The new goals mark an unambiguous departure from New Delhi's traditional position that rich nations are historically responsible for global warming and should therefore take up the bulk of the responsibility for all reduction efforts. India has in the past enthusiastically endorsed the Kyoto Protocol, which requires 37 wealthy nations to cut greenhouse gas emissions by 2012, but asked for no commitments from developing countries.

New Delhi's surprise announcement was spurred by Beijing's declaration to whittle down the carbon intensity of its own economy by 40 percent to 45 percent below 2005 levels by 2020. This development was in turn triggered by the United States' decision to cut its greenhouse gas emissions by roughly 17 percent by 2020, as compared to 2005 levels.

As India's Environment Minister Jairam Ramesh put it, "China has given us a wake-up call." New Delhi feared that it might find itself isolated at Copenhagen as a result of the Sino-American maneuver, thereby weakening its bargaining power.

New Delhi also viewed with disquiet the fact that Beijing was being credited with taking the lead last month in cobbling together a new "BASIC" coalition -- consisting of Brazil, South Africa, India and China. These four nations had already fleshed out their "non-negotiable" demands for the Copenhagen summit: no legally binding cuts, no unsupported mitigation actions, no international monitoring of unsupported mitigation actions and no use of climate measures as a trade barrier.

The developments combined to raise the pressure India felt to demonstrate that it was indeed a responsible player in global climate mitigation efforts. Also, New Delhi hoped that by following China's example in reducing emission intensity and jumpstarting the creation of low-carbon technologies, it might also be able to walk back the "obstructionist" image of its earlier stance.

Some experts believe that India's new position is fundamentally sound. Domestically, it will help the country adopt energy-efficient and cleaner technologies. On the global front, such an attitude from an emerging power like India will improve the atmosphere in Copenhagen, thereby strengthening the chances of reaching an accord.

Be that as it may, India's new stance also triggered much political theater in New Delhi. Opposition parties staged a walkout from the House last week, accusing Prime Minister Manmohan Singh of "compromising national interest" to please the United States.

Critics have asserted that India's unilateral carbon intensity cuts might jeopardize its economic growth and restrict its economic options in future. The country's sudden change in position, they allege, reflects U.S. interests, not India's own. Worse still, by announcing new numbers every day, rather than sticking to its own 20 percent by 2020 domestic commitment, the country will suffer from a credibility deficit at the international level.

Other experts argue that there really was no need for New Delhi to hastily follow China's example, as there are major differences in the mitigation efforts required from the two countries. For instance, between 1990 and 2005, per capita energy use increased by half in China -- three times more than in India. This took China's carbon intensity -- or the amount of carbon emitted per $1,000 of GDP -- to 2.8 tons, compared India's 1 ton.

China's measures, they also point out, do not commit it to "absolute reductions," but are purely "voluntary" and aimed at impressing the West. Moreover, it isn't clear whether or not Beijing will allow an external examination of the implementation of its environmental program.

These nuances, they worry, are bound to get lost in the bluster of political rhetoric at Copenhagen.

Similarly, the U.S. has also worked out a convenient arrangement for itself by not ratifying the Kyoto Protocol, a regime that would have obliged it to reduce its emissions by a fixed percentage below 1990 levels. The U.S. has, in fact, increased its carbon dioxide emissions by 20 percent between 1990 and 2007.

For its part, India has already put in place a National Action Plan on Climate Change (.pdf), which includes increasing solar power generation and improving energy efficiency. It has also been enhancing carbon sinks, recently announcing an increase in forest cover by 728 square kilometers between 2005 and 2007.

Domestic critics of India's new stance say such measures were already enough to deflect international criticism. They argue that, rather than buckling suddenly under international pressure and announcing unilateral cuts that may weaken its position at the Copenhagen round table, India should have simply continued to seek a fair international treaty. This would not only have protected its national interests, but also proved to the world that it was already doing all along what it felt was prudent to protect the global environment.

However, the fresh mitigation measures are entirely within reach, and will also cut India's emission intensity without changing its current pace of adopting energy efficiency. So by proposing them, India has been able to improve its image at little cost. And should the negotiations at the Copenhagen summit run into a wall, Western nations will find it a tad tougher to make a "recalcitrant" India the scapegoat for the failure to reach an accord.

**Neeta Lal is a New Delhi-based journalist, formerly with the Times of India and editor of the Asian Age Sunday Section. Her work has appeared in numerous U.S., Asian and European print and Web-based publications.