On the 20th anniversary of the outbreak of the second intifada (October 2000), the debate arises again in Israel as to whether the Palestinian move was an initiative of Chairman Arafat and the Palestinian Authority or whether it was a spontaneous evolution on the Palestinian side that largely surprised not only Israel but also the Palestinians.
One
opinion in Israel states that the intifada was the result of an initiative by
the head of the Palestinian Authority, Yasser Arafat, and that Israeli
intelligence knew about it in advance and warned Prime Minister Ehud Barak, who
did not listen. This opinion was expressed in the memoirs of Maj. Gen. Res.
Amos Gilad, formerly the head of the research division in the Israeli Military
Intelligence (IMI) and former Israel Defense Forces (IDF) chief of staff,
Lieutenant Gen. Res. Moshe (Boogie) Ya’alon. However, the picture presented by
the two former IDF senior personalities seem to be wrong, and in this article,
I’ll present another view showing that actually, the IMI (which is responsible
for Israel’s national intelligence estimates), contrary to its allegation,
failed to predict the Palestinian moves and did not warn the IDF and the Prime
Minister to prepare for the intifada.
The
different and probably correct opinion has been argued by the ISA (Israel
Security Agency, known also as Shabak or the Shin Bet) former managing
directors at the time, who discussed the event very openly and presented a
clear conclusion: namely that Palestinian Authority Chairman Arafat did not
initiate the intifada but was as much surprised by it as was Israel. The source
of the views presented by ISA leaders is the book The Gatekeepers (in Hebrew)
by David Moreh (2014), in which six former ISA leaders were interviewed. Among
other things, the book raised the question of how the second intifada broke
out. It is important to mention that there is no doubt in Israel that the ISA
is the organization that has the best intelligence on the Palestinian territories.
Avi
Dichter, who was the head of ISA at the outbreak of the intifada, said in this
context (p. 263): “I do not recognize the intelligence materials beyond the
reality that existed, indicative signs that Q Quote 1they are heading towards
an intifada. The Palestinians did not know that an intifada was going to break
out”. Yuval Diskin, who was Dichter’s deputy at the time, says (pages 263,264):
“The atmosphere in the Palestinian public, as well as in Israel to a large
extent, was that we were going to an inevitable confrontation. I do not know if
you remember the media at that time. Everyone prepared for the intifada,
prophesied and the prophecy came true […] there were also incidents in Joseph’s
tomb. This time the IDF decided that it would be prepared for an eruption. “No
one thought we would enter here for five, six, or seven years of suicide
bombings and such a large cycle of bloodshed”, according to Dichter.
His
deputy, Diskin, went on to talk about internal processes in Judea and Samaria
that created unrest against Chairman Arafat, and said: “On the eve of the
second intifada there were elections in Judea and Samaria and [Marwan]
Barghouti won. Arafat turned the election around because Barghouti was an
oppositionist. Barghouti led the intifada and not Arafat”. Diskin notes that,
“contrary to what experts say, Arafat did not drive the intifada. He rode the
wave later. The Fatah youths started the riots and Arafat was surprised in the
early stages by what was happening on the streets. He even tried, not with all
his might, to stop the events in the first weeks, at some point he decided to
join them and rode the wave in a very nice way”.
Avi
Dichter, head of the ISA at the time, says the following later on in Moreh’s
book (p. 265): “There was an argument between us and the IDF’s Intelligence
Division (IMI) that lasted until Operation Q QuoteDEFENSIVE SHIELD, in 2002.
The IMI claimed that the intifada was Initiated by Palestinian Authority in
Judea and Samaria and possibly also in Gaza, and we –the ISA– argued that it
has no intelligence back up and it’s all speculation. During DEFENSIVE SHIELD,
all the perpetrators of the intifada were arrested by ISA, and told in the
interrogations how they were being led into the intifada, how they caught the
bull by its horns to gain assets just like Marwan Barghouti did […]. When we
interrogated them”, Dichter added, “they told us how they were dragged in and
how they started putting names and terms together. I remember there was someone
very senior in IMI’s research division, who said, ‘It’s good that ISA is
investigating. They can direct their investigations to support their thesis'”.
In my (the present author) opinion, the man who said so was Amos Gilad, who was
then the head of the research division at IMI.
The
question of the initiative for the intifada also arose in an interview given in
2009 by Col. Ephraim Lavie, who was the head of the Palestinian department in
IMI at the outbreak of the second intifada. Lavie told journalist Akiva Eldar
in Haaretz that he demanded a thorough investigation of the failures in IMI and
claimed that a culture of speaking in two voices had developed there, one the
oral version for the consumption of the political echelon, and one the written
version for internal purposes. According to Lavie, this “formula” allowed the
head of IMI and the head of the research division to claim, ‘we told you so’
and be ‘covered’ no matter in which direction reality would develop. Gadi Zohar
(Brigadier Gen. Res.), former head of the Palestinian department at IMI,
strengthens Lavie’s opinion –in the book Craft of Thought (Hebrew), p. 121– and
claims: “The heads of the research division [developed and promoted the] ‘no
partner’ theory and [promoted the idea of] Arafat having planned and initiated
the intifada, even when it was clear at the time that this was not the
professional opinion of the IMI’s Palestinian analysts”.
It
should be noted also that an investigation conducted in 2004 by Ephraim Lavei’s
successor at the Palestinian desk in the research division of IMI stated that
the second intifada broke out as aQ Quote 3 “popular protest” that sought to
release steam and vent the popular outrage accumulated after the failure of
negotiations and inability to extract political achievements from Israel, and
not as an initiative of the Palestinian Authority.
In
conclusion, the narrative that exists among sections of the Israeli public,
especially encouraged by the political right, according to which Arafat
initiated the intifada, is incorrect. It is essential to know the reality
because as a result of errors in the Israeli intelligence, a wrong assessment
was presented to the decision-makers, according to which Arafat initiated the
intifada. Decisions and vital political moves were made in Israel, which only
worsened the situation. In this case, we are facing again the implication of
intelligence failures and also the difficulties to predict civil rebellions,
which are often spontaneous and diffused, and which make them hard to
anticipate.
https://intelnews.org/2020/09/22/01-2873/
***Dr.
Avner Barnea is research fellow at the National Security Studies Center of the
University of Haifa in Israel. He served as a senior officer in the Israel
Security Agency (ISA).