Ambassador Bolton points out that substantively, the findings are flawed and incomplete at best, noting specifically that (1) the NIE only indicates "moderate confidence" that the program's suspension continues; (2) that Iran was in fact not the subject of severe diplomatic pressure in 2003; and (3) that Iran is more than capable of disinformation.  A recent Decision Brief by the Center for Security Policy makes a similar assertion, noting that the U.S. government's previous assessments of Iran's military nuclear capability have varied wildly, and that according to one unnamed American intelligence official, Iran is the most challenging country to spy on.

Moreover, Ambassador Bolton explains that the report is also tainted by the institutional biases of its drafters, many of whom are former State Department officials with a historically soft policy outlook towards Iran – a point underscored by a recent National Review article by the Center President Frank J. Gaffney, Jr.  Bolton goes on to rightfully assert that these findings are ultimately policy judgments masquerading as intelligence assessments.  As these articles all make clear, the United States relies on this latest NIE assessment of Iran at its own peril.