In particular, Brazil and India from the Global South have significantly narrowed the developmental gap that has defined their relations with the Global North for decades, and Japan and Germany have become the world’s third and fourth largest national economies, respectively.  These developments have led many diplomats to argue that the Council should reform its membership in the likeness of the shifting international community it seeks to protect—only once has the Council reformed, increasing its six non-permanent seats to ten in 1965. 

Is Reform Feasible? 

One obstacle in particular lies on the path to a more representative Security Council: the P-5’s veto power.  In order to reform the Council’s membership structure, the UN Charter must be amended, and amendments require support from both two-thirds of the General Assembly and three-fifths of the Council, including all five, veto-wielding permanent members. 

But permanent members have little incentive to change a system that gives them final authorization of substantive resolutions, such as imposing economic sanctions on rogue states and deploying military and peacekeeping forces.  Essentially, the veto gives each P-5 country the power to derail any substantive resolution that might hurt its interests, despite the fact that Security Council members are mandated to act in the interests of the global community.  With these considerations in mind, realistic reformers have limited their efforts to expanding permanent and non-permanent seats; talk of veto-tampering is off the table for now.

What Would Reform Look Like? 

Since the end of the Cold War, seven countries (Brazil, India, Germany, Japan, Nigeria, Egypt and South Africa) and, to a lesser extent, two regions (the European Union and Africa) have lobbied for permanent Security Council seats.  Many of the countries have gone so far as to threaten reduced military and financial contributions if their demands are not met. 

In response to these growing demands, a range of reform proposals have cropped up.  Two of the more plausible reform packages came from a 2004 panel organized by Secretary-General Kofi Annan, both of which consider expanding the Council to twenty-four members apportioned evenly across four world regions.  Model A suggests adding six permanent seats (two from Africa; two from Asia and Pacific; one from Europe; and one from the Americas), and three additional two-year rotating seats (overall distribution of seats in this category: four from Africa; three from Asia and Pacific; one from Europe; and four from the Americas).  Model B proposes adding eight new seats, renewable every four years (two from each of the four world regions), and one additional two-year rotating seat (overall distribution of seats in this category: four from Africa; three from Asia and Pacific; one from Europe; and three from the Americas). 

Although Model A addresses the demand for more permanent seats, and both models increase global representation, neither broaches the subject of vetoes because of permanent members’ sensitivity to the subject.  Thus, for the time being, reform packages with a realistic chance of passing in both the General Assembly and the Security Council will continue leaving final authorization of substantive resolutions to the veto-wielding P-5, preventing fundamental change in the Council’s structure. 

Long-Term Strategy

Although the short-term prospects for bringing the Security Council’s anachronistic structure all the way into the twenty-first century are grim, aspiring reformers should not waver.  To the contrary, they should, as some currently do, view reform packages resembling Models A and B as initial steps in a longer-term strategy to make more fundamental changes.  Once on the Council, preferably in a permanent capacity, new members would have increased leverage to negotiate more favorable terms later on.  Of course, “more favorable terms” will vary from country to country: Revocation of the veto power altogether?  Limits to the use of existing vetoes?  Perhaps, an extension of the veto to new permanent seats?  Whatever the end goal, reformers should patiently prepare to move incrementally over a long period of time.