The DDH-22 is officially designated as a "helicopter-carrying destroyer" by Japan's Maritime Self Defense Forces (MSDF). But with its flush flight deck and large, starboard-side island structure, it looks a lot like a "light" aircraft carrier. While Japanese law states that carriers "exceed the war potential needed for a minimal level of self-defense" permitted by Japan's pacifistic post-war constitution, the MSDF has craved such capabilities since the 1960s, and Tokyo has long been inching closer and closer to this goal. Hatoyama's decision to commission the DDH-22 culminates a request first made when the opposition Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was in power, suggesting that a bipartisan consensus exists for the expansion of Japan's naval power.

While defense officials are loathe to say so publicly, the move is at least partly directed at China. Though Japan is still the Pacific's second-largest naval power (after the United States), Beijing's blistering military buildup is threatening to blunt Tokyo's superiority at sea. Earlier this year, China's People's Liberation Army Navy flexed its military muscle by deploying cruise-missile-laden destroyers around energy-rich gas fields in the East China Sea, and by conducting training exercises in the disputed Senkaku Islands.

The provocations so rattled Japan's Defense Ministry that it soberly concluded in its annual defense white paper that Tokyo's military posture was "inadequate" to fend off these Chinese encroachments. Hatoyama has already demonstrated his ability to offer a conciliatory posture toward Beijing -- including an apology for Japan's wartime transgressions, a pledge not to visit the controversial Yasukuni Shrine, and the inking of a joint military exercise agreement with Beijing. By approving these defense acquisitions, he has signaled that he is also willing to confront hard military realities.

The implications extend beyond Japan's immediate periphery. Since the end of the Cold War, Japanese governments have been incrementally loosening the MSDF's constitutional shackles and approving a string of increasingly ambitious international maritime missions, ranging from transporting equipment in the United Nations peacekeeping mission in Cambodia (1992) to humanitarian operations after Indonesia's tsunami (2005) to anti-piracy missions off the Somali coast (2007).

By approving the DDH-22, Hatoyama has ensured that the MSDF's international role will continue to grow. Such destroyers will further equip the MSDF with a wide spectrum of capabilities for missions such as refueling other vessels, transporting personnel and equipment, and conducting surveillance of surrounding waters. More generally, the ships' ability to deploy rotary-wing aircraft at great distance from Japanese waters suggest they can help safeguard Japan's global lines of supply and promote its overseas interests, particularly given Tokyo's overwhelming dependence on Middle Eastern oil and its deepening involvement in Africa.

Regionally, Hatoyama has also made Tokyo's naval capabilities the centerpiece of his lofty East Asia Community initiative. Most of the preliminary cooperative measures he outlined at a keynote address in Singapore last month involved the MSDF, from inking agreements on disaster management and maritime accidents to crafting multilateral efforts among littoral states to counter piracy in the Asia-Pacific. And far from merely hoping that such arrangements would materialize, he firmly indicated and specifically outlined how Japan would make a "proactive contribution" in each of these fields -- such as dispatching MSDF vessels as yu-ai boats (literally translating to "fraternal boats") in disaster-relief operations. "Japan," Hatoyama added confidently, "is a maritime country that has the know-how and assets to maintain the peace at sea."

With Japan scheduled to add even more of these destroyers to its arsenal over the next few years, naval experts James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara project that "the convergence of intent and capability could very well produce a traditional maritime power on the East Asian littoral." The specter of a militarily ambitious Tokyo might trigger alarm bells in an Asia still haunted by the nightmares of Japanese conquest and brutality during World War II. But the possibility of a full-scale Japanese aircraft carrier capacity is still far off. The DDH-22 lacks a special "ski-jump" deck needed for offensive fixed-wing jets to take off. And even if Japan does acquire the necessary technology, STRATFOR, a leading global intelligence agency, says that there is a "substantial learning curve" for both aviators and ship crews in becoming proficient in taking off and landing these aircraft.

Politically, too, Hatoyama's fledgling and inexperienced government is currently hamstrung by a fragile coalition. Further down the road, Japan's graying population will continue to exert pressure on the country's tight budget, while even incremental increases in Tokyo's capabilities will raise the eyebrows of Japan's war-wary citizenry.

Even so, it is worth considering the prospects for a confident and assertive Japanese navy in the coming years. Such a sea change would surely have significant consequences for the regional balance of power in Northeast Asia, and for global security at large.

**Prashanth Parameswaran is a research fellow for Asia Chronicle, a daily online journal, and blogs about international affairs at GlobalEye.