The post of Chief of the Libyan Intelligence Services of Tripoli’s GNA is still vacant, but only recently. Therefore, this is an optimal situation for the Head of Tripoli’s government, who is currently pro tempore Director of the GNA agencies, while the struggle for the next Intelligence Service Directors is intensifying.
In an
obvious triangulation with Turkey, which is now essential to Tripoli’s very
survival, and with France, which can do harm outside and inside the perimeter
of Haftar’s forces it continues to support, in spite of everything -also with
the support of Qatar and the Emirates and even, to a residual extent of Italy,
the major strategic failure in the post-Gaddafi chaos – and with the United
States, which is returning to Libya from the peripheries.
Russia
is increasingly dissatisfied with Haftar, but it will now be difficult for it
to negotiate a credible deal with Tripoli from a strong-to-weak position.
Pursuant
to the UN-sponsored Skhirat agreement of 2015, the still national political
structures of GNA were subject to a strict tripartite rule, whereby the three
major regions of a definitively divided Libya, namely Tripolitania, Cyrenaica
and Fezzan, always had equal representation at the “centre” of power.
Currently
the Libyan Intelligence Services are without a leader since the death of
Abdoullah Masoud Al Darsi on April 3, 2020. He had been appointed on November
1, 2018.
He
replaced Abdul Qaderal-Thulami. who had died of a “heart attack” but was
probably, and more likely, killed by the Al-Nawasi militia, closely connected
with the Tripoli Interior Ministry.
The
Al-Nawasi militia mainly operates in controlling the city of Tripoli, together
with the other militias of the “Tripoli Revolutionaries’ Brigade”, the Special
Deterrence Force and the “Abu Slim Unit of the Central Security Apparatus” and
also a large part of the regular Police forces.
The
Al-Nawasi militia was attacked by General Haftar’s Libyan Armed Forces, in Ayn
Zara, in the recent attack by Cyrenaica’s militants, while in February 2020
Tripoli’s Interior Minister, Fathi Bashaga, the strong man of the region,
publicly stated that the Al-Nawasi Brigade “blackmailed the State”.
Al-Darsi,
the former Chief of the Tripoli Intelligence Services, successor to al-Thulami,
had been recommended to al-Sarraj by Parliament and also replaced Salem al-Hassi,
an ineffective candidate who was considered a member of the Libyan Islamic
Fighting Group. That group included members of Al-Qaeda and participated in the
Islamic Shield Force and was declared “terrorist group” by the Tripoli
Parliament in 2012. It was later accepted as an internal force of Tripoli’s GNA
when, during the “second Libyan war” started in 2014, the “Shield Force”
defended Tripoli from a dangerous advance by General Haftar.
Al-Darsi
was also leader of the “Union of Reform” party and, incidentally, it was
precisely him who harshly opposed the very few Jews’ right to go back to the
country, after the pro-Gaddafi uprising, as well as to be compensated for the
damage they suffered.
Al-Darsi,
however, represented Benghazi, but was temporarily replaced when his city,
Garyan, surrendered to General Haftar’s LNA forces.
His
predecessor, Abdulkader al-Thulami, whom he replaced in 2017, came from the
Fezzan region, since he was born in Aqar al-Shati.
The
other deputy of the Libyan intelligence services is Abdul majidal-Dabaa,
representative from Tripoli, appointed together with al-Thulami, who is
currently in prison.
Accused
of complicated illegal financial operations, he is certainly a part of the
militia network that often blackmails, but operates on its own behalf, and
sometimes funds Tripoli’s central State.
Hence
who are those competing for the post of Chief of Tripoli’s Libyan Intelligence
Services? Firstly, let us study the structure and history of Tripolitania’s
Intelligence Services, considering that General Haftar has an almost
exclusively military Service.
The
Intelligence Service, known as Temehu, was established with Law 7/2012: its
primary goal is to wipe “Gaddafi’s loyalists” out. The whole structure of
departments and networks is in its Chief’s hands.
The
first Director was Salem Abd al Assalam Alhasi, who in 2015 refused to resign,
as requested by the Tobruk Parliament, although he was anyway still loyal to
that Parliament.
He was
accused, above all, of having confiscated the material of 60 Libyan snipers
trained in the United States to fight against terrorism.
Salem
Mohammad Alaswad, his deputy and successor, was a figure who accepted the
structural weakness of the post-Gaddafi Libyan State and hence also accepted
the chain of command of Tripoli’ security during the time in which he was Chief
of the Intelligence Service: Minister of Defence, the Supreme Security Council
and the brigades of the then “Libyan Shield Force”.
Al Hasi
relinquished his U.S. citizenship in 2015, by also falsifying the accusations
that he was a member of the Muslim Brotherhood.
Currently,
however, there are many more candidates than usual to replace the old Chief of
the Libyan Intelligence Service.
The
first in line is the businessman, Mohammed al-Assawi. Coming from Misrata, he
supports in every way the Chief of the Misrata militia and current powerful
number two of Tripoli’s regime, namely Maiteeq.
