Four years ago, on the eve of presidential elections in 2007, much of this uncertainty did not exist or had not yet become apparent. At the time, the question was not who would win the election, but rather which Kirchner would subsequently rule: outgoing President Nestor Kirchner or his trusted political adviser and wife Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, who was poised to win the office. High global commodity prices and a refusal to pay close to $100 billion in debts to international creditors had helped Nestor stabilize the Argentine economy and consolidate political control to pave the way for his wife's election to the presidency. 

The decision to cancel debt payments was enormously popular at home, but isolated Argentina and allowed its president to be characterized abroad as aloof and unpredictable. That was expected to change with Christina Kirchner at the helm. She was considered more of a stateswoman, and was expected to bolster Argentina's ties with key neighbors in the Americas, particularly neighbors in South America. The May 2010 appointment of Nestor Kirchner as the secretary-general of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), a regional bloc, strengthened that position. 

Christina Kirchner's political honeymoon was brief, however. Almost immediately after her election, she was implicated in a scandal over allegations that she received illegal campaign contributions from Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez. Roughly three months into her presidency, she ordered a tariff increase on agricultural exports, inciting a row with Argentina's powerful agricultural sector that lasted for more than a year and cost the Argentine economy billions of dollars. Conflicts in early 2010 with the urban lower class, her traditional base, over inclusion in unemployment benefits only worsened her popularity among Argentines. Her approval ratings immediately plummeted and were consistently among the worst in the hemisphere. 

The combination of the couple's political style, policies, and tactics, as well as their dominance and penchant for increasing executive control gave rise to a new political movement, Kirchnerismo, a variant of popular left-leaning Peronism that has been one of the dominant forces in Argentine politics since 2003. Reacting to the alienation produced by Kirchnerismo, Argentine political factions formed ties based on shared disdain for the divisive movement. Presidential hopeful Eduardo Duhalde led a split within the Kirchners' ruling Justicialist Party. Other powerful anti-Kirchner factions from the traditional center and center-right opposition were also successful at harming the public image of both Christina Kirchner and Kirchnerismo. 

The sudden death of Nestor Kirchner in October 2010 largely changed that. Christina Kirchner now enjoys an approval rating of more than 50 percent. December polls show her leading in election polls, and that 59 percent view her as a good candidate. Although she is expected to run, she has not yet publicly declared whether she will seek re-election in 2011. Currently, five candidates have officially launched their campaigns, with the conservative mayor of Buenos Aires, Mauricio Macri, also a political heavyweight, expected to run as well. 

The mudslinging has already begun. Cristina Kirchner blamed December social unrest in Buenos Aires on Macri and Duhalde. Meanwhile, a dispute over the 2011 budget remains unresolved, with opposition leaders claiming that as proposed, the budget would give the president too much additional discretionary spending during an election year. Debt repayments set in the budget's guidelines have also generated controversy. As a result, Argentina enters 2011 without an approved budget, instead relying on the 2010 budget for guidance. Opposition leaders claim this still gives the president too much room to spend freely, and also argue that the budget does not do enough to control inflation. These types of accusations are likely to intensify as elections get closer. 

Though Nestor Kirchner's death provided an initial boost to the sagging popularity of Kirchnerismo, there is reason to believe it may not last. Nestor Kirchner was seen as the strength of the movement, and his clout as head of the Justicialist Party and secretary-general of UNASUR made him and his brand of Peronist politics powerful at home. Many expected him to run instead of Cristina de Kirchner this year. Without him, it is not clear the movement has the backbone to survive the myriad attacks coming from both within the Justicialist Party and from outside.

By contrast, Nestor Kirchner's death will likely not have a significant impact on Argentine foreign policy. Brazil has firmly established itself as the regional leader on international issues and regional integration. A revived dispute with the United Kingdom over sovereignty of the Falkland Islands was largely viewed negatively by the international community, and foreign investors remain wary in spite of an economic growth rate of 8.4 percent this year and a surplus of more than $5 billion in reserves. 

Yet Argentina's long list of domestic problems will remain the dominant concern for the new president. Recent progress made with private international creditors, the IMF and the Inter-American Development Bank are positive signs that Argentina may be beginning to open back up after a long period of introspection. However, with 2011 a pivotal election year, political infighting may eclipse some of these gains. 

**Eliot Brockner is a Latin America analyst for iJET Intelligent Risk Systems. He is a regular contributor to LatAmThought.