The U.S. efforts are geared toward getting Pakistan back on track in its role as a frontline state in the fight against jihadists. Washington was hoping Bhutto would work out a power-sharing agreement with President Pervez Musharraf and that they, along with new army chief Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, would form a civil-military regime made up of moderate forces that could effectively combat rising extremism and terrorism in the country. Though this was not an outright solution, it had the potential to be the starting point for other solutions. Not that this would have been an effective alignment of forces, but it was the best option given the circumstances.

From the U.S. viewpoint, stability in Pakistan is important because the country plays a critical role in U.S.-NATO efforts to combat the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan. Futhermore, over the last five years Pakistan has emerged as the global headquarters of al Qaeda. The United States realized that Musharraf on his own is unable to deal with a growing crisis of governance in the country, much less with Islamist militancy. The solution was to bring Bhutto’s PPP into the system in order to stabilize it.

Of the three key pillars of the U.S. plan for restoring political stability in Pakistan, the only one not already in place was eliminated by Bhutto’s assassination, and it is likely the hardest to replace. This is a victory for the jihadists, who require that Pakistan descend into chaos — a condition that allows them to flourish. Bhutto’s death not only eliminates a potentially serious threat to the jihadists but also creates an opportunity for them.

This raises the question of whether there is an alternative plan to ensure the country does not become an arena for extremists to thrive in. Obviously the first order of business is to contain the unrest, which is the fallout from Bhutto’s killing. This task will be extremely difficult, to say the least.

Ultimately once the dust of unrest settles, the country’s military establishment and the United States will need an alternative civilian leader to work with. Any election that is free and fair, whenever it is held, could result in a PPP majority, especially now that the party will receive the sympathy vote because of Bhutto’s death. But a PPP sans Bhutto (the party since its founding in the late 1960s has always been led by a Bhutto) is facing a crisis of leadership.

In the meantime, Nawaz Sharif, another former two-time prime minister and one who was ousted from power by Musharraf, will try to emerge as the country’s main political leader. But Sharif’s problem is that his Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz is mostly limited to the province of Punjab, and is therefore a much smaller political force than the PPP. What we are looking at is an increasing fragmentation of the Pakistani political landscape.

Bhutto’s death has created a challenge for the United States in that it no longer has a coherent political force that could act as a partner in its efforts to contain extremism and terrorism. All eyes are now on the Pakistani military. The question is whether it can reach a modus vivendi with the country’s sundry political forces and steer the country away from political chaos and religious militancy.