Still
today Turkey wants Khaled al-Sharif – a fighter, at the time close to al-Qaeda
– but it can also agree on Emad al-Trabelsi -the old commander of special
operations in Zintan – or on the Misrata businessman, al-Issawi.
Trabelsi’s
problem is that he has very bad and hard relations with the powerful Interior
Minister, FathiBashaga.
It is
interesting to note that last June Bashaga said that Egypt – currently
supporting General Haftar – could play an important role in reconciling the
political and tribal factions of Tripolitania. Hence Bashaga would accept the
reality of a ceasefire with Egypt (and General Haftar) quickly.
Is this
the will of Turkey, which is already asking for the administration of the Port
of Tripoli – and in the future of the Port of Misrata – waiting to throw out of
the way also our local hospital – the only Italian information body in Libya –
thanks to our bunch of politicos?
Ahmed
Maiteeq was elected, with some doubts and reservations, in May 2014. The
following year, again as a man of the Misrata militia, he was elected Deputy
Prime Minister.
Minister
Fathi Bashaga also refused to provide as many as 48 million Libyan dinars to
Abdullah al-Trabelsi, the factotum brother of Emad al-Trabelsi. He said that
the money was needed to “manage” the situation of migrants in the Tripoli area.
It
should be noted that the UNCHR, the U.N. refugee agency, which operates in the
Tripoli area, was assisting 287 people in mid-June, with a total of 401,863
migrants assisted in Libya. All of them are outside Tripoli and, to a large
extent, outside Libya.
Moreover,
Emad al-Trabelsi left the Tripoli front in February 2020 to reach General
Haftar’s lines.
Another
candidate for the post of Chief of Tripoli’s intelligence Services is Tareq
Zarmoh.
He is a
former Director of the Intelligence Services Unit operating specifically in the
fight against jihadist groups.
He has
excellent relations with the United States, Great Britain and all those who
naively believe that the whole disaster in Libya and elsewhere in the region
was brought precisely by the jihadists, and not by those who brought them in,
i.e. those great Western fools. As far as we know, he has no good relations
with the Italian intelligence Sservices.
How much
influence has the United States on al-Sarraj, after Turkey’s magic hand that
prevented Tripoli from falling into General Haftar’s hands? Not so much, we
imagine. True friends come in bad times and in times of trouble you find out
who your friends are.
There
are considerable funds, however, for Zarmoh both in Switzerland and the Channel
Islands, which could strengthen his anti-terrorist groups. Al-Sarraj knows this
very well and takes it into due account.
A
further candidate for the post of Chief of Tripoli’s intelligence Services is
Mustafa Gadur, precisely the militia leader that last February was accused by
Fathi Bashaga of conspiring against his Ministry.
Bashaga
said that a leader of the al-Nawasi militia, led by Gadur, allegedly contacted
the Italian intelligence Services to coordinate a meeting between the al-Nawasi
militia and Gadur himself with the United Arab Emirates’ intelligence Services.
Currently
the al-Nawasi militia consists of approximately 700 members and includes also a
well-established group of Salafist Madkalites who operate with the other
members of the al-Nawasi militia, starting from their headquarters in Abu Seta,
where there are also the members of the GNA Presidential Council.
The
Madkhalites are Salafists who, in Westerners’ silly jargon, would be defined as
“extremists”.
They
fiercely hate the Muslim Brotherhood, but the Madkhalite tradition – of Saudi
origin, as usual – tends to be quietist.
The
Madkhalites were left alone and sometimes favoured above all by Gaddafi, who
often accepted and used their tacit revolt against the Ikhwan, the Muslim
Brotherhood.
Nowadays,
mainly thanks to France -which aims at getting us out of Gaddafi’s Libya and
above all taking ENI away from us -Italy is the target of the largest Islam
immigration to Italy and Europe that the ignorant people define as “radical”.
The
members of Gadur’s katiba, i.e. the aforementioned al-Nawasi militia, have now
infiltrated all the nerve centres of political and military power, given their
role in the central security of Tripoli’s regime. Obviously the Interior
Minister, Fathi Bashaga, does not like it at all. Bashaga does not want to be
the Chief of the intelligence Services, but he wants to choose who should hold
that post and wants, above all, to have him as a friend and, even better, as
his servant.
It
should be noted that Mustafa Gadur has excellent relations with Seddik Omar
al-Kebir, for having provided him both the security, which in Libya must be
rather “assertive”, and other support, mainly money-laundering.
He is
the Governor of the Libyan Central Bank, who is probably also a member of the
Muslim Brotherhood.
He has
long been a man of Qatar and Turkey, but he is now in the crosshairs of the
United States, which considers him its sworn enemy.
The
United States – Lord bless it – wants to merge the Central Bank of Tripoli with
that of Benghazi, led by El Hebri.
It is an
old U.N. project in the exit plan for Libya. However, currently pressing for
such a reunification is really an operation that Benedet to Croce would define
“enlightened”, i.e. full of high and noble principles, but absolutely devoid of
any pragmatism.
Obviously
al-Kabir allegedly funded also “terrorism”.
Which
one? That of so many parts that make up his government, recognized by the United
Nations?
