Prior to his taking charge, the Jehanabad incident of November 13, 2005 had already provided evidence of this war, and the fact that any administration keen on addressing the plight of the state would have to confront this challenge. And there is no single element that more clearly illustrates the character of this war than the conflict between the Left Wing extremists (alternatively known as Naxalites or Maoists) and the landlord’s ‘army’, the Ranvir Sena.

The Ranvir Sena has suffered several reverses over the past years, and had come to be regarded by many as a spent force in Bihar. It has, nevertheless, remained continuously active, and there are now reasons to believe that it could secure the political patronage that it needs to stage a comeback in the State’s murderous politics.

In its early years, the Ranvir Sena located its support base among upper caste politicians, as well as among allies in the local bureaucracy and the police, in addition to its committed supporters among the landed classes. It was the politician-bureaucrat-police nexus that had aided its initial consolidation, and this was confirmed with the arrest of the Sena’s chief, Brahmeshwar Singh Mukhiya, when a diary was recovered from his possession, containing the names and contacts of many upper caste politicians, journalists and police officers. It was this convergence of traditional elites and state structure that sustained groups like the Ranvir Sena, and that have now sparked expectations of its revitalisation.

With 55 out of the 243 Assembly seats in the State, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), a coalition partner in the present State Government, commands decisive influence. The BJP shares its traditional support base among the upper caste landlords with that of the Ranvir Sena.

With the ascent of elements drawn from this traditional elite in the new Government, analysts like Shaibal Gupta of the Bihar-based Asian Development Research Institute, fear that "the Ranvir Sena would now be encouraged to re-mobilise and operate in a more overt manner." A national news television channel pointed out, in a report on December 11, 2005, that, at a recent public meeting at Kurtha in Arwal District, Ranvir Sena men were spotted sharing a dais with an upper caste Minister in the State Government. A vernacular daily reported on November 22 that, during a raid within Patna’s Beur prison, a mobile phone was recovered from the custody of imprisoned Sena chief, Brahmeshwar Singh Mukhiya, raising concerns that he was directing the Sena’s activities from the prison premises.

Founded in September 1994 in the Belaur Village of the Udwantnagar Block in Bhojpur District, the Ranvir Sena came into existence primarily to counter the influence of various Naxalite groups in central Bihar. From Bhojpur, over a period of time, the Ranvir Sena spread to Jehanabad, Patna, Rohtas, Aurangabad, Gaya, Arwal and Buxar Districts. It mobilised the landed gentry, especially from the Bhumihar caste in the Hindu caste hierarchy, against the erstwhile Maoist Communist Centre (MCC), the Communist Party of India – Marxist Leninist (Party Unity) [or CPI-ML (Party Unity)] and the CPI-ML (Liberation). The Sena’s ‘protection’ became necessary for upper caste landlords when the CPI-ML (Liberation), Party Unity and the MCC, began taking up class and caste issues, challenging the landlords and reclaiming their surplus land to redistribute it among the landless scheduled castes and backward castes.

Unlike the other ‘private armies’ or ‘senas’, such as the Brahmarshi Sena, Kuer Sena, Kisan Morcha and Ganga Sena, the Ranvir Sena was militarily far better organised and its cadres much better paid. Official sources indicated that, in year 2000, each member of the Sena was paid between Rupees 1,100 and Rupees 1,200 per month, as landowners financed the Sena through generous subscriptions. Further, the life of each cadre was insured for INR 100,000. The outfit, however, met with a setback when its chief, Brahmeshwar Singh Mukhiya, was arrested in Patna on August 29, 2002, and another of its senior leaders, Bhuar Thakur, was arrested on December 24, 2002.

Prior to 2002, the Sena had, according to data available, committed eight massacres, where the victims numbered more than 10, and another 19, where the fatalities numbered less than 10 in each case. The most prominent of these were the Bathanitola massacre in Bhojpur District on July 11, 1996, which left 22 Scheduled Caste agricultural labourers dead; the Lakshmanpur-Bathe massacre in Jehanabad District on December 1, 1997, in which 58 scheduled castes were killed; and the Mianpur massacre in Aurangabad District on June 16, 2000, which accounted for 35 victims. Since the arrest of its head in August 2002, the Ranvir Sena has not executed any massacres, and appeared to have been considerably weakened. But the persistence of the dynamics that prompted its formation, and the continuing ground realities that accentuate caste conflict, undermine the possibilities of peace in the State.

