SUMMARY: In November, the US Congress received its annual defense department report outlining military and security developments in China, as mandated by the 2000 National Defense Authorization Act of 2000. The report mainly focuses on the technological aspects of the People Liberation Army’s ongoing expansion and modernization, though areas of engagement and cooperation are also highlighted. However, such examples are few and far between in this most recent iteration, which broadly paints a picture of a military balance that is rapidly shifting toward parity between the two global powers.
BACKGROUND
Strategy
and foreign policy
The
report doesn’t pull any punches in describing China’s long-term goals and
foreign policy. Beijing’s objectives are openly dubbed ‘revisionist’ insofar
that they seek to overturn the present rules-based international order under
the pretense of enacting ‘the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.’
Interestingly, and in a departure from past reports, the 2021 iteration notes
that China views the international system as not just a competition between
powerful nation states, but opposing ideological systems as well.
A
section of the report is devoted to China’s Military-Civil Fusion Development
Strategy, which is a broad plan to make the social and economic spheres also
serve the objective of national rejuvenation. More specifically, this strategy
involves: 1) fusing the defense industrial complex with the civilian industrial
base; 2) integrating technological developments in the military-civilian
domains; 3) cultivating talent between both domains; 4) leveraging civilian
construction for military purposes; 5) leveraging civilian logistics for
military purposes; and 6) expanding the national defense mobilization system.
In terms
of defense strategy, China pursues an ‘active defense’ concept and seeks to
create a ‘world-class’ military by 2049. Active defense, as defined by the CCP
and PLA, is somewhat of a paradox in that it can involve pre-emptive attacks if
they’re ultimately deemed to be in China’s interest; the ‘defense’ aspect lies
in the preference of avoiding conflict whenever possible. Overall, armed forces
modernization and planning efforts remain squarely focused on area-denial along
China’s periphery, which seeks to repel a ‘strong enemy,’ presumably the United
States, in the event of a conflict over Taiwan.
PLA
military bases overseas
In an
effort to expand its global power projection capabilities, Beijing is seeking
new military bases in Asia and beyond, adding to its preexisting facility in
Djibouti. Such bases would support a variety of capabilities, including naval,
air, ground, cyber, and space power projection. Some countries that are cited
as possible sites include Cambodia, Thailand, Myanmar, Singapore, Indonesia, Pakistan,
Sri Lanka, UAE, Kenya, Seychelles, Tanzania, Angola, and Tajikistan.
PRC
influencing operations
A
section of the report is devoted to PRC influence operations, which ‘target
cultural institutions, media organizations, business, academic, and policy
communities in the United States, other countries, and international
institutions, to achieve outcomes favorable to [China’s] strategic objectives.’
Such operations are overwhelmingly intended to massage public opinion in a way
that synergizes with Beijing’s favored narratives, and are arguably facilitated
by the open nature of democracies. The report also notes the PLA’s longstanding
‘three warfares’ concept, comprised of psychological warfare, public opinion
warfare, and legal warfare.
PLA Army
developments
The
report notes that the PLA accelerated its training and fielding of new
equipment through 2020, despite the negative impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Key
developments include:
Fielding
PCL-171 120 mm and PCL-181 155 155 mm self-propelled howitzers, as well as the
field testing of the Z-8L heavy-lift transport helicopter.
Holding
extensive joint training exercises through 2020, primarily focused on improving
the realism of training conditions.
Tanks
remain a laggard in terms of military modernization; around 40% of the PLA
Army’s tank force is between 20-40 years old. Infantry brigades also still use
outdated equipment.
PLA Navy developments
The PLA
Navy continues to feature prominently in China’s overall military
modernization. This is due to the importance of the PLA Navy in the context of
two of China’s territorial disputes – in the East China Sea, and the South
China Sea – and its central role in the event of a hypothetical clash with the
United States.
Key
developments include:
Unlike
the PLA Army, 2020 saw the PLA Navy being equipped with largely modern,
multi-role platforms.
The PLA
Navy now has 355 ships and submarines, 145 of which are major surface
combatants. There are plans currently in place to achieve a force structure of
460 ships by 2030, with growth primarily coming from new major surface
combatants. The United States, by comparison, will field 305 ships by the end
of 2021, and expects to increase its fleet size to 355 by 2049.
The PRC
commissioned its first domestically built aircraft carrier in late 2019, and
its first Renhai class cruiser in early 2020. A second domestically-built
carrier is expected to follow in 2024. Once deployed, the Renhai class (Type
055) will significantly bolster China’s anti-air and anti-ship capabilities around
the periphery; four such ships are expected to be deployed by the end of the
2020s.
The PLA
Navy deployed its second Yushen class amphibious assault ship (Type 075 LHA) in
2020, with a third now under construction. Though these ships would not tilt the
balance of power in a Taiwan-related conflict per se, they would hypothetically
be used to ferry over large amounts of PLA troops to occupy the island.
The PLA
Navy appears to be on the brink of being able to launch long-range cruise
missiles from submarines and surface combatants, enhancing long-range power
projection capabilities.
Anti-submarine
warfare has been identified as a short-term priority in order to enhance
protection of carriers and ballistic missile submarines.
Submarines
have also been a modernization priority; the PLA Navy now operates six
nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, six nuclear-powered attack subs,
and 45 diesel-powered attack subs. The plan is to maintain 65-70 subs through
the 2020s. By comparison, the US Navy currently operates 68 submarines.
PLA Air Force developments
Taken
together, the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) and the aviation wing of the PLA Navy
constitute the largest air force in the Indo-Pacific region. The PLAAF
specifically has been modernizing and expanding such that it is now considered
a formidable peer to Western air forces.
Key
developments include:
The PRC
has unveiled an airborne component to its nuclear deterrence in the form of the
H-6N bomber, a long-range aircraft that is nuclear capable and able to receive
air-to-air refueling.
The
PLAAF and PLA Navy now boast a combined 2,800 total aircraft (not including
UAVs), of which 2,250 are combat aircraft.
The
report notes that the PLAAF modernization program is “gradually eroding
longstanding and significant US military technical advantages vis-à-vis the PRC
in the air domain.”
The
PLAAF’s UAV program has been expanding rapidly, and the 2018 Zhuhai Air Show
revealed a wide variety of new offensive and surveillance platforms.
The
PLAAF now has one of the largest long-range SAM systems in the world, composed
of Russian S-300 battalions and the domestically-produced HQ-9s. Recently, the
air force acquired one newer S-400 system from Russia.
PLA Rocket Force developments
The PLA
Rocket Force (PLARF) is the wing responsible for the PRC’s land-based nuclear
and conventional missile forces. It has long been a priority in modernization
programs due to the importance of an initial ballistic missile strike in the
event of a hypothetical attack on Taiwan.
Key
developments include:
The
PLARF’s inventory of DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missiles continues to
grow. The platform is capable of conventional and nuclear strikes on ground and
naval targets at ranges as far out as 5,000 km.
New
ICBMs are being tested that will quantitatively and qualitatively improve
China’s nuclear deterrence. Three new ICBM silo fields are currently under
construction, and the number of land-based ICBMs that could strike the United
States is expected to grow to 200 in the next five years.