The timing of the move by the AFA, a key activist group within the U.S. religious right, is interesting on several levels. For one thing, it is being launched at a time of internal change within the conservative evangelical movement. And further complicating matters, the call for a boycott is coming in the run-up to November's midterm elections, which could usher in a shift in control of Congress and force a strategic retrenchment by all elements of the evangelical right.

With polls showing popular support for President George W. Bush eroding, political evangelical organizations are beginning to consider a future in which they might have to work with a Democrat-led Congress. For the more pragmatic, realistic evangelical organizations, this means winning as many political battles as possible before November -- even if this requires compromise. For idealists, however, the situation is more difficult. The idealist evangelical argues that they spent 15 years in efforts to win some degree of power within the federal government, and that they are close to achieving their core policy objectives (though not yet perfectly in position). In contrast to the realists, this segment of the religious right, then, is unlikely to compromise on their policy objectives and will support the GOP in the hope that the party can retain its majority status in Congress.

If Democrats win control of either the House or the Senate in November, one option for evangelical activists will be to follow the example of consumer and environmental groups, who -- seeing few opportunities to impact policy in Washington during the past five years -- have turned to campaigns in the marketplace and at the state level. In this sense, the AFA's boycott of Ford -- and its success or failure -- could have lasting implications: A boycott that fails decisively could leave the religious right appearing weaker and more fragmented than it really is. And a high-profile failure (which is not a given, but is possible in this case) also might have a chilling effect, dissuading other activist organizations from taking on battles in the marketplace.

AFA is the mainstay activist arm of the religious right. It is also the leading market-campaign group on the political right. The group claims to have approximately 3 million members, and it has a powerful voice in the media, particularly among mainstream conservative commentators. However, it has achieved mixed results in past attempts to change corporate policies. In November 2005, it initiated a highly successful campaign that pressured retailers to use the word "Christmas" in holiday-season advertisements and store displays. It was much less successful with campaigns targeting Kraft for its support of homosexual social events or, more recently, against CBS for its prime-time television content.

Despite AFA's past successes, the recent move against Ford is unlikely to succeed -- if for no other reason that consumers are much less likely to boycott certain brands when major purchases are involved. Boycotts against certain types of gasoline stations, candy bars, light bulbs or cleaning supplies are ideal, because foregoing a particular brand in any of these cases is not a decision with long-term consequences for the consumer. But decisions involving high-ticket items like cars, laundry machines and homes are much more complicated, and much less likely to be impacted by activist group campaigns.

It is not a foregone conclusion that AFA's campaign against Ford will fail, but the group has embarked on a high-risk strategy. The only way AFA can claim victory is if Ford pulls the ad campaign targeting gay consumers; if it does not, the AFA at some point will have to drop its boycott instead. Usually, such a setback would not attract significant attention -- but against the backdrop of broader changes among the religious right, the failure of a major AFA campaign could carry deeper consequences. Ultimately, there is a risk that a failed boycott could be portrayed (even if unfairly) as an example of a crisis on the right.

The evangelical movement in the United States has gone through two distinct phases of development, and there are increasing signs that it is entering a third.

Thirty years ago, when it was just emerging as a political and social force, the evangelical movement was typical of most religious denominations. Evangelicals viewed conservative churches as havens from the relativism that emerged in the 1960s. These churches provided a conservative home for those who considered liberal social values -- particularly the overriding trend toward secularism -- anathema to their own values. This nascent period lasted for 15 years, during which the foundation for the modern religious right was built.

In the mid-to-late 1980s, evangelical churches became increasingly active in politics. Politically active evangelicals, led by Pat Robertson and the Christian Coalition, believed that, rather than simply providing the disaffected with a conservative alternative to mainstream culture, they needed to engage with the mainstream -- to simultaneously encourage a negative reaction against "postmodernism" and also offer an alternative to its relativism.

Internal discipline (particularly in public pronouncements) coupled with a lack of serious analysis by the media led to a general perception that the "religious right" was a solid, unified movement. It was broadly portrayed as a single constituency that was becoming responsible for various changes in national politics and, particularly, within the Republican Party. Of course, like every other significant social movement that came before it, the religious right was really never a monolithic political actor. Had it not been for discipline and organization, the differences among the various elements of the evangelical right would have been clear to the general public a decade ago.

