The G-2 combination of the United States and China was first mooted by former US National Security Adviser Zbignew Brzezinski at a non-official conclave in Beijing sometime in mid-June 2009. This advocacy was based on the premise that the world’s only superpower and the world’s most prominent rising power could cooperate in joint management of global and Asian security. It was echoed by President Obama sometime thereafter. China at that time however did not warm up to the idea presumably reading the Asian political environment.

Curiously, after the lapse of five years or so, it is China now that has emerged as an active proponent of a US-China G-2 combine for security management especially in the turbulent Asia Pacific region.

China’s active espousal of the US-China G-2 combine for security management of the Asia Pacific raises a number of vexing questions in terms of timing and intent. Also needing examination is the larger question of whether in the Asia Pacific capitals this US-China G-2 concept would be strategically and politically acceptable.

Further, examination would also be in order as to what impels the United States’ strategic preference for China as opposed to a more logical strategic combination of a US-Russia G-2 combination.

The Asia Pacific security environment today stands churned up by China’s military brinkmanship and aggressive activities in the South China Sea and East China Sea region. In Asian capitals China is no longer perceived as a benign stakeholder in Asian security. Does China seriously consider that its born-again espousal of US-China G-2 concept would assist the retrieval of the threat perceptions generated in Asian capitals? Has China given a go-by to the US strategic pivot to Asia Pacific prompted by a rising Chinese military threat in the region? China seems to be playing on American propensities to grab every dubious opportunity it throws at the United States, irrespective of the repercussions in Asian capitals.

Intentions’ reading is a difficult subject. However, on the face of it, it is apparent that China is addressing multiple intentions in this direction. Overall, any even marginal secondment of the US-China G-2 combination by USA confers on China a “strategic equivalence” with the United States. This provides it with leverages in its dealings with Russia, Japan and India besides other Asian capitals. In one stroke the United States by joining in such a strategic enterprise with China could alter the emerging ‘balance of power’ in Asia presently tilting against China. China could then lunge back at the United States itself.

A US-China G-2 combination could also be intended by China that it be let loose in Central Asia by United States permissiveness to follow its strategic designs to emerge as a Eurasian power. The United States may be tempted to let loose China in Central Asia to offset Russian ambitions in its former republics.

Coming to the larger question of whether a US-China G-2 combination for security management of Asia would be acceptable in Asian capitals the evident answer while reading the Asian security environment in which the China Threat is palpable, the answer is a resounding and decisive NO.

China’s not-so-peaceful military rise and its military aggression in recent times from the Himalayas to the Seas of the Western Pacific has generated “severe strategic distrust” of China in the Asia Pacific. Asian countries would evidently not be inclined to accept a US-China G-2 combine, notwithstanding United States accepting and jointly putting into operation such a security management combination with China.

It is for this reason that indigenous strategic coalitions minus the USA and China would most likely emerge which stands reflected in my papers presented at International Conferences and published on this website thereafter.

The last issue which needs examination is as to why the United States prefers a US-China G-2 combination for global and Asian security management as opposed to the more logical US-Russia G-2 combine? There are a number of reasons for this beginning with the more obvious one of US- Russia global rivalry with Russia having the potential of regaining its erstwhile bi-polar status with the United States.

The United States in a US-China G-2 combination is more comfortable with China as China can only operationally function as a junior partner of such a combine with glaring strategic asymmetries in relation to the United States.

With China seeking “strategic equivalence” with the United States through a US-China G-2 commination it seems unlikely that China would accede to this combination unless the United States cedes to China the strategic equivalence that it seeks.

A US-Russia G-2 combine is a more workable strategic combination for both global security management and management of Asian security. It stood the test of time during the challenging Cold War era where regional conflicts were confined to limited conflicts by the virtually evenly managed bipolar global security architecture and its management of global security.

Concluding it needs to be pointed out for the US security establishment that Russia despite visceral American strategic dislike is a more predictable strategic entity than China. It was that predictability that led to a more workable global and Asian security management.

*Dr Subhash Kapila is a graduate of the Royal British Army Staff College, Camberley and combines a rich experience of Indian Army, Cabinet Secretariat, and diplomatic assignments in Bhutan, Japan, South Korea and USA. Currently, Consultant International Relations & Strategic Affairs with South Asia Analysis Group. He can be reached at drsubhashkapila.007@gmail.com