It is important to note that the intelligence division of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), known as Israeli Military Intelligence (IMI), and the  Israel Security Agency (ISA), have been monitoring Hamas for years. These two agencies are believed to have conducted a situation assessment approximately two weeks before the October 7 attack. The assessment concluded that Hamas was deterred and had no interest in changing the status quo by attacking Israel in the short run. This assessment was communicated to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Minister of Defense Yoav Gallant.

It appears that this assessment was not supported by concrete intelligence. The agencies that produced it relied primarily on monitoring the recent behavior of Hamas, including the fact that it was allowing Palestinians living in Gaza to work inside Israel. Additionally, the assessment noted the fact that Hamas was receiving funds from Qatar to help the poverty-stricken residents of Gaza. In retrospect, this assessment appears to have been based on wishful thinking.

The Egyptian Warning

It is now known that Abbas Kamel, Director of the Egyptian General Intelligence Directorate, sent a warning to Israel a few days before Hamas’ attack. Kamel allegedly warned of “something unusual, a terrible operation”, which was about to take place from the direction of Gaza. The warning was forwarded to Prime Minister Netanyahu’s office. The Israeli newspaper that published this report, Yedioth Ahronot, is known for its serious reputation and quality sources inside the Egyptian establishment. According to the report, Kamel was told by the Israelis that they were focused on preventing terrorist attacks in the West Bank.

Yet, in a speech that Netanyahu delivered immediately after the October 7 attack broke out, he denied claims about the Egyptian warning and claimed that they were fake news. However, American Congressman Michael McCaul, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said on October 11: “We know that Egypt […] warned the Israelis three days prior that an event like this could happen”. Speaking to reporters following a closed-door intelligence briefing on the crisis for American lawmakers, McCaul added: “I don’t want to get too much into classified [details], but a warning was given”. An Egyptian government source also asserted that Egyptian intelligence officials warned their Israeli counterparts that Hamas was planning “something big” ahead of the October 7 surprise onslaught. But this intelligence appears to have been ignored.

Inadequate Intelligence Collection

On October 11, an IDF spokesman admitted that, on the evening before the attack, suspicious movements by Hamas operatives were detected near the perimeter fence separating Gaza from Israel. However, according to the spokesman, “there was no intelligence alert for this incident”. It was later revealed that a few hours before the attack there was suspicious chatter in Hamas communication channels. Several discussions were held at the IDF on that evening. However, its intelligence officers did not get the impression that the chatter reflected Hamas’ operational readiness to move against Israel. That is why the IDF did not raise the alert level in southern Israel and did not report this chatter to senior decision-makers.

The big question is how Israel’s intelligence community failed to gather relevant intelligence on Hamas’ intention to attack Israel for such a long time. Israel’s intelligence collection on threats emanating from the Gaza Strip is based on a division of responsibilities: the IMI is traditionally responsible for gathering information through signals and visual intelligence, while the ISA is responsible for gathering information through human intelligence. It should be noted that the leaders of the military wing of Hamas were apparently aware of Israel’s intelligence capabilities. That is why they avoided using digital communication channels to organize their attack, which made it very difficult to intercept valuable intelligence.

It is now evident that the ISA failed to penetrate Hamas’s inner circle, and thus failed to issue an early warning for the October 7 attack. Additionally, Hamas used a very strict compartmentalization system, allowing only a few to have a picture of its intentions and plan of attack. Interrogations of Hamas captives in Israeli hands shows that the training and preparation for the attack lasted for many months; but intelligence about Hamas’s intentions was kept very close to the chest of the heads of Hamas’ military intelligence.

****Dr. Avner Barnea is research fellow at the National Security Studies Center of the University of Haifa in Israel. He served as a senior officer in the Israel Security Agency (ISA). He is the author of We Never Expected That: A Comparative Study of Failures in National and Business Intelligence (Lexington Books, 2021).