But now, due to a number of factors, it is becoming easier to discern factions within the movement -- and with the potential for a power-shifting election in November, these factions are beginning to move in different directions. The evangelical right is fragmenting along two lines -- religious and political -- and divergent approaches to policy are beginning to come into conflict.

At the core of the political fragmentation is an implicit debate over whether the current government -- with George W. Bush as president, Republicans controlling both legislative branches and a majority on the Supreme Court having been placed there by Republican presidents -- represents the best that religious conservatives can hope to see in power. This debate reflects the traditional splits between idealistic political activists and pragmatic, realistic activists.

For those who fear the current composition of the federal government represents the apex of the religious conservative movement's power, now is the time to make concessions in order to win whatever prizes are possible. The realists want to consolidate their gains before the November election, which polls indicate could turn at least one chamber of Congress over to Democratic control. Currently, these realist groups, typified by the Christian Coalition, are pressing for the immediate approval of federal judges and for a variety of religion-centered policies to be passed and signed into law. They are conceding ground on certain priorities and are showing a willingness to break from the GOP on non-religious side issues, such as energy policy and health care.

The idealists, typified by the AFA and Family Research Council, believe the president and current congressional leadership do not sufficiently represent the views of conservative religious voters. Many within these groups complain that Bush has not fulfilled the promises he made when (as they see it) the religious right decisively turned out conservative voters in 2000 and 2004, and they do not trust him to act in their interests. They also do not believe that either Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist, R-Tenn., or House Speaker Dennis Hastert, R-Ill., adequately represent the views of the religious right. In the run-up to November, the idealist segment is likely to step up its activism on behalf of Republican candidates -- hoping not only to maintain GOP control of Congress but also to impress upon the party's leadership that evangelicals are responsible for their position in power.

Idealists, almost by definition, argue against compromise on the vast majority of issues. Instead, they want voters to continue pushing the Republican Party further toward religious conservatism and are demanding increased orthodoxy from Republican politicians. These stalwarts are active not only on what traditionally have been priorities for the religious right -- issues such as abortion and prayer in schools -- but also on core GOP issues that are not necessarily religious in nature. For instance, Dr. James Dobson's group, Focus on the Family, in February lashed out at other evangelical leaders -- including Duane Litfin, president of Wheaton College -- who spoke out in favor of federal policies addressing climate change.

Taking a long view, these splits between realists and idealists will be exacerbated by a more fundamental fragmentation that is developing within the religious right. As the evangelical movement morphs into its third stage of existence, a new thread -- a "progressive" movement -- is emerging. This movement reflects a dramatic shift in evangelical Christianity, one that dramatically threatens the conservative dogma at the center of the movement's politics.

Activists within the new "progressive" thread express impatience with the battle being fought by realist evangelical conservatives -- the idea of maintaining an influential political bloc while winning as many victories as possible. Rather than fighting mainstream culture -- or making concessions to it -- these new evangelicals are willing to embrace American culture and are attempting to slowly transform it, from within (heeding the Biblical calls to be the "salt of the earth" and "light of the world") into one that reflects their own evangelical beliefs. This approach is antithetical to the aggressive political strategies and tactics of the idealists and realists discussed above. And the progressives don't want to be a power bloc in Washington.

Politically, many of these evangelicals vote for Democratic candidates, though the abortion issue keeps most in the Republican camp -- and they are all-but-deaf to calls to boycott an automaker on grounds that it runs advertisements in gay magazines.

Within the near term, the November election will be the primary source of agitation and anxiety within the evangelical right. Members of this constituency almost certainly will vote for the GOP more consistently than any other bloc within the party. Still, they alone cannot carry the election for the Republicans.

In the media, blame for a GOP loss in November would be placed squarely on the president. However, the splits in the evangelical right will be clear after the election. Democrats and moderate Republicans will come to see factions within the religious right that are potential allies in the 2008 election. Both parties will begin to look for ways to appeal to various segments of a bloc that once was viewed as a monolith. The real application of this understanding will become evident in subsequent primaries and the general election in 2008