Fresh feuding has broken out among Naga rebels twenty-three years after a bloody internecine struggle left scores dead and an insurgency divided. Another split is now threatening to impact on the protracted Naga peace process.
On June 7, 2011, a meeting of
the Khaplang faction of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN-K) ‘expelled’ its 'chairman',
S.S. Khaplang, on charges of behaving in a ‘unilateral and dictatorial manner.’
This essentially means that the NSCN-K has split with those who have expelled
Khaplang choosing ‘General’ Khole Konyak, until now the group’s
‘commander-in-chief’, as their new chairman. The outfit will drop Khaplang from
its name, and is shortly expected to announce a new name. Khaplang is expected
to continue to head a faction under the original name, NSCN-K, as he still has
a considerable following and can command his cadres from his base in Myanmar.
An internal power struggle has
troubled the NSCN-K for some time now, and Khaplang’s ouster is a culmination
of growing difficulties within the group. On March 17, 2011, Chipu Menon aka
‘Brigadier’ Khungwang, head of the NSCN-K’s operations in Arunachal Pradesh,
was killed near Mon in Nagaland after allegedly being ‘summoned’ by some senior
leaders of the outfit for ‘urgent discussions’. Media reports indicate that
some NSCN-K leaders had claimed Menon was awarded ‘capital punishment’ for
allegedly killing five senior citizen from Bordoria and Kaimai villages under
the Tirap District on the pretext that they were working for the rival
Isak-Muivah faction of the NSCN (NSCN-IM) in 1999. Menon was also
accused by some of his colleagues of setting up a new rebel group, the
Arunachal Naga Liberation Force, in Tirap and Changlang in 2010, and extorting
money from local businessmen in the name of this new outfit. Menon’s killing
demonstrated that the power struggle within the NSCN-K had become acute.
The NSCN now has four factions
— the Isak-Muivah faction, the NSCN-K splinter headed by Khole Konyak, the
NSCN-K headed by Khaplang, and NSCN-Unification. The NSCN came into being in
1980, after a split from the Naga National Council (NNC). Led by Thuingaleng
Muivah, Isak Chishi Swu and S. S. Khaplang, the NSCN parted ways because it
opposed the NNC’s signing of the Shillong Accord in 1975 and its acceptance of
the Indian Constitution. In 1988, the NSCN itself split over purported
‘ideological differences’ in a violent parting of ways. Early that year, Muivah
apparently received news that the Indian Government was ready for talks within
the framework of the country’s Constitution. Although the offer was rejected,
there were widespread rumours that Swu and Muivah had ‘sold out’ and planned to
oust Khaplang, seize arms from the Konyak cadres and surrender in India. Amidst
a ‘National Assembly’ session of the group that was called to resolve the
controversy these reports had generated, Khaplang’s fighters, backed by a
section of Burmese troops, attacked Muivah’s group in a pre-emptive strike at
dawn on April 30, 1988. Some 140 of Muivah’s cadres, primarily Tangkhuls, were
killed. This incident resulted in the split of the NSCN, as Isak (Swu) and
Muivah formed the NSCN-IM, while Khaplang gave his own name to his faction, the
NSCN-K.
In 1997, the NSCN-IM and the
Government of India signed a ceasefire agreement and entered into a peace
process to resolve what the outfit calls the ‘Indo-Naga conflict.’ Today,
fourteen years later, and more than seventy rounds of talks across the world
between the NSCN-IM and the Government of India, a ‘solution’ remains elusive.
The NSCN-K followed suit, entering into a truce with New Delhi on April 30,
2001, but has not begun formal talks yet.
Another split, though
bloodless, came about on November 23, 2007. Several NSCN-IM cadres, led by its
one-time ‘home minister’ Azheto Chopey, broke away from the group and formed
the NSCN-Unification. On January 21, 2008, the NSCN-IM ‘dismissed’ 27 of its
cadres, who had defected along with Chopey from ‘national service’ with effect
from January 22, 2008, for ‘deliberately defying’ a directive of the ‘yaruiwo’
(prime minister) Isak Chishi Swu, to return from the “reactionary camp” and
report to the Council Headquarters. Since January 2008, the NSCN-U has been
involved in bitter clashes with the NSCN-IM, culminating in the death of 14 of
its cadres near Dimapur, Nagaland’s commercial hub, on May 16, 2008. Since
2009, however, the NSCN-U has been maintaining a low profile.
