The immediate cause of the violence was Decree 03-2010. Issued by Ortega in January 2010, the decree allows for a number of public functionaries -- ranging from Supreme Court judges to congressmen and electoral commissioners allied with Ortega's Sandinista Party (FSLN) -- to remain in power beyond their 2010 term limits. 

Not to be denied by Ortega's supporters, the Nicaraguan opposition met at a Holiday Inn on April 20, where they formed a quorum and overturned the controversial decree.

But Decree 03-2010 is just one of many highly divisive issues that have marred Ortega's second term as president. Since the former left-wing guerrilla leader assumed office in 2007, members of the opposition have accused him of abusing power and attempting to illegally alter the constitution for his political benefit. The charges range from accusations of electoral fraud during 2008 municipal elections to complaints over Ortega's decision to convene the Supreme Court of Justice during a recess period in October 2009. The court subsequently issued a ruling amending the constitution, in order to allow Ortega to run for re-election in 2011. Many argue that the only reason the ruling passed was due to the timing of the session: Because the court was in recess, many anti-Ortega justices who may have voted against the ruling were not present. 

Meanwhile, divisions between Nicaragua's opposition coalition and ruling government continue to widen, as reflected in their respective stances about what role the Organization of American States should play in Nicaragua's current political standoff. On April 26, members of the FSLN rejected the notion of OAS intervention. Four days later, members of the opposition asked the organization to intervene. On May 5, Ortega refused to show up at a hearing where he was expected to defend Decree 03-2010 before congress, claiming that the ruling overturning his decree was unconstitutional. The decision about the decree's legality now rests in the hands of the Supreme Court. 

As the OAS continues to debate the future of Honduras following that country's political crisis of June 2009, the fate of many Nicaraguan institutions hang in a state of precarious limbo, with little public indication from the international community about if and how it will respond. In all likelihood sensitive to the tenuous state of Nicaraguan political institutions, the OAS has largely remained quiet about what it intends to do. Other Latin American governments, such as emerging regional leader Brazil and Nicaragua's closest ally, Venezuela, have also been silent about Nicaragua's institutional crisis. 

Venezuela has a number of commercial ties to Nicaragua, including in the media and oil sectors, and its president, Hugo Chavez, shares many ideological similarities with Ortega. Given the economic and political unity between the two countries and a recent history of close mutual cooperation, it is likely that Venezuela will continue to support Ortega's government. Brazil, which has been vocal about refusing to attend an upcoming EU-Latin America summit if Honduran President Porfirio Lobo attends, may adopt a similar view, especially if Ortega is forcibly removed from power in anything but a constitutional procedure. 

Nevertheless, a repeat scenario of what happened in Honduras nearly a year ago does not seem as likely. In spite of a popularity rating hovering around 30 percent, Ortega remains a powerful figure in Nicaraguan politics. Former Honduran President Manuel Zelaya was ousted by the military, which, following a number of high-profile dismissals in the days leading up to Zelaya's June 28 removal from office, was no longer loyal to him. Ortega, however, is close allies with Nicaragua's top general, Julio Cesar Aviles, and recently gave the military extra funding. 

Additionally, although the opposition coalition is united in its distaste for Ortega, it is also deeply mistrusted by many Nicaraguans. Its constituent parties clearly have political incentives to try to use Ortega's power grab as a boon for their own candidacies. On May 6, for instance, a leading opposition candidate and former president, Arnoldo Aleman, announced his intention to run for president in 2011.

Foreign aid may also play a role in deciding Nicaragua's immediate political future. Honduras lost millions in funding as a result of its crisis, and as a result, the government's coffers are now nearly empty. Nicaragua will try to avoid the same fate. However, some nations have already suspended funding or increased restrictions, indicating that political stalemate may be just as harmful for the nation's economy. 

One thing is certain. As tensions continue to mount and the divide between the opposition coalition and Ortega grows wider, something will have to give. Though there is currently no date set for a ruling, the Supreme Court could help decide the country's political future. A ruling against Ortega, however, would not be set in stone.

**Eliot Brockner is a Latin America analyst for iJET Intelligent Risk Systems. He is a regular contributor to LatAmThought.