Perhaps the biggest issue is that Chile and Argentina are seen in competition with each other when it comes to managing their lithium reserves.
The
conventional wisdom in the Southern Cone is that Chile is a market-friendly
economy where businesses can succeed, while Argentina is a basket case of state
intervention where businesses will suffer. And there is some truth to those
stereotypes.
Over the
past two decades, Chile has been a place where businesses can operate in a
regulatory environment shaped by steady and fair rules. In contrast, Argentina
has lurched from crisis to crisis, placing extensive regulations on prices,
taxes and capital controls that have made business—as well as life in
general—difficult. Even from 2015 to 2018, when Chile had a nominally socialist
president and Argentina had a nominally pro-market rightwing president, Chile’s
regulatory environment and business culture still made it the heavy favorite
for foreign investment.
However,
when it comes to the lithium industry, that narrative about the two countries
has just been flipped. In recent months, even as Argentina has suffered from a
renewed economic crisis and hyperinflation, the country’s lithium industry has
been prospering due to a relatively light touch by the government. The
Argentine government has streamlined the permitting process, reduced
bureaucratic hurdles and offered tax incentives to attract foreign investment
in the lithium sector. Much of the regulation is managed at the state level,
but many states have also made operating easy. As a result, companies are eager
to jump into the Argentine market, while the companies already there—including
Livent, Allkem, Ganfeng Lithium and Lithium Americas—are all making progress
and likely to expand their production in the years ahead.
Meanwhile,
on April 20, Chilean President Gabriel Boric announced a vague new policy to
bring Chile’s lithium industry under greater state control. The proposal
includes the creation of a national state lithium company similar to Chile’s
national copper company, CODELCO; the involvement of the state as a majority
shareholder in all future projects; and negotiation with the owners of the largest
current projects to increase state involvement.
Following
the announcement, the two largest lithium companies currently active in the
country, SQM and Albemarle, lost over $8 billion in market cap. While both
companies insist that operating in Chile is still possible and profitable,
Boric’s proposal has left many investors and industry stakeholders questioning
whether Chile will continue to be an attractive destination for lithium
investment and development. At best, it could reduce the profitability of future
operations, leading companies to reduce their exposure to the sector. An
unlikely worst-case scenario, though one feared by some investors, is that the
Chilean government could decide that lithium is a strategic asset and force the
nationalization of reserves currently controlled by private companies.
The new
rules for lithium in Chile are far from decided. Boric must now negotiate with
the private companies already operating in the country and push legislation
through Congress that would codify the new proposals. The legislature, which
has rejected many of the president’s proposals in the past, is almost certain
to moderate his agenda on lithium as well. Meanwhile, Boric’s proposal sets
2030 as the rough target date for finalizing the changes, meaning that Chile
will have had two more presidential elections—and will probably have adopted a
new constitution—by the time any new rules for lithium mining come into effect.
That is
plenty of time for the proposal to change shape, and given Chile’s history, the
country will find a path that protects private investment, even if the state
gains some more influence in the sector. Chile is likely to create some sort of
state lithium company, but the country can’t succeed without private
investment, and Chilean policymakers know that. A responsible debate over the
balance of future public-private partnerships is likely to take place.
If
investors are too bearish on Chile, they are likely far too bullish on
Argentina. Yes, the national government and the provinces have promoted lithium
mining investment in an uncharacteristic pro-business manner. But the
short-term outlook is challenged by continued hyperinflation, a peso that is
hard to manage and regulations that make any profit-taking difficult.
Additionally,
the Peronist coalition at the head of the current Argentine government is
widely expected to lose the national election later this year; President
Alberto Fernandez has already opted out of seeking reelection due to the
country’s economic ills and his own unpopularity. The likeliest outcome in
October is a government far friendlier to private industry and foreign
investment across the country. That could usher in a period of great
opportunity for the industry starting in 2024.
But
Argentina’s history suggests the pendulum will swing against business yet again
before the decade is out. And a profitable mining sector will be a tempting
target for any future Peronist government that faces continued challenges in
paying its bills. Mining projects require at least a decade, and likely far
more, to make their return on investment worthwhile. But the private companies
that are expanding in Argentina today are likely to see serious swings in
regulations, taxes and currency rules that will challenge their ability to
operate in a steady and predictable manner.
We
should all be rooting for both Chile and Argentina to get it right when it
comes to managing their lithium reserves. States should be working to achieve
the best labor, environmental and social conditions for their populations.
National governments and local communities should benefit from the profits of
the mines. Countries should have opportunities to move up the global economy’s
value chain, using the lithium that is mined in domestic manufacturing
industries that provide jobs and economic stability, in order to move beyond
the boom-and-bust cycle of raw commodities markets. And the world needs the
lithium for storing renewable energy and managing the electrification of
transportation.
Yet,
private mining companies also need to operate profitably, and therein lies the
challenge. At a certain level, taxes, royalties and regulations eventually
cause mines to become unprofitable, meaning companies and investors will either
halt operations or refuse to put in additional money for expansion.
As the narrative
has shifted toward Argentina and against Chile in recent months, perhaps the
biggest issue is that the two countries are seen in competition with each
other. One’s loss is the other’s gain, as investors in the sector search for
regulatory and tax regimes that make them the most profit and give their
businesses the greatest security.
Speculation
about an OPEC-style South American lithium cartel that would include
Bolivia—the so-called ABC lithium triangle—has resurfaced in recent years, but
it is unlikely for a variety of reasons, including the nature of the global
lithium market. Still, if Argentina and Chile—and eventually perhaps
Bolivia—could agree to some common frameworks and minimum standards, it would
benefit their economies, but also the mining industry, which suffers from
giant, back-and-forth policy swings between nationalization and a race to the
bottom on private regulation. Getting this nascent industry right will be
crucial to both countries, as well as the world’s green transition, for decades
to come.
***James
Bosworth is the founder of Hxagon, a firm that does political risk analysis and
bespoke research in emerging and frontier markets. He has two decades of
experience analyzing politics, economics and security in Latin America and the
Caribbean.