Whenever it seems that the war in Syria can’t get more tragic and dangerous, it does. That conflict has already created the worst humanitarian disaster of a young century and empowered the barbaric self-declared Islamic State. And it could become worse.
The Obama administration has avoided an entangling
involvement, instead providing refugee aid and supporting some of the less
repellent rebel groups, in the hopes that the combatants conclude that an
outright military victory is out of reach and accept a power-sharing
arrangement. That was a long shot from the beginning and became even less
likely as the hatred between the warring parties mounted.
Today Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s government and
the various rebel movements see absolute victory or their own destruction as
the only options. A few weeks ago Assad might have begun to believe that
military victory was unrealistic. But after Russia’s intervention and increased
support from Iran and Hezbollah, he undoubtedly feels that he can defeat the
rebels, at least in the parts of Syria where his fellow Alawites live.
Tragically, Syria is moving further away from a
negotiated settlement rather than closer. This nullifies current American
strategy and should compel U.S. policymakers to coldly re-examine future
actions. In doing so, they must understand how the Syrian conflict could
produce even greater disasters. Three nightmare scenarios are particularly
worrisome. One is that Sunni nations up their involvement to counter increased
Russian and Iranian support to Assad, with the war escalating to a region-wide
international sectarian war. It is hard to predict how the United States would
respond, but this would be one of the most dangerous and troubling choices
Washington has faced for many decades.
A second nightmare would be if the Syrian conflict
engulfed bordering states. It has already made the long-term survival of a
unified Iraq unlikely. Lebanon hangs on to stability by a thread. Jordan is
deeply threatened and struggling to deal with a massive influx of Syrian
refugees. But the most troubling of all is Turkey. While far above the rest of
the region in economic and military capability, Ankara has played a dangerous
game, tolerating Assad’s opponents, even decidedly extremist ones. But in the
past year, Turkey recognized that it too was threatened by extremists grown
strong from the chaos in Syria. Last week’s deadly bomb blast in Ankara, which
has been blamed on the Islamic State, shows that Turkey is being dragged
deeper into the complex Syrian conflict. The country is, as Steven
Cook puts it, “tearing itself apart in a war with itself.” Turkey’s democracy
could become one more casualty of the Syrian conflict.
The third nightmare scenario would be an extremist
archipelago across the Islamic world, from northern Nigeria to Afghanistan,
inspired and fueled by the Islamic State’s ability to control parts of Syria
and Iraq. Groups tied to or emulating the Islamic State are already on the
rampage in Libya and growing in Yemen and Egypt. The organization has
established a foothold in Afghanistan, where in places it appears to be
supplanting the Taliban, and has claimed credit for terrorist attacks as far
away as Bangladesh. It is not hard to imagine the Islamic State establishing
itself in Pakistan, Palestine or some of the other Central Asian nations with
repressive governments, sectarian splits or ethnic schisms. A transnational
Islamic State archipelago would be nearly impossible to defeat, since even if
it were eradicated in its homeland, it could shift resources, leadership and
effort elsewhere.
Given all this, a strong case can be made that keeping
Syria from getting worse and spiraling into any of these nightmare scenarios
should drive American policy. The idea of nudging the combatants toward a
negotiated power-sharing arrangement has lost any shred of viability that it
might have once had. It is time for a plan B to navigate the quagmire. But
knowing that does not automatically indicate the best way forward.
It is clear that the longer the conflict continues, the
greater the price paid by the Syrian people and the greater the chances for one
of the nightmares to become reality. But outsiders with a vested interest in
one side’s victory—like Russia, Iran and the Gulf states—cannot engineer a
resolution whether by military force or negotiation. A settlement would require
two things. First, all involved in the war, both Syrians and outsiders, must
accept that the Syrian nation as it existed before the war is no longer viable.
The best that can be hoped for is a separation that keeps open the possibility
of future reunification. Clinging to the idea that Syria must remain whole
simply prolongs the conflict, the suffering and the chances of the nightmare
scenarios coming true.
The second and more important requirement is the
deployment of a robust, prolonged peacekeeping or peace-enforcement operation,
led by the United Nations with components from nations without a stake in who
rules Syria. Whether nations with the capability to provide forces would be
willing to do so is another question. Without it the nightmare scenarios will
rapidly become more likely, perhaps even probable. The idea of American
involvement in such a multinational peacekeeping force under current budgetary
pressure is abhorrent. But the alternatives may be even more so.
**Steven Metz is the author of “Iraq and the Evolution of
American Strategy.” His weekly WPR column, Strategic Horizons, appears
every Friday. You can follow him on Twitter @steven_metz.