemen, had been implemented ‘to a large extent’. The State Government, he claimed, was already providing a suitable incentive package to Police personnel involved in anti-Maoist operations. Further, he stated, another 3,000 tribal youth from the insurgency-affected areas will be recruited as Special Police Officers (SPOs). This will be in addition to the existing 2,100 SPOs. A special recruitment drive by the Army, which the Chief Minister has requested the Ministry of Defence to carry out, is, moreover, aimed at preventing tribal youth from being enlisted by the Maoists. Other programmes announced by Patnaik include plans to open at least one Industrial Training Institute in each block to enhance employability of the youth; spending at least INR 200,000 per District in tribal areas for sports activities; and filling up vacant paramedical staff posts in all schedule areas of Orissa. The Chief Minister disclosed that another 4,000 Home Guards would be engaged, with special emphasis on Maoist affected Districts. Another initiative to try and counter the Maoists was the withdrawal or dropping of petty cases against tribals. As many as 9,000 minor forest offences and 3,000 other cases against tribals have reportedly been dropped.

There are, however, serious chinks in the State Government’s armour. Despite declared intentions, the State has a severe handicap in training its Police personnel, with a capacity to train a maximum of 300 personnel in nine months. To augment the capacity, the State has opened one training School in each of the seven Police ranges. However, one District Police Superintendent told SAIR that these training centers have no trainers at all. Neither is there any dedicated officer to monitor the progress and the quality of training. The officer opined, moreover, that the current recruitment policy failed to give due importance to strength and endurance. Furthermore, sources in Delhi indicate that not a single retired Army officer has so far come forward to head the proposed counter-insurgency school to be set up in Orissa.

The State Government’s neglect has also been documented in detail by the latest Comptroller and Auditor General’s (CAG) Report, which reviews the period 2002-2007. On Police modernization, the Report points out, Orissa did not spend more than 30 per cent of the total plan outlay of INR 2,441.7 million over the period 2000-04. With an augmenting Maoist insurgency to combat, returning allocated funds reflects a colossal administrative failure. INR 422.6 million reportedly lay idle in deposits. The Report noted, at the same time, that the Orissa Police lacked modern weapons and other equipment. The CAG Report has also noted that:

• Bullet-proof jeeps worth INR 3.63 million could not be deployed since they did not have bullet-proof tyres and air-conditioning. The State Government acquired 1,067 vehicles of the 1,495 required, but had a shortfall of as many as 971 drivers.
• On arms, the Orissa Government spent INR 81.2 million (30 per cent of funds allocated). And on significant force multipliers such as information technologies and forensics, the State Government spent nothing at all.

More ominously, there have been occasions when the Orissa Police has failed to act on intelligence received. About the Narayanpatna incident of June 18, 2009, a CRPF officer lamented, "I have been intimating the Orissa Police for the past six months, but they chose not to take any action." He was quoted as stating that the Narayanpatna incident was the first successful replication of the Lalgarh experiment in Orissa. The Orissa Police has now admitted that the CPI-Maoist were strengthening their base and are capable of attacking SF troops on a large scale in some isolated pockets of the State. Addressing top-rung Police officials at the Biju Patnaik State Police Academy in capital Bhubaneswar on August 7, Director General of Police (Intelligence), Prakash Mishra, said that the Maoists were "ready for positional warfare" and were capable of attacking troops in the Malkangiri and Narayanpatna areas. "They can hold security forces for a longer period," he said, adding that different Districts in Orissa had been controlled by at least "10 divisions" of the CPI-Maoists under various names. While, in many Districts, the Maoists are geared up for early guerilla warfare, there are a few Districts where the insurgents are in an advanced stage of guerilla warfare, he stated: "Angul, Boudh, Kalahandi and Nuapara are some of the Districts which fall into perspective stage. They are now visiting and meeting downtrodden people in these areas. Naxalites are picking up small struggles and extending their support. Moreover, they are trying to rope in teachers, students and intellectuals."

After the abduction and killing of a Sub-Inspector of Police on July 16, a media report quoting different Police personnel stated that the Government was weak and confused on the counter-insurgency strategy. While some Policemen believe the Government is scared of the human rights lobby and the Maoists are consequently taking full advantage, others claimed the Police was not getting the "free hand required in the battle against these anti-nationals." One senior officer was quoted as stating, "The last DG promised that there would be more manpower and a modernised police force in the state but what has really happened so far it is there for everybody to see. The Government only talks big… but when it comes take real action it chickens out. There is no courage."

The State Government’s counter-insurgency strategy has come in for more flak from within. Sawarmal Sharma, president of the Orissa Havildar and Constable Federation, has alleged that senior officers "sitting in AC chambers" are "not leading from the front, leaving lowly constables and havildars to patrol mine-infested areas in the heat, fire at encircling Naxal [Maoist] hordes, and die a gory death." Though there is some unfairness in accusing all senior officers, some of Sharma’s observations demand urgent attention, particularly in the aftermath of the killing of Sub-Inspector Ajit Bardhan by the Maoists on July 17, 2009. These include: procuring helicopters and allocating more money for the Police; moving the anti-Maoist headquarters from capital Bhubaneswar to the Maoist-dominated areas; a pan-state coordinated anti-Maoist strategy; and the emulation of the successful Andhra Pradesh strategy in Orissa.

The State, sources disclose, has no proper personnel policy for the Police. In the absence of such a policy, some Policemen are posted in the insurgency-affected areas for relatively longer periods, while the ‘well connected ones’ are able to avoid such postings altogether. This has also led, in some cases, to the less influential Policemen spending more time and energy in trying to avoid postings in the insurgency zones. There also appears to be no consistent policy governing reward or punishment within the Police. A CRPF officer pointed out, further, that the Orissa Police must have a specialized unit to target the top Maoist leadership which is holed up in the urban areas, but no such unit exists.

Most urgent, however, is the crisis of capacities and leadership in the Orissa Police. The State has a Police-population ratio of just 97 per 100,000 (in early 2008), well below the abysmal national average of 125/100,000. There is a virtual collapse at leadership levels. The State has a sanctioned strength of 207 officers in the top Indian Police Service (IPS) ranks, but only 97 officers in position. Rather timorously, the State Government had requested the Centre to allocate at least eight IPS officers from the new batch of recruits in 2009. In its munificence, the Centre has allocated four – a number that will not even account for those who would reach superannuation in the current year. While the Centre can squarely be blamed for this, the State Government has done worse. The State Services Examinations, which select officers to the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police, have not been held for 33 years – since 1976 – leaving a gaping hole in the officer ranks. Between the ranks of Assistant Sub-Inspector and Inspector of Police, the sanctioned strength stood at 6,315 and the officers in position numbered just 4,345, reflecting a deficit of 31.2 per cent in early 2008.

The Orissa Police is an under-led, under-manned, under-trained, ill-equipped and grossly under-resourced Force, and neither State nor Central Government responses appear to be even remotely in proportion either to the magnitude of its deficits, or to the magnitude of the challenge of the Maoist insurgency confronting the State. The existing structural deficits cannot be met through any policy of incremental augmentation, and there appears to be no will or capacity to respond on a war footing. Under the circumstances, the Maoist rampage can only expand across newer areas, even as it intensifies further in areas of present consolidation in the State.