WPR: What is the extent of Turkey's diplomatic and trade ties with South America?
Gareth Jenkins: During the Cold War, Turkey's ties with South America were so limited as to be almost nonexistent, but a 1995 visit by Turkey's then-President Suleyman Demirel triggered an increase in ties. There has been another flurry of interest over the last couple of years under the Justice and Development Party (AKP), with Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan paying an official visit to South America in May and June 2010. But ties remain very limited. Most Turkish trade with South America is, not surprisingly, with Brazil, but at just $1.4 billion in 2009 it still accounts for only a little more than 1 percent of Turkey's total foreign trade, and the balance is heavily in Brazil's favor by a margin of nearly three to one.
Brazil and Turkey also cooperated in early 2010 in an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to broker a deal to forestall additional U.N. sanctions against Iran. But that was probably a one-off. Turkey and South America are simply too far apart for regional cooperation, and, for the moment at least, neither packs the global punch necessary for the two to be effective players outside their respective regions.
WPR: In economic terms, what are the important areas of comparative advantage and complementarity?
Jenkins: For South America, the main advantage of closer economic ties with Turkey probably lies in its domestic market of 75 million inhabitants. But while there is scope for increased exports from South America to Turkey, there are much larger and potentially more-lucrative markets in other countries.
For Turkey, the main advantage would be energy. Turkey has almost no hydrocarbons of its own and is heavily dependent on energy imports. It currently imports nearly two-thirds of its natural gas and one-third of its oil from Russia and knows that it needs to diversify its sources. Significantly, several of the agreements recently signed by the AKP with Latin American countries have been in the energy sector. But, as with economic relations as a whole, although there is scope for growth, it would be surprising if Latin America became a major energy supplier to Turkey.
WPR: How high a priority do the countries involved place on pushing the relationship further?
Jenkins: The increasing engagement has been primarily driven by Turkey, mainly because the AKP is trying to enhance Turkey's international status and make it a global player, rather than because of any special interest in South America. But the AKP's ambitions outstrip the country's resources and there is a danger of overstretch. For example, at the most basic level, Ankara is having difficulty finding diplomats to staff all the new embassies it is opening around the world. Ultimately, the AKP's ambitions would be better served by focusing on specific regions, and South America is simply too far away and with too little at stake to be a priority.
