Memories of the Naxalbari incident of March 1967 were revived on July 9, 2005, when three Communist Party of India - Marxist (CPI-M) leaders and a policeman were killed in two separate attacks by left-wing extremists (also known as Naxalites) of the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist). In Bankura district, two district-level leaders, Raghunath Murmu and Bablu Mudi, were shot dead by the Naxalites at Majgeria under Barikul police station. When the police reached the spot, a bomb intentionally left behind by the Maoists exploded killing a policeman and injuring 16 others. Within an hour of the Bankura incident, another CPI-M activist, Mahendra Mahato, was shot dead in the adjoining Purulia district by the Maoists.

The incident was a chilling reminder that it was West Bengal's soil that produced the first Naxalite movement. The 'Naxalites' take their name from the tiny hamlet of Naxalbari in the Darjeeling district of West Bengal where an insurrection commenced in March 1967, to spread across the State and ravage it for the better part of six years, till it was crushed in 1973, and eventually wiped out under the Emergency of 1975. Since then, West Bengal had remained largely free of the scourge of violence inspired by the radical Marxist-Leninist or Maoist ideology, even as large areas in its neighbouring States fell under the renewed spell of this ferocious dogma.

The July 9 incident, however, was not the first time that the State has woken up to Naxalite violence in the recent past. On October 14, 2004, six Eastern Frontier Rifles personnel were killed in a landmine attack triggered by Naxalites inside the Ormara forest in Medinipur district. Traditionally, the three districts of Bankura, Purulia and Medinipur have been the worst affected in Naxalite violence, especially the Jhalda, Bundwan and Jaipur areas in Purulia District; the Ranibundh, Raipur, Sarenga and Simlapal areas in Bankura District; and the Belpahari, Lalgarh, Banspahari and Khejuri areas in Medinipur District.

Reacting to the attacks on the CPI-M activists, State Home Secretary Prasad Ranjan Roy, on July 11, admitted there was a total 'intelligence failure' on the police's part in anticipating the attacks. Roy said that, in spite of 29 companies of paramilitary forces, including the Border Security Force (BSF) and the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), deployed in the three districts, the forces had proved ineffective in facing up to the Maoist threat.

Apart from the 'intelligence failure', a more important aspect that has allowed the Naxalites to flex their muscle is the apparent lack of development in the region, as compared to other districts of the State. According to the West Bengal Human Development Report 2004, published by the State's Development and Planning Department,

The western parts of the State (the districts of Medinipur, Bankura and Purulia or the Paschimanchal region) include some of the most backward areas from the point of view of infrastructure and material development, with the lowest levels of per capita income and also relatively poor HDI rankings……the lack of development in this region is evident not only in terms of the level of basic infrastucture in the region but also with respect to agricultural development. This is compounded by the fact that this region is relatively speaking the driest in the State; it receives the least amount of annual rainfall and is more prone to drought than other parts of West Bengal… There are large tracts of land which remain fallow because of inadequate irrigation facilities and rainwater harvesting techniques… The problems of the Paschimanchal region therefore appear at one level to be more tractable than those in the other regions, because they stem more directly from poor infrastructure and material development.

It is this poor infrastructure and underdevelopment that have been fodder to the Naxalites. Documents seized from three CPI-Maoist leaders, Prasanta Roy, Gautam Bhattacharya and Ajit Haldar, from a forest in Burdwan district on July 2, 2005, revealed details of their plans for the three districts. According to District Police chief, Niraj Singh, "We have found in the papers plans to attack or blow up police stations. There were also notebooks with details of how tribals of Bankura, Purulia and West Midnapore are 'exploited' and how they could be freed."

On July 12, echoing the findings of the Human Development Report 2004, the Minister for Tribal Affairs, Upen Kisku, stated at a public meeting at Bijaharpur, about 70 kilometres from the State capital, Kolkata, that Maoists have spread their tentacles among the tribal people as "we have not been able to provide irrigation facilities and electricity to them". This was reiterated by State CPI-M Secretary Anil Biswas, who said, "The Maoists are misguiding a section of youths in the poverty-stricken areas, cashing in on the lack of development."

Recent evidences indicate that the Naxalite spread is not just confined to the Bankura, Purulia and Medinipur Districts, but is making inroads in the Hooghly and Nadia Districts as well. In December 2004, nine Naxalites, six from Nadia and three from Hooghly, were arrested with propaganda material. In Hooghly, the police have identified the Jangipara police station area as the hub of Naxalite activities in the District, while Naxalite presence has also been reported from other areas like Goghata, Khanakul, Chanditala and Dadpur. North and South 24 Parganas are also being considered as 'targeted' districts. Barasat, Belgharia, Agarpara, Barrackore and Naihati areas in North 24 Parganas and Gosaba, Basanti areas in South 24 Parganas are said to be witnessing an increase in the support base of the Maoists.

Further, Kolkata has emerged as a main operational base for the Naxalites. This was revealed by Sushil Ray and Patit Paban Halder, two senior Maoist leaders arrested from Belpahari by the Special Operations Group (SOG) on May 24, 2005. Following this disclosure, on June 1, CPI-Maoist 'politburo' member Asit Jana was arrested from the Hind Motor area of the capital city. Asit reportedly confessed during interrogation that the house where he and his associates had been staying was their main operational base in the region. According to Asit, they used small-time courier companies even to send consignments of explosives to States like Bihar, Orissa, Jharkhand and Assam.

An internal assessment by the CPI-M reportedly corroborates the fact that, in Bagmari, Jadavpur and Behala areas of Kolkata, the Maoists are actively working against the ruling party and the Government. The assessment also recorded that Maoists were making efforts to infiltrate the academic community both in Jadavpur and Calcutta University, especially the students. In the urban areas the Naxalites are adopting a different strategy, taking part in anti-CPI-M and anti-Government agitations through front organisations. Revolutionary posters and underground campaign leaflets against the CPI-M and State Government have been put up and distributed in key areas like the Writers' Building, different Government offices, Calcutta University, Jadavpur University and railway stations.

The current Maoist strategy for West Bengal appears to be a much-improved version of the Naxalbari uprising of March 1967. In an interview to The Telegraph published on July 15, a 'central committee' member of the CPI-Maoist, identified as 'Comrade Dhruba' remarked that, apart from the Bankura, Purulia and Medinipur Districts, "our mass base in Murshidabad, Malda, Burdwan and Nadia is ready. After five years, we will launch our strikes." When asked whether the Maoists had any plans for Kolkata, he said, "We do not plan violence in Kolkata because we know when we establish our base there, people will be forced to obey us."

While replying to a debate in the State Legislative Assembly on July 14, Chief Minister Buddhadev Bhattacharjee stated that, "the current version of terror culture is an import from Andhra Pradesh", adding, "neither this is an extension of the Naxalite Movement nor this has any local basis. They aren't local people. They are outsiders who are using some local youth in a game of bloodshed."

But this assessment is, at best, partial. The Andhra influence cannot be denied, and the current disorders are not an extension of the Naxalite Movement of the 1960's and 70's. There are, in fact, a much better and efficiently organized movement, which is rapidly extending its tentacles. The Naxalites definitely cross State boundaries, depending on the ground situation, and the Chief Minister's position that the present violence in the State has no 'local basis' is no more than an attempt to avoid responsibility for the incompetence of his own State machinery. Such denials will only lead to a deepening of the existing unrest.