Though the decision to send Makled to Venezuela appears to be final, the political implications of his extradition from Colombia -- where he was arrested in August 2010 -- have just begun to ripple around the region and in Washington. 

The controversy surrounding Makled, suspected of being one of the region's most powerful brokers in the drug trade, stems from what he knows: Makled claims he has information and video evidence proving that high-ranking military and civilian officials in the Chavez government are involved in drug trafficking. Venezuela has long been known to be an important transshipment route for illegal drugs bound for Central America, Mexico, the United States and Europe, and many analysts have suspected that this has been made possible by the tacit agreement of Chavez government officials. 

Top U.S. officials have expressed disappointment at Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos' decision to extradite Makled to Venezuela. Makled has said that he will not cooperate with Venezuelan authorities, and has gone on the record saying he will divulge information only if extradited to the United States. As a result, Santos' decision has come under fire from many in Washington and Bogota tasked with fighting the war on drugs. U.S. and Colombian officials worry that if Makled is sent to Venezuela, both sides will lose an invaluable source on the drug war and terrorist financing. Makled is suspected of possessing a wealth of information related to local drug-trafficking routes as well as ties between criminal groups in the Americas and terrorist organizations in the Middle East.

Whichever way he decided, Santos was sure to upset either Venezuela or the United States. Extradition to the U.S. ran the risk of undermining the significant diplomatic progress made with Venezuela over the past nine months. It may also have potentially hurt Colombia's ties with the rest of the region, where the decision would have been perceived as proof that Colombia remains beholden to U.S. interests. Meanwhile, the extradition to Venezuela is certain to upset the United States and could hinder attempts to pass a free trade agreement (FTA) that has been stalled in the U.S. Congress since its inception in 2006. 

Caught in this politically tricky situation, Santos opted to stand on the legal precedent of his decision, emphasizing that it was approved first by the Supreme Court of Colombia; is in accordance with the order in which the extradition requests were received; and is therefore compliant with Colombian law. He has denied any ulterior political motive for the final decision of where to extradite Makled.

Yet the political ramifications of his decision, whether intentional or not, are very real for Bogota's relations with both Washington and Colombia's neighbors in Latin America. In addition to the technical and legal rhetoric, there may be another reason for sending Makled to Venezuela: Santos wants to shift Colombia's relationship with the U.S. from one based primarily on the war on drugs to one based on shared economic interests. By extraditing Makled to Venezuela, Santos not only upholds the position of respecting Colombian law above all other considerations, he is also able to demonstrate his disappointment with U.S. officials for failing to approve the FTA, thereby highlighting the importance of the agreement to Colombian-U.S. relations.

Additionally, if Santos ordered Makled to the U.S., it would have removed a potential bargaining chip in the push toward approving the FTA. The Santos administration may have seen extradition to Venezuela as the lesser of two evils, since compliance with U.S. requests for Makled would not necessarily have guaranteed the agreement's passage. Colombians have long sought approval for the deal, and Washington's lagging response has led to disillusionment among Colombia's business and political elites toward the United States. 

Yet, on April 6, two weeks after the Colombian Supreme Court decided to approve Makled's transfer to Venezuela, a breakthrough was announced that put the FTA back on the U.S. Congress' agenda, with some U.S. business leaders predicting passage as early as July. Worryingly for Santos, though, on April 18, a letter written by two U.S. congressmen, one of whom had been in Bogota that week for a hearing on approval of the agreement, appeared in the press, warning Santos that failure to send Makled to the U.S. could jeopardize the deal. 

Looking beyond the trade agreement, Santos' decision to extradite Makled to Venezuela shows the rest of the region -- and the world -- that Colombia is distancing itself from the extremely close relationship with the U.S. forged during the administration of the previous Colombian president, Alvaro Uribe. The move sends the message that Santos is committed to improving ties and cooperation with Venezuela, while also underscoring that Washington is no longer the only game in town. For Santos, who has been trying to improve diplomacy with Colombia's neighbors, this is an opportunity to follow through on his commitment to improving regional relations -- with Venezuela and others. 

There is strategic importance to the decision as well. Although the U.S. is an extremely important ally in the war on drugs, Colombia also needs its South American neighbors -- Venezuela, Ecuador and Brazil -- to help address the problem. Additionally, although ties between Colombia and the U.S. are strong enough to withstand Makled's extradition to Venezuela, the opposite may not be true: Sending Makled to New York may have reversed the recent improvements in relations and vital bilateral trade with Venezuela. Whichever the case, the move marks a clear shift in Colombian policy, highlighted by the fact that Uribe, normally silent on presidential decisions, opined publicly that Santos should have extradited Makled to the United States. 

**Eliot Brockner is a Latin America analyst for iJET Intelligent Risk Systems. He is a regular contributor to LatAmThought.