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14/01/2010 | Google and China

Evan Osnos

Call it the Great Push Back of 2010. Google has done something that no global technology company had previously dared to do: publicly challenge the Chinese government and threaten to pull out. Google warned that it will close its China business if the government does not curtail censorship and cut down on cyber attacks that reportedly sought, among other targets of infiltration, to break into the e-mail accounts of human-rights activists.

 

The threat, if sincere, marks a turning point in how the world’s information giants are dealing with an authoritarian regime that has the rare combination of powers to 1) open up vast, lucrative markets, and 2) govern the bounds of freedom within them. Until now, Google, Yahoo, Microsoft, Cisco and other firms have argued that the state-imposed limits on their operations in China were a tolerable cost—financially and morally—for the benefit of exposing the Chinese population to the wider world of information. Google has changed that bargain just by raising the issue, and it is likely to compel other tech companies to consider the ethical calculations that sustain their China businesses.

Some might say that taking a grand moral stand on the way out the door is an elegant way to exit a market that has been full of frustrations and obstacles for Google, but I wonder whether Google would risk the inevitable and costly “hurt feelings” this will elicit on the official Chinese side simply to score points with Western critics. But I might be overestimating the costs.

For more, I checked in with James Mulvenon, director of the Center for Intelligence Research and Analysis, a Washington-based consulting firm. He is a specialist on the Chinese military, with a particular interest in computer-network attacks and the information revolution in China. He has watched the Chinese Internet since its infancy and co-authored a 2002 book that predicted “time may be on the side of the regime’s opponents.” In a measure of how far things have moved, in our exchange today he says that “the Chinese government is surprisingly nimble and flexible in its responses to new technologies, far more adaptive than the prophets of the Internet would ever have given them credit for.”

What do you think of Google’s decision to go public? Has Google been targeted for attack more than other foreign Web sites or are they simply more vocal in response?

Google had to go public, at the very least to reclaim some of its soul and corporate culture. The company has always been in an awkward position in China. The company that promised “Don’t Be Evil” found itself making a series of compromises to get into the China market, even going so far as to create a separate, censored version of its search engine. Despite these sacrifices, it has never figured out a way to defeat its rival, Baidu, which clearly enjoys the support of the Chinese government.

These attacks appear to have been the last straw. They threatened not only the core intellectual property of the company but the the intrusions into the e-mail accounts of human-rights activists struck at the heart of Google’s self-perception of its role in the world. When the other affected companies decided not to go public, Google stepped forward, even though its decision will likely result in the loss of its China business.

If Google abandons google.cn, what would the practical effect be for users in China? Wouldn’t they still be able to access google.com, even if it is housed on servers overseas? What about with a proxy?

Users in China have not been able to easily access google.com since the introduction of google.cn, and the embarrassing scandal surrounding the abandonment of the latter will likely make it even more difficult. Proxies in China work for short periods of time, until the censors and the Great Firewall track them down. Instead, most Chinese users will content themselves with domestic search engines like Baidu, which will fulfill their needs.

The minority who seek unfettered information from abroad will continue their cat-and-mouse game with the Beijing regime, employing a constantly evolving set of technologies and techniques to breach the barriers. But the Chinese government is surprisingly nimble and flexible in its responses to new technologies, far more adaptive than the prophets of the Internet would ever have given them credit for. Google’s withdrawal will likely make it harder in the short term for Chinese netizens to enjoy the full benefits of global cyberspace.

In your 2002 book with Michael S. Chase, you posited that “time may be on the side of the regime’s opponents.” In the eight years since then, how has your sense of that evolved?

Time may be on the side of the regime’s opponents eventually, but the Beijing government has confounded all outside observers with its surprisingly nimble responses to the rapidly changing technologies and trends of the global information revolution. Despite the success of the censors in China thus far, however, there are some reasons for optimism and hope, however slim. A Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) report on the social impact of the Internet in China found that Chinese Web surfers expect the Internet to enhance freedom of speech and increase opportunities for political participation. According to the report, “The Internet is changing the Chinese political landscape. It provides people a platform to express their opinions and a window to the outside world as never before.”

As a professional Chinese middle class emerges, it will likely increasingly seek to leverage its growing economic clout in the political arena, at least to provide inputs into state economic policies. With the media under state supervision, the Internet is an attractive forum for organizing and articulating these preferences, and could thus serve as the medium for the pluralization of the Chinese political system, either within a co-opted space permitted by the Chinese Communist Party or in direct opposition. In this way, the Internet in China could facilitate political change in the same way that audio tapes of Khomenei’s speeches helped overthrow the Shah in 1979 and fax machines almost brought down the Beijing government in 1989.

The New Yorker (Estados Unidos)

 


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