The key phrase is 'clearly defined'. Latin America does not figure prominently in either document and when it does, it is mainly in the form of narrative, extremely laconic in the case of DIA director Michael Maples, slightly less so in that of the new director of national intelligence (DNI), Michael McConnell. There is very little actual assessment of threats, actual or potential.

The clearest definitions come from Maples. He notes that the Farc guerrillas continue to view US government and Department of Defense personnel as 'legitimate targets' and predicts, 'the possibility of the Farc targeting U.S. interests and persons will remain as long as we are directly involved in Colombian counter-drug and counter-terrorism efforts.' Maples also notes that the Farc's power and scope has waned under President Alvaro Uribe's counterinsurgency efforts, adding somewhat noncommitally that 'that trend is expected to continue in 2007.'

Regarding Venezuela, he says, 'President Chávez won re-election and is following his mentor, Cuban President Fidel Castro, and President Chávez's vision for the continent. Venezuela cooperates with Cuban projects abroad. Key to this ideology is President Chávez's agenda to neutralize US influence throughout the hemisphere.' McConnell says something similar: 'Chávez is among the most stridently anti-American leaders anywhere in the world, and will continue to try to undercut US influence in Venezuela, in the rest of Latin America, and elsewhere internationally.'

Both 'assessments' draw attention to Chávez's arms purchases; Maples merely registering the fact without commentary, McConnell stating that these acquisitions, plus Chávez's moves towards developing his own arms production capability 'are increasingly worrisome to his neighbours' and 'could fuel an arms race in the region'.

The grounds for this reading are not made clear. Publicly at least, the governments of Venezuela's neighbouring countries have repeatedly stated their lack of concern about this, and the one with most reason to worry, Colombia, has accepted Venezuela's rationale that it is merely carrying out long-delayed replacement of obsolete defence hardware. This is the same rationale invoked in recent years by Chile and Brazil for their military purchases, both of which were widely portrayed at the time as liable to trigger arms races. Venezuela is a latecomer to this process. Peru is currently using similar arguments to justify its own planned renovation of defence equipment.

Beyond the clearly defined threats, another is hinted at - but only by fitting together observations made separately in the two 'assessments'. In his review of terrorist threats, McConnell ranks the one coming from Hizballah as second only to that from al-Qaeda and ventures, 'As a result of last summer's hostilities, Hizballah's self-confidence and hostility toward the US as a supporter of Israel could cause the group to increase its contingency planning against US interests.'

For his part, Maples notes, 'Some South American based supporters of Lebanese Hizballah are suspected of sending a portion of their profits from narcotics trade to the group in Lebanon.' In both cases, this is speculation; together, the theme connects with a longtime US hobbyhorse: the 'terrorist' presence in the Triple Border area where Brazil meets Paraguay and Argentina, which has so far turned out to be a combination of overt funding of Hizballah by members of the local Lebanese community with the shady financial and commercial dealings that are the area's stock in trade. Connecting this with the drugs trade is a new twist.

Taken together, the two 'assessments' obliquely signal the disappearance of a perceived threat. Both Maples and McConnell dismiss the notion that Latin America has been swinging leftward. Maples says, 'Nearly a dozen presidential elections in 2006 produced winners ranging from pro-business centre-right to market-friendly social democrats and radical populists.' As to Chávez, whose growing influence US officials had until recently portrayed as a threat to the entire hemisphere, he merely notes that he 'found allies in the newly-elected presidents of Bolivia and, to a lesser extent, Ecuador and Nicaragua.'

McConnell broaches the subject more explicitly, saying, 'Although some commentators spoke of a "lurch to the left" in the region, the election results point to no dominant ideological trend. Moderate leftists who promote macroeconomic stability, poverty alleviation, and the building of democratic institutions fared well, as did able right-of-centre leaders.' He also acknowledges that 'individuals who are critical of free-market economics and have friendly relations with Venezuela's President Chávez won the presidency in two of Latin America's poorest countries, Ecuador and Nicaragua', attributing the 'strong showing of candidates with leftist populist views' elsewhere 'to the growing impatience of national electorates with the failure of incumbent governments to improve the living standards of large elements of the population.'

Absent, too, is any reference to the Central American street gangs known as maras, which in the past year the US government had elevated to the category of regional security threat affecting the US as well.

Though not explicitly categorised as a threat, both 'assessments' concur in their outlook on Cuba. Maples says, 'Raúl Castro is firmly in control as Cuba's acting president and will likely maintain power and stability after Fidel Castro dies, at least for the short-term.' McConnell, while echoing the official line that 'the post-Castro transition in Cuba has begun', is similarly cautious about what to expect. 'This year,' he says, 'is likely to mark the end of Fidel Castro's domination of Cuba; but significant, positive change is unlikely immediately following his death: the period following his July 2006 operation afforded Raúl Castro the opportunity to solidify his own position as successor.'