Eight years after the bloody civil war that split Côte d’Ivoire in two, hard fought efforts to unify the government-controlled south and rebel-held north have once again crumbled. The November 28, 2010 presidential election, which drew 80 percent of the Ivorian electorate, was hoped to be a watershed in the painfully slow detente between two sides. Hopes were promptly dashed, however, when incumbent Laurent Gbagbo refused to cede power following internationally verified results declaring former Prime Minister Alassane Ouattara the victor. In response to ensuing waves of protests and other attempts at his ouster, Gbagbo has supported state security forces, Liberian mercenaries and various militias in quelling pro-Ouattara groups; the latter have in turn massacred those obstructing their path to the presidential palace.
The post-poll conflicts have sparked an exodus of almost 200,000 refugees into 11 neighboring countries and displaced upwards of one million internally, effectively thrusting the country back to the brink of civil war. Recent reports of crimes against humanity are raising questions about whether the UN Security Council may respond as resolutely as it did to the Libyan conflict.
The Worst of Times, the Best of Times
Gbagbo’s intransigence could not have come at a worse time for international security and humanitarian actors. Less than three weeks following the West African election, civil disobedience swept across North Africa, culminating in Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions, a Security Council-authorized military intervention in Libya and growing civil tension from the Fertile Crescent to Mount Sinai. Although Libya is the sole conflict in which Security Council-authorized military forces have intervened, its attendant refugee crisis has exacerbated tenuous security conditions in Egypt and Tunisia, further compounding regional instability. Meanwhile, Japan is struggling to rebuild amid threats of radiation leaks from nuclear reactors damaged by the tsunami that has put the combined total of those dead and still missing at 28,000. Between the refugee crises and war in North Africa, the growing likelihood of similar outcomes in the Middle East, and Japan’s unfolding disaster, international humanitarian and security actors are overburdened.
For Gbagbo, the string of emergencies has created an opportunity to further tighten his bloody grip on the reins of presidential power. Indeed, international attention shifted toward rising revolutionary tensions in December, just as Gbagbo’s violent campaign was taking form. By the time Tunisia and Egypt came under new leadership in mid-February, the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) put the post-electoral death toll at approximately 300.
Since late February, a surge in violence has overwhelmed humanitarian personnel. Moustapha Soumare, UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Liberia noted in a March press conference that the recent rise in Ivorian violence had forced an estimated 40,000 refugees into Liberia in only three days. The January Flash Appeal of $55 million to fund humanitarian efforts responding to Liberia’s refugee influx, he said, was already outdated, no longer reflecting the intensifying crisis. Accompanying Mr. Soumare was Ndolamb Ngokwey, Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Cote d’Ivoire and Humanitarian Coordinator for the UN Peacekeeping Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI). He emphasized that Côte d’Ivoire’s January Flash Appeal of $32 million was outdated as well, noting that the number of displaced people in the country’s capital, Abidjan, already “stood at a staggering 300,000 and could grow to 450,000.” Only one week later, the number of displaced people in Abidjan had risen to 500,000.
The most recent reports from Côte d’Ivoire suggest not only increased fighting between the two sides, but violence directed toward civilians and UN peacekeepers, the latter two of which have raised the specter of international intervention. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported “some 50,000 people have been displaced by two days of fighting in the town of Duékoué, which was captured by pro-Ouattara forces.” The death toll from the Duékoué conflict alone ranges from several hundred to 800. Throughout this period, UN staff and vehicles have been targeted by stone-throwers, at least six UNOCI staff members have been seriously attacked, one UN member killed by a stray bullet, and the FRCI fired at a UN helicopter. On March 25, Permanent Representative of Côte d’Ivoire to the UN, Youssoufou Bamba, went before the Security Council to plead for help. Arguing that “the world was witnessing a long-planned ethnic cleansing and genocide” by Gbagbo, Mr. Bamba demanded “rigorous” action from the Council.
The UN’s humanitarian and security arms have responded to the deteriorating situation in ways similar to its treatment of Libya. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) nearly tripled the Liberian Flash Appeal to $146.5 million and authorized $10.4 million from the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) to Côte d’Ivoire, the combination of which exceeds the amount pledged to Libya’s refugee crisis. On March 30, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1975, which imposes targeted sanctions against Gbagbo and his close associates, empowered the UNOCI to “to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence,” “condemns in the strongest terms the recent escalation of violence throughout the country which could amount to crimes against humanity,” and demands Gbagbo to "immediately step aside." The strongly-worded Resolution resembles that adopted prior to the authorization of a no-fly zone to protect civilians in Libya.
The Security Council’s Next Move
The conflict in Côte d’Ivoire contains many of the same elements that led the UN Security Council to authorize international military intervention in Libya: a recalcitrant despot refusing to relinquish power despite tightening Security Council sanctions; a growing risk that the situation could destabilize the surrounding region (several countries near Côte d’Ivoire are engulfed in conflict or have recently emerged from civil wars, including Liberia, which has been the destination of more than 150,000 refugees); and most importantly, an unprotected civilian population now caught in the crossfire.
Although Council members adopted Resolution 1975 unanimously, most of them urged restraint by all parties involved and backed efforts of the African Union and the Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS) to work toward a political solution. In other words, the Council is still seeking alternatives to authorization of another Libyan-like international military intervention. One reason is that political capital for such a drastic move depends largely on the success of coalition forces in routing Qaddafi’s regime. And even then, the Council must assess what kind of government will fill the vacuum. In the meantime, however, the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire is worsening, civilian casualties are rising, and broader regional stability is at stake.
