A month and a half ago, right after the attempted Wagner coup, there appeared to be chaos in Moscow, with the future of President Vladimir Putin in question. There were indications of some movement toward negotiations in the war. Some of those contacts were public. The director of the CIA, while on a visit to Ukraine, had an extended telephone conversation with the head of Russian intelligence. What was said is unknown, but it is unlikely that the two intelligence chiefs spoke without prior discussion at lower levels. Given the nature of this war, it’s unlikely that contact between Russia and the United States, however trivial and ineffective, hasn’t been underway throughout.
The war
appeared to have two limits. The United States would not deploy significant
force in Ukraine or fire on Russian forces. The Russians would attack Ukrainian
forces but not American supply depots in Poland. This meant that the war would
not pit Russian and U.S. forces directly against each other, continuing the
understanding in place since 1945, overwhelmingly but not absolutely honored.
Strategic combat would be between Ukraine, supplied by the U.S., and Russia.
That agreement holds and limits the global risks in the war. It may have just
worked out that way, but I expect some explicit understanding was reached. The
Wagner incident must have worried Washington as to who was in control in Moscow
and raised questions about whether the understanding was still in place. The
transfer of Wagner fighters to Belarus and to Poland’s border must have
increased worries.
Two
things became unlikely: that Russia would destroy the Ukrainian army and occupy
Ukraine, and that Ukraine’s army would drive Russia out of Ukraine. The only
logical step is a negotiated settlement. The question is what that settlement
might consist of. The only logical settlement – on the surface, at least – is a
division of Ukraine. One option might be that Donbas, full of ethnic Russians
and on Russia’s border, is ceded to Moscow. But Ukraine cannot cede more – or
even this – because it reasonably doesn’t trust the Russians not to base a
force there and attack again in the future. The Russians will have a great deal
of trouble accepting this. They have lost much in the war, and returning with
only Donbas would be an insult to the dead and devastating to Putin. Ukraine
must have a militarily defensible boundary and a shallow concession. Russia
must validate the claim that it is a great power and can settle for far more
than Ukraine can concede. Each side must make a powerful move to convince the
other that a bad compromise is better than defeat.
I had
thought that Russia might launch a powerful offensive designed to shatter the
Ukrainian army and begin taking Ukrainian territory, forcing a settlement. I
was surprised that it did not do so. I then realized that the Russian army does
not have the ability to organize such an attack or to accept those kinds of
casualties. Putin used Wagner as a separate force because he understood the
limits of his enemy. When that blew up in his face, he realized what I missed:
that his military was in no position to launch a final assault, and that he was
in no position to negotiate.
Ukraine’s
problem is that it does not control most of its logistical system and its prime
supplier, the United States, has somewhat different if overlapping interests.
The Ukrainians’ goal is to defeat the Russians and regain all of Ukraine. The
American interest in defending Ukraine is both an end in itself and the means
toward another end. The U.S. must keep Russia from moving west and creating a
new and very costly cold war. The U.S. also wants to demonstrate to the world
that it is in a position to militarily participate in Ukraine’s defense so long
as Ukraine is prepared to defend itself. Another obvious object of the lesson
is China and its periphery, particularly Taiwan. In a way, this is the final
repudiation of the Vietnam model, where U.S. forces engaged in direct combat
because the South Vietnamese were unable or unwilling to. In Ukraine, the U.S.
avoided the body bags that came home during Vietnam and also showed the power
of logistical support.
If it is
accurate that Russia cannot launch a decisive ground attack, then it must do
something indirectly to drive a wedge between Ukraine and the United States.
The Kremlin knows that a full break is impossible, but a break on peace terms
may well be possible. One Russian strategy that is failing is supporting a
Vietnam-style antiwar movement in the United States. There is one, but it is
not as powerful as the Vietnam antiwar strategy was.
An
alternative is to drive a wedge between the U.S. and other allies. The U.S.
needs allies in the region, and pleasing Ukraine while alienating them is
unsupportable. The Russian decision to move vessels into the Black Sea achieved
two things. Ukraine is a major exporter of grains, and cutting off those grains
would cause problems in general and likely disaster in Africa. The Russians would
hope to shape this into international demand for a settlement, more on Russian
terms.
Their
other goal would be to split NATO. The Black Sea includes NATO states like
Romania. The presence of a small Russian fleet near its coast might force the
Romanians to demand that a settlement be reached. Both of these are strategies
of misdirection, used when direct power is not available. However, ships are
very vulnerable these days – to air power, missiles and drones. Thus, the
Ukrainians attacked Russian ships, sensing the importance not only of their
exports but also of showing the Americans that they remain a serious force. The
attacks also increase the sense of Russia’s vulnerability.
There
are, as I said, informal talks underway. The Russians must decide whether to
double down on the Black Sea strategy, seek another flank to hit or accept a
settlement that gains them little but does not humiliate them. It is a question
of how far Putin’s hubris goes and how secure he is.
***George
Friedman is an internationally recognized geopolitical forecaster and
strategist on international affairs and the founder and chairman of
Geopolitical Futures.
Dr.
Friedman is also a New York Times bestselling author. His most recent book, THE
STORM BEFORE THE CALM: America’s Discord, the Coming Crisis of the 2020s, and
the Triumph Beyond, published February 25, 2020 describes how “the United
States periodically reaches a point of crisis in which it appears to be at war
with itself, yet after an extended period it reinvents itself, in a form both
faithful to its founding and radically different from what it had been.” The
decade 2020-2030 is such a period which will bring dramatic upheaval and
reshaping of American government, foreign policy, economics, and culture.


His most
popular book, The Next 100 Years, is kept alive by the prescience of its
predictions. Other best-selling books include Flashpoints: The Emerging Crisis
in Europe, The Next Decade, America’s Secret War, The Future of War and The
Intelligence Edge. His books have been translated into more than 20 languages.
Dr.
Friedman has briefed numerous military and government organizations in the
United States and overseas and appears regularly as an expert on international
affairs, foreign policy and intelligence in major media. For almost 20 years
before resigning in May 2015, Dr. Friedman was CEO and then chairman of
Stratfor, a company he founded in 1996. Friedman received his bachelor’s degree
from the City College of the City University of New York and holds a doctorate
in government from Cornell University.
https://geopoliticalfutures.com/the-state-of-the-war-in-ukraine/?utm_source=GPF+Free+Newsletter&utm_campaign=ea5bb4022d-20230809_FL_Weekly&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_f716b3bf65-ea5bb4022d-265241590&mc_cid=ea5bb4022d&mc_eid=da98cf085a
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