Such conditions were recognized early on, with the Bush administration establishing a unified command dedicated to the African continent, known as AFRICOM. Geographically, AFRICOM’s presence is heavily concentrated in conflict-prone regions such as the Horn of Africa and the Sahel. As one of eleven such commands, AFRICOM was borne out of an impetus to confront violent extremist groups such as homegrown outfits like Al-Shabaab and satellite groups of Al-Qaeda.

Since then, throughout its operating history, AFRICOM has existed long enough to see the rise of additional groups such as Boko Haram and affiliates of the Islamic State. Fueled by fighters fleeing the Levant (primarily from Syria and Iraq) and entering through Libya, these groups have benefitted from the inherent weakness of states across the Sahel region. The lawlessness has enabled a nexus of criminal groups and terrorist organizations to exploit new sources of revenue through kidnapping, extortion, and the trafficking of drugs, weapons, and humans.

Thus far, AFRICOM’s activities have focused primarily on capacity-building and training missions, which are designed to shift responsibility to host militaries and multilateral forces operating in missions designated by the African Union. Though the Horn of Africa has seen notable progress, civilian and military casualty figures have scaled considerably in the Sahel over the past year, engulfing a growing number of fragile states across North and West Africa.

In spite of its ambitious mandate, AFRICOM is comprised of well under 6,000 total Department of Defense personnel, with most housed in Djibouti, where the US operates its sole permanent African base. With an annual budget of $2 billion USD, AFRICOM’s share of total US defense spending is paltry at just under 0.3%.

Nevertheless, further cuts to AFRICOM have been mulled since last December when US Defense Secretary Mark Esper began exploring options to reshuffle troops as part of the Trump administration’s desire to reorient its focus toward great-power competition with China. With France already actively supporting a counterterrorism operation in the Sahel, any American troop reduction would likely derive from West Africa, placing a greater onus on French and other European forces to contain the spiraling conflict in the region.

Save for the Niger incident, the Trump administration’s Africa policy has been relatively muted. Key positions in the State Department related to Africa remained vacant after the end of the Obama administration. In addition, the leak of an unflattering comment made in reference to the continent by US President Donald Trump nearly two-and-a-half years ago undoubtedly impaired the relationship between key African leaders and the White House.

Even an election victory by former US Vice President Joe Biden, who will challenge Trump for the presidency in November, may not be enough to maintain AFRICOM. Though Biden has voiced support for air strikes and small deployments as a means to combat terrorism, he has also argued for a boost in America’s physical presence in the Indo-Pacific theatre as a means to challenge China’s aggression in the region.

Alternatively, a successful reelection bid in November’s election could accelerate the Trump administration’s drawdowns. Such a decision would create a vacuum for new security partners on the continent, a void that U.S. adversaries such as Russia and China have demonstrated a willingness to fill.

In addition to its heavy investment and financing of infrastructure projects, China has also established its first foreign military base in Djibouti. For its part, Russia’s role on the continent has included a strong presence of Russian-owned private military contractors (PMCs) and military aid in the form of training, advisors, and arms. Both trends suggest that the absence of a US presence on the continent would have cascading consequences that would thwart several US interests in both the War on Terror and in its renewed quest to prepare for great power conflict.

On the counterterrorism front, US ally France now finds itself fatigued after experiencing a military victory early on in its Sahel operations. The mounting losses endured by armies of the G5 Sahel Joint Force (Mali, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad) have made those governments even more reliant on French support. Though it has attempted to encourage further participation and troop contributions from other European states, France will likely shoulder much of the burden and costs following any US withdrawal. This coincides with a time where the momentum enjoyed by Islamist groups is strongest in North and West Africa, making it an apt place for fighters to regroup and launch operations into the nearby Mediterranean.

Swift and uncalculated pullouts are hardly new to the Trump Administration. As demonstrated by its sudden withdrawal from the Syrian-Turkish border, America’s alliance-building takes a reputational hit that can be difficult to reverse when new conditions and threats arise. To preempt such threats, AFRICOM provides an affordable level of stability, but only if followed up by meaningful commitments in the form of presence and partnerships.