China successfully destroyed one of its satellites in outer space January 11 by striking it with a ballistic missile. The stunning anti-satellite (ASAT) test was not only further evidence of China’s rapidly evolving space program but was a clear indication that Beijing may have reversed course on its longstanding opposition to the weaponization of space. Policy makers and defense analysts were alarmed at the test expressing concern that it could be interpreted as a provocative challenge to America’s space dominance. There was no doubt in the minds of many that China’s ASAT success exposed the vulnerability of U.S. space platforms. Knocking out American communication, surveillance, and missile-launch detection satellites, as a prelude to military action, for example, would effectively leave the U.S. military blind, deaf, and mute. Furthermore, China’s now proven ability to track, identify, and strike satellites in space demonstrated, experts say, that it has mastered the basic technology necessary to track, identify, and intercept ballistic missiles, giving China a nascent Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) capability.
On January 11, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 2nd Artillery Battalion launched a ground-based medium-range ballistic missile that slammed into and destroyed one of its aging Feng Yun-1C weather satellites 535 miles above the earth. The event sparked international condemnation and alarm at China’s development of a space warfare capability. The missile used a non-explosive kinetic energy kill vehicle, similar to the U.S. design for ballistic missile defense, which destroys its target by slamming into it at extremely high speed rather than exploding near it, destroying it with shrapnel.
The ballistic missile is thought to have been launched from the Xichang facility in China’s Sichuan province and was quickly detected by U.S. missile warning satellites. U.S. Air Force reporting on the FY-1C satellite quadrupled just before the ASAT test, suggesting that the United States anticipated the strike and was able to monitor the test and collect a significant amount of data. Air Force Space Command radars were able to monitor both the kinetic energy kill vehicle and the satellite before and after the impact. Radar tracking data revealed debris from the impact was ejected in all directions. “This is by far the worst satellite fragmentation in the history of the space age, in the past 50 years”, Nicholas Johnson, NASA’s chief scientist for orbital debris told Aviation Week & Space Technology, February 12, 2007. “Many of these debris will be in orbit for 100 years or more because the altitude of the breakup was so high,” he said.
The international community, upset over the further militarization of outer space, expressed concern that the large debris field could damage any of the 800 operational satellites currently in low earth orbit.
ASAT Test Demonstrated Missile Defense Capability
China used a kinetic kill vehicle instead of the ‘shot-gun blast’ approach pioneered by the Soviet Union that relied upon an explosive charge to spray a large area with ‘shrapnel’ in order to ensure the destruction of the satellite. The use of a non-explosive kinetic kill vehicle requires an advanced and highly accurate radar tracking capability in order to guide the kinetic warhead into the target at such high speeds – equivalent in difficulty to reliably striking a bullet in mid-flight with another bullet. This suggests that China’s space-tracking capabilities may be far more advanced than previously thought and, if China is able to guide a kinetic kill vehicle into a satellite, it is likely that Beijing is, or is not far from, mastering the ability to track and intercept missiles or warheads traveling through the same medium.
Beijing’s ASAT test comes just months after reports claimed China temporarily ‘blinded’ an American reconnaissance satellite with a ground-based laser. While the details of that incident remain highly classified, U.S. officials have said the January 11 event was China’s fourth attempt to destroy an orbiting satellite, with the previous three failing. The development of a ballistic missile ASAT kill vehicle, combined with the deployment of ground-based lasers capable of interfering with American reconnaissance satellites, reveals a growing Chinese interest in counter-space operations.
The United Sates, Japan, Britain, and Australia all condemned the ASAT test. National Security Council spokesman Gordon Johndroe said the administration was “concerned about China’s lack of transparency,” according to The Washington Times, January 24, 2007. China’s public and private assurances “are incomplete and do not answer many of the questions raised by the international community … for example, China has not explained the intent of this weapons test, nor has it stated whether or not it plans a future test [or how this test] is compatible with its public stance against the weaponization of space,” Johndroe added.
U.S. Space Policy Updated Just Months Ago
China’s ASAT shot comes only months after the first revision to America’s official space policy in ten years. Those changes, authorized by President George W. Bush on August 31, 2006, were largely based on the recommendations of the 2001 Commission to Assess United States National Security, Space Management, and Organization. While specific changes to the policy remain classified, the administration released an unclassified version that defense experts are saying marks a significant paradigm shift in the traditional rhetorical ambiguity surrounding the weaponization of space.
