That marked the beginning of a lengthy power struggle between Zelaya and interim President Roberto Michelletti that thrust the small Central American nation into the international spotlight.

Lobo's inauguration definitively answers the question of who will be president of Honduras in 2010, and closes some lingering chapters from the crisis. Under a deal brokered with the incoming government, all military officials involved in Zelaya's removal were exonerated from any resulting charges that are still pending. In turn, Zelaya, who had been staying in the Brazilian Embassy in Tegucigalpa since September under threat of arrest, was granted safe passage to the Dominican Republic, along with his immediate family.

Nevertheless, a significant amount of work lays ahead for Lobo's government, which is under pressure from many governments in the region -- as well as the Organization of American States -- to carry out a full-scale investigation into the events of last year, in order to make sure that a repeat scenario is avoided. The new Honduran government is now delicately engaging regional governments, while forging a new path that it hopes will lead the nation away from the debacle that characterized the nation's politics in the latter half of 2009. Lobo has already met with Colombian President Álvaro Uribe to discuss security issues, and he met with high-ranking members of the U.S. State Department days after his inauguration.

Other foreign leaders haven't been so welcoming. Bolivia, Ecuador and emerging regional leader Brazil have all said they will not recognize the new government, claiming it was elected under an illegitimate regime. Though Brazil has hinted it is close to reconsidering that position, the polarizing nature of the conflict -- which Lobo's inauguration was supposed to have closed -- could set the stage for a prolonged stalemate.

As a result, Honduras -- which is in desperate need of political unity to accomplish the daunting tasks ahead of it -- risks being pulled apart by the competing international factions looking to stake their claim in regional politics. This is precisely what characterized the country's preceding seven months of political conflict, causing many ordinary Hondurans to suffer, and there are a number of immediate reasons why Honduras -- and its people -- can no longer afford to let such a situation to continue.

The first is money. Honduras is one of the poorest nations in the Americas, a problem exacerbated by seven months of political paralysis. In the wake of slowdowns in manufacturing and commodity exports as well as tourism, the nation's GDP fell 2.5 percent in 2009 -- 32 percent below the regional average as predicted by the U.N. commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. Additionally, the international condemnation of the manner in which Michelletti came to power, which many analysts and foreign leaders believed bore too close a resemblance to Latin American coups of years past, resulted in the withholding of foreign aid from disapproving governments, punishing poor Hondurans more than the government.

The second is safety. Frozen by political infighting, Honduras made for a more attractive link in the northbound supply chain for international drug-trafficking organizations and local organized crime alike. Their continued presence has transformed Honduras into one of the most violent nations in Central America. Reports of kidnappings and muggings in broad daylight are daily reminders of the dangers now facing urban populations throughout the country, especially in the major cities of San Pedro Sula and Tegucigalpa.

Lastly, education and job creation are also immediate concerns the new government must tackle. In October 2009, schools shut down during a strike triggered by the powerful teachers' union -- a lobby that was loyal to Zelaya and instrumental in his 2005 election -- following a dispute with Michelletti's interim government. Jobs in the manufacturing sector that were lost during the economic crisis are not guaranteed to return, and a recent increase in the minimum wage may push the number of unemployed even higher.

Restoration of the Honduras' political system and an honest accounting of the events of the past seven months are important. But for Hondurans' sake, the country's new government should resist caving in to external pressures and instead focus on translating the international attention the nation is receiving into help for rebuilding the country and addressing the pressing issues it currently faces. The new government must also avoid falling prey to internal bickering and the impossible task of trying to please everyone.

The establishment of an investigative commission and a promise to make sure violent power-grabs are a thing of the past is crucial to Honduras' long-term success. However, the government must also consider the opportunity cost of political reconciliation. Every day spent working toward a resolution of the irreconcilable differences of the past is a day less spent on improving the plight of ordinary Hondurans' future. Having put a difficult 2009 behind it, Honduras' primary objective must be assuring its future.

**Eliot Brockner is a New York-based media analyst and writer. He is a regular contributor to LatAmThought.