Enhanced transnationalism in international systems is creating new sources of comparative advantage for nations, with the strategic value of connectedness being a particularly noteworthy example. But in an age where horizontal global network connections are proliferating, the world's fastest-rising power, China, maintains a rigidly vertical, Communist Party-led hierarchy of information. This exceptionalism, increasingly apparent throughout China's domestic and foreign policy, is emerging as one of the most fundamental obstacles to the country's continued international rise.

Chinese exceptionalism in formal foreign and economic policy is by no means a new phenomenon, but China, to a greater degree than any other major economic power, has resisted informal convergences of international systems. China's integration into the socio-cultural components of the global market, such as the World Wide Web and other emerging transnational social networks, is limited, and this disconnectedness is becoming more pronounced as the country continues its rapid economic rise.

This is not to deny the substantial internationalization of the Chinese economy since 1978 or the rapid emergence of new constellations of foreign relations, such as Chinese engagement with Africa and Latin America. But China is struggling to engage fully in the global exchange of ideas, and aloofness in a host of emerging transnational systems and communities is a critical feature of this dynamic.

The past year has been characterized by a more abrasive Chinese foreign policy, but domestically it has also seen an increase in domestic Internet controls, the most wide-reaching and sustained crackdown on "unharmonious elements" for at least a decade and a tightening of domestic regulations on holding international conferences and meetings. Members of the foreign business community also talk of a significant deterioration in their operating environments here. 

Moreover, China has found itself isolated on key issues. Beijing has abandoned its longstanding respect for the institution of the Nobel Prize, positioned itself as an outlier on "the West's cocky Libya gamble" and maintained its staunch support for North Korea in the wake of the Cheonan incident to the detriment of nearly all its other international relations in Asia. 

A revealing example of the lag between China's global economic integration and its socio-cultural and intellectual integration is last week's share offering on the New York Stock Exchange by Renren, a social networking site dubbed the "Chinese Facebook." The offering attracted huge interest from investors, and shares rose 30 percent on the first morning of trading. 

But while Facebook has users in more than 100 countries and is a truly international forum for the exchange of diverse information and the seeding of new local and transnational communities, Renren is an overwhelmingly single-nation platform whose functionality is restricted by China's political environment. The site is heavily monitored by government censors who ensure that there is little or no "unharmonious" political content, oversee any community-building initiatives and control the inflow of foreign news and opinions. Thus, Renren,  like China's information culture more generally, does not exhibit the two most striking features of new media: rapid and uncontrolled flow of information and ideas, and the ability to foster connectedness between previously unlinked individuals, groups and institutions.

There is considerable debate over why economic development has failed to bring wider integration benefits in China. It is a common but misleading view that isolationism and introversion have historically been the default modes of Chinese civilization. In fact, one of the most striking characteristics of Han Chinese culture has been its ability to expand and assimilate. The isolationist argument cannot explain major historical events such as the assimilation of the Mongol and the Manchu invaders into the Chinese state, the country's tradition of expansive international trade or the hybrid political systems found in Hong Kong and Macau.

Another line of analysis holds that China's previous experiences with international integration have made it more cautious as it re-emerges on the global stage. This is true to some extent, but it is important to recognize that this line of thinking is most persistently found in Communist Party propaganda. In many ways, China finds itself debating a similar spectrum of views on the country's place in the global order as were common a century ago(.pdf).

In truth, China's relative lack of engagement in new global networks is almost entirely a direct consequence of current Communist Party policies, one of only a handful of governments that choose to significantly restrict their citizens' access to the Internet. Beijing's economic foreign policy is designed to reduce the informal social and cultural feedback associated with internationalization. Attempts to expand international soft power are dominated by state-led initiatives at the expense of more-heterogeneous, organic cultural products, and their awkward tone is often more alienating than engaging.

The Chinese government is aware of its negative image abroad. It seems to realize that the key variable in the county's continued international rise is no longer simply sustaining domestic economic growth, but Beijing's own ability to overcome a trust deficit and carve out a more proactive role in the international community. But this task is made harder by current policies that restrict the global connectedness of Chinese society and promote skepticism in international relations.

China is justified in its desire to defend national sovereignty and stability, but in the age of connectedness, an overemphasis on these concerns will be strategically counterproductive. For example, it is hard to see an upside from China's current Internet censorship policies that is not massively outweighed by the damage they do to the country's international image. A significant reduction of Internet restrictions would, at a stroke, eliminate one of the most potent manifestations of Chinese exceptionalism and usher in -- symbolically at least -- a new era of Chinese self-confidence and openness.

While cultural factors unquestionably shape China's global outlook, many of the most significant causes of China's disconnectedness are simply political power-plays by the state. In an era when the strategic value of connectedness is increasing, this approach will become more and more damaging to China's overall national interests in the modern economic and security environment.

**Iain Mills is a Beijing-based freelance writer.