Questions have always been
asked as to which of the principal NSCN factions (NSCN-IM or NSCN-K) was the
‘true representative’ of the Naga people; or whether New Delhi or the Nagas
themselves believed there could be lasting peace with a possible accord being
reached with either one of the Naga rebel factions. That the answer was always
in the negative is indicated by continuing efforts by Naga civil society groups,
particularly Church leaders and the Naga Hoho (the apex tribal council), in
trying to unite the two rebel factions. The logic for this, as yet
unsuccessful, unity effort is simple — only an accord by the Government of
India jointly with the two NSCN factions has the potential of bringing lasting
peace. It is impossible to see New Delhi signing two separate deals with two
Naga rebel factions fighting over more or less the same issues. With the split
in the NSCN-K, the job of Naga civil society and the Government would appear to
have been made somewhat more difficult.
There is, however, another side
to the story. Reports trickling out of the anti-Khaplang camp suggest that
Khaplang was first impeached by the outfit’s ‘Tatar Hoho’ or ‘parliament’ and
then expelled, not just for behaving in an ‘autocratic’ manner, but for
obstructing the process of unification among the Naga insurgent factions. The
accusations against him included the charge that he had unilaterally
‘dismissed’ ‘General’ Khole Konyak, the outfit’s ‘commander-in-chief’, who was
also the undeclared vice-chairman of the group, and appointed a new
vice-chairman; that he had ordered his leaders not to attend the Naga
reconciliation meeting organized by the Forum for Naga Reconciliation on September
18, 2010; and that he has been in exile for too long, operating from his base
in Myanmar, and had consequently lost sight of things on the ground.
If charges of Khaplang actually
ordering his men to keep away from the Naga reconciliation efforts are true,
there is a possibility that his ouster could actually hasten the process of
unification of the NSCN-IM and the faction headed by Khole Konyak. There is
possible speculation, moreover, that Khaplang’s ouster may have come about
because the Hemi Naga from Western Myanmar was not fitting into New Delhi’s
scheme of things with regard to a peace deal; and that Khole Konyak and others
have inched closer to sorting out differences with the Government. Khaplang, in
this scenario, would appear as a spoiler, because his affiliations are with
Nagas from Myanmar, allowing him to strike a far more belligerent posture.
Khaplang’s ouster is certainly
going to disrupt, or at least weaken, the Myanmar connection of several
frontline rebel groups from the Northeast, such as the Paresh Baruah faction of
the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) and Manipur’s United National
Liberation Front (UNLF), which have found safe haven in
that country under the wings of the NSCN-K. These rebel formations, operating
out of Myanmar, were also provided logistic support by NSCN-K cadres in
Nagaland, parts of Assam, and Arunachal Pradesh –states that either share
direct borders with Myanmar or that are close to these borders (Assam). This
certainly gave Government agencies reason to undermine Khaplang.
These are, of course, just
teasers; the reality may be nothing more than the usual power struggle within
insurgent formations.
Khaplang’s ouster in a
bloodless coup became possible because he has been away from the Naga heartland
(Nagaland) for far too long, and had lost touch with the Naga people, mainly in
Nagaland and Manipur. Under the new circumstances, the two factions – Khaplang
and Khole Konyak – may both weaken substantially; or Khaplang may be
progressively sidelined, leaving behind a stronger Khole Konyak formation. In
either case, New Delhi may find itself in a better position to dictate terms to
the rebels. If, on the other hand, the NSCN-IM and Konyak factions move towards
unity in the days ahead, New Delhi would have to listen to a broader Naga
voice.
On June 10, 2011, Khaplang had
retaliated with the counter-expulsion of several breakaway leaders, including
‘general secretary’ Kitovi Zhimomi (one of those who is in charge of the Konyak
faction after Khaplang’s expulsion) and erstwhile ‘home minister’ Azheto
Chophy, besides six other functionaries. Khaplang’s silence on ‘General’ Khole
Konyak, the new ‘chairman’ named by the group, is, however, significant.
Khaplang has sought to add a new dimension to murky NSCN politics by saying
that members whom he has now expelled are actually members of NSCN-Unification,
and not his group, the NSCN-K. Khaplang has also formally declared that his
group would not be part of the Naga reconciliation process.
The realities of Naga insurgent
politics remain complicated, and the road to Naga peace is full of traps and
pitfalls. A single, united, Naga voice is still nowhere to be heard.