Among the new principles set forth by the amended space policy was the declaration that the “Freedom of action in space is as important to the United States as air power and sea power … and [America] rejects any limitations on the fundamental right of the United States to operate in and acquire data from space ... or the development of new legal regimes or other restrictions that seek to prohibit or limit U.S. access to or use of space.” Moreover, the United States “will dissuade or deter others from either impeding those rights or developing capabilities intended to do so; take those actions necessary to protect its space capabilities; respond to interference; and deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to U.S. national interests.” The revised policy charges the Secretary of Defense with ensuring “force enhancement, space control, and force application missions.” The term ‘space control’ has been interpreted as especially alarming by critics because it suggests the United States has openly declared its intention to deny the use of space to others through the use of space weapons.
The new American space policy has been widely criticized in the international arena, especially in Europe, as overly unilateral, aggressive, and “imperialistic”, but the European Union continues to be ‘lost in space’ with its own space policy. According to Defense News, October 23, 2006, “everything tiptoes around the question no national capital wants to openly address: How are the Europeans going to coherently exploit their space assets in times of crisis, and by whose authority?” Jean-Jacques Dordain, director general of the European Space Agency says, “The problem Europe has is integrating its space security objectives, not the capabilities.”
Nonetheless, at least one leading Republican says the U.S. reaction, especially from the White House and the State Department, has been weak and ambiguous in light of the threat posed by Beijing’s ASAT shot. Senator Jon Kyl, a veteran member of the U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee, accused President Bush of lacking the will to implement a comprehensive initiative designed to protect American satellite assets and ensure our dominance in space during a speech at the Heritage Foundation, January 29, 2007.
U.S. Response to ASAT Test Muted
“Why do we need to hear from the Chinese exactly what their intentions are? What intention could possibly be behind the test save for the capability to blow up satellites in space? Would the State Department believe any alternative explanation if it were given to it?” Kyl asked in response to the State Department’s earlier briefing on the incident, which he felt was too soft. “Security in space is a vital national interest. The loss of access to space would threaten the very stability of our nation” … [and yet] since the test was reported, there has been no public statement by the President or any Cabinet officials and no mention during the State of the Union. No congressional hearings have yet been scheduled. No indication has come out of the Pentagon that the space budget is being in any way revisited. The State Department has provided no specific information about what our diplomats are, or are not, saying to the Chinese in response to this provocation,” Kyl added.
In February, the White House announced it was suspending plans for developing cooperative space ventures, including a joint mission to the moon, in reaction to Beijing’s ASAT test. “We believe China’s development and testing of such weapons is inconsistent with the constructive relationship that our presidents have outlined,” NASA spokesman Jason Sharp said, according to The Washington Times, February 2, 2007. Sharp was referring to a space agreement concluded last April between President Bush and visiting Chinese President Hu Jintao.
The asymmetric threat to U.S. space platforms and their importance in modern warfare is accelerating America’s need to defend those platforms against attack. The issue was first explored by JINSA in the 2003 article Foes See U.S. Satellite Dependence as Vulnerable Asymmetric Target. “We took extraordinary steps to protect our satellites” from Soviet attack during the Cold War, Lt. Gen. Michael Hamel, director of the Air Force’s Space and Missile Systems Center, said November 1, 2006, according to GOVEXEC.com, a news daily and web site covering the business of the federal government. “We’re going to see a lot more investment to rebuild those capabilities,” Hamel continued. “Those assets provide us an ability to see, hear, communicate and act at the speed of information,” U.S. Air Force Lt. Gen. Robert Kehler, deputy commander of U.S. Strategic Command, told an audience at the Strategic Space and Defense 2006 conference in Omaha Nebraska, according to Aviation Week & Space Technology, November 6, 2006. “So, we are very protective of our space capabilities. The world has changed, and the environment on orbit has changed. [Potential adversaries] have noted the significance we’ve put on our space assets. We need to make sure we can defend [them],” Kehler warned.
Asymmetric Threat to U.S. Space Platforms
In order to do that, however, the United States will need to increase its space situational awareness to “know what’s up there, and in the case of active satellites, be able to understand what they are doing – both friendly as well as possibly hostile satellites,” Hamel continued. One high priority effort for the United States Air Force is the Space Based Space Surveillance (SBSS) program designed to detect and track space objects such as satellites and orbital debris generating data to be used in support of military operations. Hamel said it will enable the USAF to “distinguish between something coming close to a critical defense payload, whether it’s just a wandering satellite or something with more threatening intentions.”
