Brazil has had a lot to celebrate recently. Its economy has been growing at a slow but healthy clip, thanks to prudent fiscal policies that have helped it weather the financial crisis better than many. The nation has taken on an increasingly important role in matters of regional diplomacy and has emerged as the de facto political and economic leader of Latin America. Foreign leaders as varied and diverse as U.S. President Barack Obama, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and South African President Jacob Zuma have all recently met with Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in efforts to strengthen diplomatic and economic ties. Everyone seems to want a piece of Brazil, including the International Olympic Committee, which awarded Rio de Janeiro the 2016 Olympic Games earlier this month.
But ever since Oct. 17, the spotlight has been on Rio de Janeiro -- and Brazil -- for all the wrong reasons. Just two weeks after the Olympic Games announcement, a deadly fight between rival drug cartels broke out in the city's Morro dos Macacos favela, resulting in more than 40 deaths, the destruction of 10 buses, and the takedown of a police helicopter. The goodwill generated by Rio's surprising Olympics victory inevitably turned to questions regarding safety. Gruesome images and video in local media of the chopped up remains of a man left in a shopping cart, and a video showing police robbing stolen property from two thieves while ignoring the original owner and victim as he lay dying on the ground, gave the impression of uncontrollable violence and police corruption.
With international attention at a peak, Brazil is taking the security issue seriously. The government of Rio de Janeiro plans to add 47 police stations to various favelas -- of which there are more than 1,000 -- by 2010. On Oct. 27 , the federal government announced plans to increase spending to $142.6 million by the end of this year to bolster Rio's police force -- more than doubling the initial budgeting. Brazilian Justice Minister Tarso Genro called for stricter punishment for drug dealers, while Rio de Janeiro's Secretary of Security José Mariano Beltrame recently called the fighting that took place on Oct. 17, "our Sept. 11."
Yet questions remain, not only as to whether the amount budgeted for security will be sufficient, but whether it will actually arrive and be put to good use. Not all of the money set aside for law enforcement in Brazil actually goes for that purpose. In 2009, for example, only 13 percent of the $54.8 million set aside to modernize the Brazilian police force has actually reached its final destination.
Unlike the Sept. 11 attacks in New York, the Oct. 17 firefight in Rio between the Comando Vermelho and Amigos dos Amigos is an ordinary occurrence. Rio's drug gangs frequently battle each other for control of distribution zones in the city's multimillion-dollar market for illicit drugs. Rio's elite police force occasionally enter the favelas in efforts to crack down on the drug gangs operating there. But because the police do not stay and the attacks often result in the deaths of innocent bystanders, the efforts result in few long-term changes, while breeding contempt for the police among favela residents, says John Fitzpatrick, a São Paulo-based writer and consultant. Corruption and ties between law enforcement and narcotraffickers also impede progress, Fitzpatrick says.
Crime also remains a real threat for Rio de Janeiro's inhabitants outside the favelas. Earlier this week, Mayor Eduardo Paes told the Financial Times that his concern over security is not limited to the Olympic Games and World Cup (to be held in Brazil in 2014), but includes day-to-day violence as well. But not all of Rio's residents are convinced. One, who asked not to be identified, is skeptical about how much long-term impact the security measures will have. "Sending troops to the streets or increasing money on security does not address the underlying issues of social inequality, lack of jobs, education, health care, and housing that are at the root of the violence."
Samuel Novacich, a 2008-2009 Fulbright Research Grantee in Rio de Janeiro, also questions the effectiveness of sending in troops to quell the violence. "During the Pan Am Games [held in Rio de Janeiro in July 2007], the city brought in the recently created National Police Force and the Brazilian Army to combat drug traffickers. The result was disastrous. The worst day of fighting saw 26 deaths, many of whom were civilians."
These harsh domestic realities contrast with Brazil's image of success and progress. Though its rise as a regional diplomatic leader has not been without rough spots, Lula has by and large demonstrated diplomatic prowess at putting the country in a positive light. As a result, Brazil's increasing global influence is not likely to be derailed by one internationally publicized incident, no matter how violent.
But the events of Oct. 17 call attention to the gap that exists between Brazil's rising global image and local reality. Beneath the veneer, Brazil still faces many social problems that cannot be solved by money alone. It is not the first Olympic country to face this image gap. Many analysts viewed the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games as China's official arrival on the world stage. Yet, the suppression of dissenters and other domestic issues remained a constant leitmotif behind the magnificence of the opening ceremony and China's flawless execution of the games.
As Brazil continues -- in the words of La Nación, a leading Argentine daily -- to "seduce the world," it must also pay attention to internal issues of security, inequality, and justice. In that effort, its greatest challenge in delivering real change for its citizens may not be its inability to control the violence in Rio de Janeiro, but rather its inability to control the actions of its own police force and formal justice system.
**Eliot Brockner is a New York-based media analyst and writer. He is a regular contributor to LatAmThought.