While, the reportage on the Ranvir Sena-Maoist conflict is extensive, the activities of the Sena at the district and local level have largely gone unreported. Though the levels of Ranvir Sena violence have been whittled down, the organisation remains active. Some incidents in the post-2002 demonstrate the Sena’s continued penchant for violence:

March 8, 2005 – Two members of the Dalit community and CPI-ML (Liberation) supporters were killed by activists of the Ranvir Sena at Charpokhri village in Bhojpur District.

March 28, 2004 – Three villagers were shot dead by Ranvir Sena at village Bishunbigha in Jehanabad district.

January 3, 2004 – Ranvir Sena activists shot dead five people and critically injured two others in a Bariari Village in Arwal District.

After Ranvir Sena leaders Bade Sharma and Vishveshkar Roy were killed by Communist Party of India – Maoist (CPI-Maoist) cadres during the Jehanabad attack on November 13, a spokesperson for the Sena declared, "the Maoist acts will force Sena activists to retaliate… we have to a give reply in their language by killing Maoist supporters and sympathizers." On November 20, Home Secretary, Hemchand Sirohi, in a letter sent to all District Magistrates and Superintendents of Police, warned that the Ranvir Sena may target railway property in the State to avenge the killing and abduction of its members by Maoists in Jehanabad and asked them to tighten security. Further, the Special Inspector-General (Jehanabad), S.K, Bhardwaj, indicated that the Police had identified the villages of Ganiyari, Pariyari, Majidpur, Aiyara, Parhar, Puran, Gadopur and Khajuri in Arwal District and Sukalchak, Bistol, Mandebigha, Kakariya, Balabigha, Kinarpur, Salalpur, Khiderpur, Mokar, Pandaul, Panditpur, Sawan Bigha and Salempur in Jehanabad District as being vulnerable to a Ranvir Sena backlash.

The Sena’s decline was directly engineered by the increasing clout and unity of Left Wing extremist groups in the State. As these Maoist groups steadily strengthened their independent bases, they found it expedient to consolidate power by mergers and deals between warring factions. Thus, on August 11, 1998, the erstwhile Peoples War Group (PWG) merged with the CPI-ML (Party Unity), in an apparent effort to secure a foothold in the Districts of Bhojpur, Arwal and Jehanabad, where the latter was strong. Six years later, after an extended period of negotiation, on September 21, 2004, the PWG – which had its strongest base in Andhra Pradesh – united with the Bihar-based MCC to form the CPI-Maoist. This was followed by the declaration of a unilateral cease-fire by the CPI-Maoist, at the beginning of 2005, against the CPI-ML (Liberation), in order to "stop the loss being suffered by the allies and concentrate on the larger objective of the Naxal movement and to fight the class enemies."

It was this larger objective that was furthered through the Jehanabad attack. Azad, the All-India spokesperson of the CPI-Maoist Central Committee (Provisional), thus declared, "This biggest-ever operation in Bihar’s history was a complete success and the CPI-Maoist was able to achieve its three objectives. Firstly, it was able to secure the release of its leaders, activists and ordinary prisoners who have been languishing in the jail for many years; secondly, it carried out the people’s verdict against the reactionary state-sponsored Ranvir Sena by annihilating its leaders and capturing several of its activists; and, thirdly, it seized hundreds of rifles and thousands of rounds of ammunition."

The new Chief Minister has recognized that the core issue of conflict in the State has been the failure to draft and implement effective land reform schemes in Bihar, and to implement existing land ceiling laws, such as the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961. As a result, he has announced the decision to introduce a "government at your doorstep" programme, which would ensure ‘on-the-spot solutions’ to the people’s problems relating to land and other disputes. The task, however, will not be as easy as the announcement of the programme may suggest: according to the State’s Department of Revenue and Land Reform data for year 1999, there were close to 1,472 cases involving 136,821.17 acres of land pending in various courts, some for more than forty years.

A reminder of the enormity of the task involved was demonstrated on December 12, 2005, when five persons, all from a minority community, were killed in Chilraon Village of East Champaran District, by suspected assailants from the Bhumihar and Yadav communities. The feud was over a land dispute that was under litigation. The claimants, from the Bhumihar and Yadav communities, had reportedly gone to take occupation of the land, when the incident occurred.

Although, the Ranvir Sena will not be able to match the operational capabilities of the CPI-Maoist, there is much to suggest that a new chapter in the ongoing ‘war’ has now been opened with the Jehanabad attack and the subsequent abduction and killing of Ranvir Sena cadres. This, in combination with the emerging political alignments, would suggest a revival of the caste army, though a return to pre-2002 levels of violence by the Ranvir Sena is not within the realm of proximate possibility. Nevertheless, a renewal of sustained and targeted violence would appear to be very much on the cards.