The United States also needs to improve its understanding of the space environment in order to distinguish between a deliberate attack against a U.S. space platform or if environmental factors, like solar radiation, are affecting the performance of a satellite. General Kevin P. Chilton, Air Force Space Command commander, said he wanted to improve capabilities to “identify what’s up there, understand its mission and, ultimately, determine [the satellite’s] intent,” including the capability to determine the satellite’s payload, whether or not parasitic satellites for mounting attacks are attached, is the satellite able to maneuver and if so, is it positioning for an attack, according to Aviation Week & Space Technology, October 9, 2006. “The technology and capabilities required to [rendezvous with] another satellite and do something to it exists in multiple countries [worldwide],” Chilton observed.
“If our space capabilities are taken away, the U.S. military begins to go back in time … the less effective and capable we are in space, the farther back in time we go, until we [no longer have] precision strike [and] we don’t have – or have very little – situational awareness. We do not have reach-back abilities” and would have to revert to military strategies and methods used 10-20 years ago, Kehler said, according to Aviation Week & Space Technology, November 6, 2006.
Arms Control Implications
Despite the obvious asymmetric threat posed by America’s overwhelming reliance upon space-based platforms, China’s ASAT test fundamentally contradicts its adamant opposition to American withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and the subsequent deployment of a BMD shield. Both China and Russia have sought to limit American defensive and possibly offensive space assets by proposing an international ban on weapons in space in order to deter a new ‘space race’ and prevent American hegemony in space. “Since other countries care about this question and are opposed to weaponization of space and an arms race in space, then let us join hands to realize this goal,” Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu said in response to American and Japanese criticism of the ASAT test, according to The Washington Times, February 2, 2007.
But Kyl insisted that space has been “weaponized” since the first German V-2 rockets passed through space on their way to targets in London during World War II and like contemporary space analysts, he drew a comparison between space and the ocean: “Few object when the United States Navy deploys hundreds of heavily armed warships in every one of the world’s oceans. No one accuses us of contributing to the “weaponization of the sea” because they know that the presence of our weapons ensures free transit for all who pursue their peaceful interests. U.S. systems based in space could similarly patrol the ‘commons’ for the good of all.”
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao said, “The test was not directed at any country and does not constitute a threat to any country,” according to The New York Times, January 23, 2007. “What needs to be stressed is that China has always advocated the peaceful use of space, [and] opposes the weaponization of space and an arms race … China has never participated and will never participate in any arms race in outer space.”
The Defense Department’s 2003 annual report to Congress on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China stated that Beijing “is believed to be conducting research and development on a direct-ascent ASAT system that could be fielded in the 2005-2010 timeframe.”
“This is a wake up call,” declared Undersecretary of State for Arms Control Robert Joseph, according to The Washington Times, February 2, 2007. The ASAT test shows that space is a “contested environment” and other “countries are developing capabilities to put at risk our assets for which we are dependent,” he said. The United States, Joseph said, needs “to ensure that we take the steps necessary to protect the space assets and the right to unfettered access to space.” Joseph also said he was surprised the international community has not responded to this incident more aggressively, adding “just imagine the international reaction if the U.S. had conducted such a test.”
Alarming Implications for Iran’s Missile Programs
China’s ASAT test has also caused alarm in Israel because of Beijing’s close relationship with Iran’s in missile technology development. “We are well aware of attempts by hostile states, especially Iran, to acquire an independent space-launch capability,” Israeli Defense Minister Amir Peretz said, in reference to Tehran’s plans to convert a Shihab-3 ballistic missile into a space-launch vehicle, during a January 31st conference at the Fisher Institute for Air and Space Strategic Studies, according to Defense News, February 5, 2007. And “we’re also aware that … only recently a nation like China proved its ability to physically strike orbiting satellites. This capability compels us to prepare for the most difficult scenarios, in the event that, in the future enemy states will be able to harm Israeli space assets,” Perez said.
Uzi Rubin, a former director of the Israeli Missile Defense Organization, told Defense News that the direct transfer of complete ASAT systems to Tehran is not viewed as a likely scenario, but China’s “proliferation history over the past decade has shown that if the Iranians are willing to pay, they would be willing to provide the relevant technological assistance.” In response, Israel is considering a ‘launch on demand’ capability that would allow it to quickly replace satellites that have been damaged or destroyed. “It neutralizes the motivation for the other side to threaten your satellites, since they not only expose themselves to retaliatory response, but they know that in a matter of hours or days, we’ll be able to put up additional space-based capabilities,” Tal Inbar, vice president of the Israel Space Society, told Defense News, February 5, 2007.
