A report by the DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG), issued approximately two weeks before the failed terrorist attack, examined the Transportation Security Administration's plan for spending $1 billion in American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), aka stimulus, funds, available for the 'procurement and installation of explosives detection systems and equipment.' 

The narrowly averted tragedy of Flight 253 has forced a wide-ranging reexamination of DHS' anti-terrorist activities, and it has reordered airport explosives-detection-equipment acquisition priorities. 

A report by the DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG), issued approximately two weeks before the failed terrorist attack, examined the Transportation Security Administration's plan for spending $1 billion in American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), aka stimulus, funds, available for the 'procurement and installation of explosives detection systems and equipment.' 

The report found that TSA's plan to 'procure and install explosives detection systems and equipment is generally practical, thorough, and comprehensive, except that it does not have contingency plans for equipment that the Transportation Security Laboratory has not yet qualified or operationally tested. Transportation Security Administration did not develop a contingency plan to reallocate the Recovery Act funds if the passenger screening technology it plans to purchase does not pass qualification and operational testing.' 

Keep in mind though that the OIG report was issued before the so-called 'underwear bomber' tried to detonate a high-yield explosive on an American airliner. Since then, for example, so-called full-body scanners have gone from being controversial to seeming inevitable. 

And keep in mind that the report's objective was limited: 'To determine whether the (ARRA) expenditure plan was practical, thorough, comprehensive, and designed to meet the Recovery Act's goals.' 

Of the $1 billion allocated for detection equipment, the TSA plan called for dividing funds between the electronic baggage screening program ($700 million) and the passenger screening program ($300 million), according to the OIG. 

The pre-Flight 253 expenditure plan called for TSA to allocate $197.7 million of the $300 million in the passenger screening program for screening technology, while spending $96.6 million for program operations and management and $5.7 million for an advanced surveillance program. 

At the time of the OIG's review, 'TSA had used only $3 million of its $197.7 million passenger screening technology budget to purchase first-generation advanced technology x-ray machines.' 

TSA planned to award the remaining $194.7 million by the fourth quarter of FY 2009. According to the report, that $194.7 million in the expenditure plan was expected to be spent for the following acquisitions: 

Advanced Technology X-ray 755 Units;

Universal Conveyor Systems 275 Units;

Bottled Liquid Scanners 500 Units;

Whole Body Imagers 200 Units; and

Explosive Trace Detection 300 Units. 

The report also emphasized that, 'all of these technologies, except for explosives trace detection, are still undergoing qualification and operational testing. As a result, TSA does not yet know whether or when these technologies will be available for deployment.' 

Accordingly, he report warned that the 'unavailability of qualified technology may delay projected contract award dates and the expenditure of the Recovery Act funds.' 

The expenditure plan also called for TSA to install checked baggage inspection systems at airports in Atlanta, Columbus, Dayton, Honolulu, Huntsville, Jackson Hole, Maui, New Orleans, Orange County, Orlando, Philadelphia, Portland, Sacramento, San Francisco, San Jose, and Tallahassee. 'TSA selected these airports through a risk-based project prioritization model, the quality and completeness of each airport's initial application, TSA's cost validation process, and the airports' readiness,' according to the OIG report. 

Finally, the report points out that the 'Acting Assistant Secretary disagreed with our conclusion that the expenditure plan did not include contingency plans for equipment that had not been qualified or operationally tested.'