Raúl’s tenure as head of state also is likely to be transitory. But the chances of an abrupt change of the political and economic system are dim, as this is a handover that the government and the powerful Communist Party have been readying for years. Indeed, systemic continuity is probably in prospect well into the medium term.

The announcement on July 31st that due to illness and surgery Fidel had ceded authority to his brother should not have come as a complete surprise. It may even have been staged as a dress rehearsal, in no small measure to gage the reaction of Cubans and the international community alike. It will give the government more information to use to hone its succession strategy and ensure that it runs smoothly.

Moreover, for the past year and in particular in recent months there has been growing talk of succession and of Raúl. This has helped to prepare the Cuban citizenry for an eventual handover, and explains the subdued response to the event by most Cubans on the island—unlike that of Cuban-Americans in Miami, who have celebrated the news as the end of an era.

It also comes just weeks following the release of a major report by the US government’s Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba, which looks at US policy and preparations for a post-Castro period. That report states that the US would not accept a “succession” process as legitimate and does not believe it would lead to stability, and instead insists on “transition” to a new system. In a sense, Cuba has called Washington’s bluff, proving that a transfer of power to Raúl will not cause any immediate political or economic crisis.

Change with continuity

Nor is this quite the end of an era. Raúl, 75, has been groomed for many years to succeed his brother. Fidel’s closest confidant since the 1959 Cuban Revolution and head of the armed forces, Raúl has the reputation of a political hardliner and an “enforcer” in the communist government.  Recently there have been efforts made to soften his image and to build his connections to the population, this to compensate for his lack of charisma or close bonds to the people relative to his brother.

Whenever Raúl takes over permanently from Fidel—the first stage of the government’s planned succession strategy—his rule might differ in some respects from Fidel’s. Though politically tough, Raúl is believed to be more pragmatic and open to economic liberalisation. He favoured much of the limited free-market openings begun in the early l990s and was behind the military’s direct involvement in and ownership of a variety of enterprises, including trading companies, manufacturing facilities and hotels. He is said by some to lean more towards a Chinese-style system: political control via a one-party state combined with open markets.

But lacking Fidel’s domineering personality and political grip, Raúl might delegate more responsibility. He has suggested that he would govern in a collective fashion with other top officials and leaders of the Communist Party. The recent reestablishment of a 12-member secretariat of the Communist Party suggests that the institutional framework for such decentralisation and shared leadership is in place.

However, at 75 years of age and just five years younger than Fidel, Raúl cannot be expected to enjoy a lengthy term. It can be assumed that the Cubans have prepared for this as well. There are both institutions and procedures in place to select the next successor, and other well-trained and ideologically pure leaders of a younger generation who could step in to avoid a vacuum.

Prospects for the ascent to power of the democratic opposition are slim. The dissidents on the island are weak, and public opinion about the democracy movement is divided. There is no viable political figure or organisation to effectively challenge the status quo, with or without Fidel.

US’s tricky approach

Meanwhile, despite the revelry on the part of the US-based exile community, the last thing the US government probably wants is instability and disruptive change in Cuba. The George W Bush administration has ratcheted up the pressure on the Castro government since last year and talks regularly of aiding democracy activists in Cuba. Two weeks ago the US State Department unveiled a plan to spend US$80m over the next two years to help with a post-Castro transition.

However, while pushing for regime change, many policymakers in Washington are also concerned about the possibility of uncontrolled unrest on the island. They are making preparations to avoid, or at least limit, the potential for a massive outflow of Cuban refugees akin to the Mariel exodus of 1980, or an inflow to the island of Cuban-Americans aiming to boatlift their relatives out.

With multiple crises in other parts of the world, particularly the Middle East, many—except for the most fervent anti-Castro ideologues—in Washington may well prefer, at least for now, some stability and continuity in Cuba.

The future is here

Whatever the speculation about the latest events in Havana or how the US should and will react, one point is clear: what was once in the realm of theory is now reality. The passage to a post-Castro Cuba is no longer in the future; it is in progress.