Defending Against Foreign ASAT Capabilities
Buried within the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Congress has called for the creation of a new National Space Intelligence Center, in hopes of improving the ability to protect American satellites from attack and identify space-based threats, noting that some estimates indicate that we commit only 10 percent of what we did nearly 25 years ago to the analysis of threats to space systems.” In an obvious reference to Beijing’s ASAT test, an unclassified version of the report said, “recent international events have only served to highlight this problem.”
The creation of a National Space Intelligence Center comes amidst concerns from military analysts wondering why Chinese spacecraft are in orbits that bring them within close proximity of key U.S. satellites, according to Air Force Times, February 2, 2007. The Chinese spacecraft do not appear to be conducting any particular mission and that has analysts worried. The satellites could be identifying the capabilities and mission of American space platforms, attempting to intercept their communications with ground-based receiver stations, or placed in position to explode or impact a U.S. satellite in times of war. “There is a menu of missions that could be performed that we are not yet clear about,” one unidentified source told the industry magazine. “These things aren’t being sent up there to be space rocks,” the source cautioned.
A Boost for New U.S. Space Programs?
In January, two leading members of the House Armed Services Committee launched an effort to increase the funding for classified space programs, saying China’s ASAT test has added a “new era of military competition.” Neither Rep. Duncan Hunter (R-Calif.) or Rep. Terry Everett, (R-Ala.) would discuss specific space programs that could receive additional funding, but in a letter to President Bush, they asked the administration to review U.S. capabilities to protect space assets, adding that they are “integral to the daily execution of virtually every military campaign, operations and exercise involving U.S. forces today,” according to a January 31, 2007 GOVEXEC.com article.
Two such programs could involve Lockheed Martin’s XSS-11 and another project dubbed ‘Angels’. Both platforms are designed to be highly maneuverable spacecraft capable of scrutinizing other space platforms and autonomously rendezvous with other orbiting satellites. According to Air Force Times, the XSS-11 brought back information from a space mission that prompted top U.S. military commanders in January 2006 to say they needed to improve their understanding of the space-based threats to U.S. platforms and dramatically accelerate America’s ability to quickly launch and replace satellites that have been compromised or destroyed from enemy action.
Both the United States and Russia developed limited ASAT capabilities in the 1980s, but the program was heavily scrutinized because the technological similarities between an ASAT system and a BMD shield jeopardized America’s legal commitment to the ABM Treaty. China’s recent test is thought to be the first successful destruction of a satellite in orbit in more than 20 years, but during Congressional testimony before the Senate Intelligence Committee in January, however, Gen. Michael Maples, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), said “Russia and China continue to be the primary states of concern regarding military space and counter-space programs.” Maples went on to reveal that, “several countries continue to develop capabilities that have the potential to threaten U.S. space assets and some have already deployed systems with inherent anti-satellite capabilities,” including, “kinetic or directed energy weapons capabilities.”
The continuing foreign development of ASAT capabilities is thought to have led to the formation of the United States Air Force 76th Space Control Squadron in 2004, which is capable of disrupting foreign satellites via ground-based electronic jammers, according to The Washington Times, January 17, 2007.
Beijing’s proven ability to hold hostage satellites in low earth orbit, including U.S. satellites used for reconnaissance, missile detection and early warning, reveals a burgeoning BMD capability that will carry strategic regional and worldwide implications.
According to a Congressional report compiled in 1985 by the U.S. Congress Office of Technology and Assessment, “Anti-Satellite Weapons, Countermeasures, and Arms Control”, the “testing of advanced ASATs could provide valuable information that would contribute to the development of a very capable BMD system.” Those concerns are rooted in the ability to track and intercept moving targets in space, including incoming ballistic missiles. “There is considerable overlap between BMD and ASAT technologies,” the Congressional report concluded, adding that the United States government was specifically troubled at the time by the advancements in ASAT technologies the Soviet Union was making and the inherent dual use applicability to a BMD shield, possibly violating the ABM Treaty. As a solution, the report suggested, “effective ASAT arms control would likely place significant restrictions on the testing and deployment of future ballistic missile defense systems.”
“The bottom line is this: We must not jeopardize our war fighters in the name of preserving an indefensible distinction between space and non-space weapons. If targeting an adversary’s satellites allows our military to achieve victory more quickly, or at lower cost in blood, such attacks must be considered. The Chinese seem to understand this point much better than we do,” Kyl concluded.
by JINSA Editorial Assistant Jonathan Howland.