Al-Kabir
has obvious relations with the militias, i.e. above all with the “Special
Deterrence Force” (RADA). Al-Kabir, however, can also rely on the support of
the Libyan ambassador to Turkey, Abdul Razzak Mukhtar Abdul Gader, a very
important Muslim Brother, as well as with Megaryeh, former director of the CBL
and current Head of Bahrain’s branch of the Arab Banking Corporation.
Megaryeh
is also Director of the Doha centre of the Brookings Institution, as well as
Director of the Silatech association, founded by Sheika Moza Bint Nasser, the
mother of Tamim al-Thani, the Emir of Qatar.
Al-Kabir
is also one of the sources of the Italian Intelligence Services.
General
Haftar’s heavy offensive, however, has led to some remarkable results: firstly,
there is the almost total loss of power, influence and also information of the
Italian Intelligence Services, which are now outside Libya.
Obviously,
the Turkish Intelligence Service, which has already much helped Italy in Silvia
Romano’s liberation, is now capable of deciding many posts and positions in the
Tripoli government, pulling rank and underlining its military role, with its
jihadists transported from Idlib, Syria.
It has
already happened with Khaled Sherif, supported by the Muslim Brotherhood, who
last May was not appointed Chief of the LNA Intelligence Service.
He was,
however, harshly “purged” by Fathi Bashaga.
After
the Turkish jihadist support to Tripoli, there were continuous visits of the
most important Turkish Ministers, starting from that of Foreign Minister
Cavusoglu on June 17, and of Hakan Fidan, the Chief of the Turkish MIT
Intelligence Service, immediately afterwards, who operated also with Tunisia.
Not to mention the visit of the Chief of the Turkish e-intelligence, Cemalettin
Celik, as well as of the very powerful new Chief of the Turkish intelligence
Service network in Libya, Metehan Olgun.
The
visit of the Turkish Foreign Minister was not by chance, not even from an
economic viewpoint.
As
already mentioned, Turkey harshly told al-Sarraj it wanted the almost complete
management of the port of Misrata.
Now,
there is the Misrata Free Zone, without Misrata; no major imports from abroad
into Libya; no connection with the Mediterranean; no major transportation of
legal or illegal oil to Italy and the EU.
Furthermore,
just during the Turkish clash with General Haftar, Turkey explicitly stressed
the importance of the Misrata Forces, which still report to Fathi Bashaga, the
Interior Minister and true number 2 of the Tripoli government for long time.
He is
the likely king maker.
Currently,
however, the mediators, brokers and businessmen of Misrata operate mainly with
exchanges from Turkey, especially with regard to the agrifood sector.
Moreover,
Bollorè -a man of the French Presidency, but often in contrast with its
intelligence Services, which sometimes have flooded the Italian ones with very
negative dossiers on him – has had a contract with the Misrata Authority since
2010, but has obviously not supported the French engagement with General
Haftar. Quite the reverse. But we do not believe that Bollorè is in the first
thoughts of the Misrata Port Authority.
Turkey
is largely penetrating Africa from Libya.
Guinean
President Alpha Condé visited Ankara twice in less than two months, but
President Erdogan alone has also put the Turkish NGO, IHH, into action to
support Alpha Condé and the Guinean population and to pave the way for some
Turkish businessmen who want to do business and make transactions in Guinea
Bissau, or are even forced to do so.
In the
African regions of Islamic tradition, the Turkish government is replacing the
still operational wide networks of Fethullah Gulen – by now its number one
enemy – especially in Guinea, Senegal and Gabon, while Gulen’s schools are
still performing well in South Africa and Nigeria, despite the efforts of the
textile oligarch (with factories in the areas where migrants from Syria stay),
who is also honorary consul to Pretoria.
In
Mogadishu, the Turkish conglomerate Albayrak operates by processing Guinean
minerals, while the local government in Bamako has recently entrusted the
management of a fast road to the Turkish family Kalioncu.
A
Turkish business family, however, has failed to sign the contract for the
construction of the Kandadji dam on the Niger River in favour of India, which
can transfer the materials from the Konkola copper mine to Niger’s ports, while
the government of Zambia – an unavoidable channel – supported Turkey.
Currently,
before its actual conquest of Libya, but mainly thanks to our strategic
foolishness, Turkey records approximately 30 points of economic development in
Africa.
***Giancarlo
Elia Valori, Advisory Board Co-chair Honoris Causa Professor Giancarlo Elia
Valori is an eminent Italian economist and businessman. He holds prestigious
academic distinctions and national orders. Mr. Valori has lectured on
international affairs and economics at the world’s leading universities such as
Peking University, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Yeshiva
University in New York. He currently chairs “International World Group”, he is
also the honorary president of Huawei Italy, economic adviser to the Chinese
giant HNA Group. In 1992 he was appointed Officier de la Légion d’Honneur de la
République Francaise, with this motivation: “A man who can see across borders
to understand the world” and in 2002 he received the title “Honorable” of the
Académie des Sciences de l’Institut de France. “
https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2020/07/14/the-outstanding-issue-of-the-libyan-intelligence-services/