India has long seen a reconstruction role for itself in Afghanistan, despite its lack of direct military involvement in the country. Its interests there are obvious: A strong Kabul that keeps the Taliban -- and by extension al-Qaida -- in check also ensures that jihadi forces in Pakistan do not use Afghanistan as a backyard assembly line for militants who can then be turned against India, and the rest of the world.

But New Delhi is not finding its Afghan sojourn easy.

Earlier this month, the Indian embassy in Kabul was attacked for the second time in 15 months. Last July, 58 people, including two diplomats, died and nearly 150 were injured in the deadliest suicide bombing since the fall of the Taliban in 2001.

The latest attack could have been as devastating, but enhanced security resulted in reduced casualties, though at least 17 died and over 60 were injured.

Although the Taliban quickly claimed responsibility for the attack, both Kabul and New Delhi suspect a Pakistani role -- particularly, rogue elements in the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) possibly assisting non-state players in orchestrating the strike.

A statement released by India's foreign ministry said, "The attack was carried out by elements from outside Afghanistan seeking to damage the excellent India-Afghan relations."

The Afghan foreign ministry said that the blast was "planned and implemented from outside Afghanistan."

Indian Foreign Secretary, Nirupama Rao, who flew to Kabul immediately after the attack, said, "Whoever is responsible for this attack is against the people of Afghanistan and against the people of India." Rao called on Afghan President Hamid Karzai during his visit, as well as the Afghan foreign minister and national security advisor.

Ironically, the latest attack against India comes at a time of confusing American signals -- called "schizophrenic'' by some Indian analysts -- regarding New Delhi's role in Afghanistan. In his recent strategic review, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, commander of the U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan, wrote that India's increasing influence in Afghanistan could "exacerbate" regional tensions and lead to Pakistani "countermeasures" in Afghanistan or even India.

According to McChrystal, "The current Afghan government is perceived by Islamabad to be pro-Indian." At the same time, though, he admitted that India's activities largely benefitted the Afghan people.

The attack in Kabul, which followed as if on cue, prompted some analysts to link it to McChrystal's comments, and served to underline the often conflicting strategic interests pursued by the many nations currently braving the cauldron of Afghanistan.

Indeed, there are indications that Washington is under pressure from Pakistan to factor resistance to India's role in Afghanistan into its Af-Pak policy. Islamabad sees a security risk in any Indian presence on its western front hemming it in between the shared border in the east.

America, meanwhile, needs Pakistan as an ally to flush out al-Qaida terrorists holed up in the frontier tribal regions bordering Afghanistan.

New Delhi, however, believes that most of the American military assistance extended to Pakistan to fight terror has only helped build an arsenal designed for use against India. That explains New Delhi's anxiety over the $7.5 billion aid package promised to Pakistan over the next five years under the recently signed Kerry-Lugar Bill, as well as the 18 additional F-16 fighter jets promised to Islamabad.

Thus, there is every indication that India is not going to cede its Afghan positions -- which have grown dramatically since the end of Taliban rule -- to Pakistan so easily.

Direct Indian military involvement in Afghanistan is infeasible due to the domestic political repercussions of soldiers being killed in battle, as well as the risk of opening a war front with Pakistan. But India's civilian involvement, estimated at over $2 billion, is only expected to grow.

Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh recently said that the people of Afghanistan, as well as European and American leaders, favor India's role there. "We have not supplied any arms, we are also helping them in construction and financing of projects in power, health and education sectors," Singh said.

Apart from checking the extremists, India's imprint on western Afghanistan opens a potential corridor to reach hydrocarbon-rich Iran, Iraq and the broader Middle East. India imports the bulk of its gas from Qatar and has been looking at Iran as a potential additional source. Its attempts so far via the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) gas pipeline have been stymied due to America's resistance to the project.

India has also been looking at the prospects of an undersea pipeline from Qatar, which could bring Iran online at some future date. Indian firms have chalked out big plans to invest in Iran's gas rich South Pars fields.

Given the security and transit issues that India has with Pakistan, particularly the volatile Baluchistan, Afghanistan could prove to be a good landing point for New Delhi to keep an eye on its main energy sources, while also limiting Islamabad's influence there to a much smaller pocket.

With an air base already located in neighboring Tajikistan, India could also look at the option of beefing up its military presence in the region at some future date. Needless to say, all of these potential scenarios are looked on with alarm by Pakistan.

**Siddharth Srivastava is a New Delhi-based journalist covering foreign and strategic affairs, security, politics, defense, business and lifestyle issues. He has been a correspondent for the Times of India and is widely published in newspapers and magazines in Asia, Europe and America. His Web site can be found here.